

ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY

Second Series

DUALISM AND MONISM

AND OTHER ESSAYS

DUALISM AND MONISM

AND OTHER ESSAYS

BY

JOHN VEITCH, M.A.

HON. LL.D. (EDIN.)

LATE PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF GLASGOW

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

R. M. WENLEY

M.A. (GLAS.), D.Sc. (EDIN.)

FORMERLY ASSISTANT TO THE PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

MDCCXCV

PREFATORY NOTE.

IN fulfilling the melancholy duty of investigating the large quantity of MSS. left by the late Professor Veitch, I have been greatly aided by information which he gave me six weeks before his death. Inspection of his papers confirmed his verbally expressed opinion of them in nearly all particulars.

The essay printed here under the title "Dualism and Monism" was left ready for publication, and is reproduced without essential change.

Another work, of a much more extended character, had been so far drafted. It was intended to embody a history of the leading doctrines of Greek Philosophy with special reference to the theory that the history of philosophy is a record

of "progress by antagonism." As Mr Veitch had himself indicated to me, this MS., although of considerable length, is not wrought out in detail, and is therefore not in a condition to warrant publication. The opening chapter, purely general in nature, nevertheless presented signs of revision, and it forms the second essay in this volume.

The third essay, which many consider one of the best examples of its author's constructive writing, was originally published in *Wordsworthiana*, a series of papers selected from the Transactions of the Wordsworth Society. By the courteous permission of Professor Knight, the Editor, and of Messrs Macmillan & Co., the Publishers, which I desire gratefully to acknowledge, it is reprinted here.

At Mrs Veitch's request I have prefixed a brief Introduction. Of its inadequacy no one can be more sensible than myself.

R. M. WENLEY.

QUEEN MARGARET COLLEGE,
GLASGOW, 27th April 1895.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
LIST OF PROFESSOR VEITCH'S WORKS . . .	ix
INTRODUCTION ; PROFESSOR VEITCH'S POSITION IN PHILOSOPHY	xi
AUTHOR'S PREFACE	xli
DUALISM AND MONISM—	
I. REALISM AND COMMON-SENSE	3
II. PHENOMENON ; PHENOMENALISM	21
III. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THINGS	49
IV. BEING AND LAW	76
V. PHENOMENAL MONADISM	87
HISTORY, AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY—	
I. HISTORY, AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY	119
II. HEGEL'S VIEW.	136
III. WHAT REMAINS OF THE HEGELIAN VIEW ? .	154
THE THEISM OF WORDSWORTH	175

LIST OF PROFESSOR VEITCH'S WORKS.

1850. Descartes' 'Discourse on Method.' Translated with an Introduction.
1853. Descartes' 'Meditations,' and Selections from 'The Principles of Philosophy.' Translated with Notes and an Appendix.
1857. Memoir of Dugald Stewart.
- 1859-60. Sir William Hamilton's 'Lectures on Metaphysics' and 'Lectures on Logic.' Edited conjointly with Dean Mansel. Four volumes.
1864. Speculative Philosophy : an Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Glasgow.
1869. Memoir of Sir William Hamilton.
1872. Hillside Rhymes.
1875. The Tweed and other Poems.
1875. Lucretius and the Atomic Theory.
1877. The History and Poetry of the Scottish Border.
(*Out of print.*)
1879. Descartes' 'Method,' 'Meditations,' and Selections from 'The Principles of Philosophy.' Trans-

X LIST OF PROFESSOR VEITCH'S WORKS.

- lated with a new Introduction, Appendix, and
Notes. (Now in its tenth edition.)
1879. Hamilton : Blackwood's Philosophical Classics Series.
1884. Hamilton—the Man and His Philosophy : two Lectures delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution.
1885. Institutes of Logic.
1886. The Theism of Wordsworth : Transactions of the Wordsworth Society. (*Wordsworthiana*, 1889.)
1887. The Feeling for Nature in Scottish Poetry. Two volumes.
1889. Merlin and other Poems.
1889. Knowing and Being. Essays in Philosophy. First Series.
1893. The History and Poetry of the Scottish Border. (New and greatly enlarged Edition.) Two volumes.
1895. Dualism and Monism ; History, and the History of Philosophy ; The Theism of Wordsworth. Essays in Philosophy. Second Series.
- (*In preparation.*) Border Essays, with a Memoir and Portrait.

INTRODUCTION.

PROFESSOR VEITCH'S POSITION IN PHILOSOPHY.

UNIQUE though his strong personality was, Professor Veitch's life presents none of those dramatic incidents, so called, which are calculated to startle or arrest the general public. He was a pure scholar and thinker, singularly devoid of craving either for fame or for any of the more solid rewards that sometimes fall to the lot of men of high intellectual attainments. Diffident in temperament, when not aroused by a sense of duty, and essentially shy—a feature which was concealed, as with many similarly constituted, by a certain brusqueness of manner—his services to his university, to his colleagues and others, and to several public associations, have not become known as they otherwise might. It was sufficient

for him, to take an example, that the exceptionally valuable library of his master, Sir William Hamilton, should pass into the safe keeping of Glasgow University, without any special recognition or record of his part in the transference. No doubt it was better thus. For, although many details which might redound to his credit are consequently wanting, the interest of his life concentrates itself upon his position as what one may term *ultimus Scotorum*.

A Borderer by birth and by affectionately nurtured lifelong association, entirely Scotch by academic training, Mr Veitch had been fitted beyond most to appreciate the conditions and requirements of a Scottish philosophical professorship. "The interest and eagerness of the Scotch student," he writes, "the large class, the sympathy of numbers, the readiness for hard thought, and the disinterestedness of feeling, are the elements on which the Professor is privileged to work. He has the opportunity, simply by the character of his prelections from the chair, of quickening and inspiring his students in philosophical studies, and giving them a connected, comprehensive, and systematic view of his depart-

ment—such as can be accomplished equally well under no other arrangement. If he fail to do this, the fault is his own.” His sense of the value of this arrangement in the past was the secret of his untiring hostility to any but the most circumspectly considered changes. From his own experience of it also arose his deep feeling for the *personnel* of his classes. Few could have felt more sympathetically for the students. In his own life he had learned their varied and peculiar difficulties—their frequent poverty, their occasional lack of preparation, their sometimes misdirected zeal. Yearning is the word which best conveys his attitude. And thus it was that, in spite of the undoubted unpopularity of the philosophy which he taught, there was no one to whom, in later life, former pupils more readily turned when they stood in need either of material assistance or of advice. Within the class-room his teaching, partly on account of its extremely critical character, did not exercise dominating influence. But, after they had gone out from the artificially restricted academic sphere and had battled with the world for a time, those who had heard him were quick to acknowledge his chasten-

ing power ; his practical reverence and shrewd caution came back for judgment, and, be it said, for comfort to the men who, as students, had been unaffected by his acuteness.

Although in no way disposed to magnify his office, Mr Veitch had unrivalled knowledge of the history of the Philosophical Department as an integral factor in the course at the Scottish universities. He was proud of the names which had adorned it, and was correspondingly tenacious of what he conceived to be its interests and rights. "In the Universities of Scotland at the present day, after all the changes of constitution which they have undergone during four hundred years," he says, "the subject of Mental Philosophy occupies, if not an exclusive, at least a very prominent place in the curriculum of Arts. For the degree of Master of Arts this department constitutes a proportion of requirements such as is not found in Oxford, Cambridge, or Trinity College, Dublin. The teaching of Mental Philosophy is addressed to a class of students of an age considerably higher, as a rule, than that of those who undergo the classical training. The Scottish Universities must,

therefore, be judged as well by the relative merits of Mental Philosophy as a study and discipline, and by the way in which it is taught, as by any comparison of them with Universities which aim exclusively, or even mainly, at reaching a high standard in classics or mathematics. Any criticism of the Scottish University system, or proposed reform of it, which ignores or underestimates the historical and actual place of Mental Philosophy as an essential part of its discipline, is neither intelligent nor just." It is pleasing, but pathetic, to think that Mr Veitch's last course of lectures was given during the last session in which the Logic class at Glasgow met under the conditions to which he makes reference above. One is glad to know that the changes which the order, now beginning, must inevitably work upon the place of philosophy at our universities cannot trouble him. But it is pathetic that his profound grasp of the historical circumstances, wide personal experience, and tenacity of purpose should be unavailable during this critical period of passage from old to new. • They would have been wisely exercised in support of a favourite thesis—the importance

of the philosophical department as an instrument for general education as opposed to "paying" specialisms. Perhaps no one was in a better position to urge this. For Mr Veitch, if the last representative of one type of Scottish professor, reverted in many ways to the characteristics of the more ancient Regents, whose duties led them to teach several subjects. His attainments in literature, in archæology, and in philology are too well known to need comment. Some few may not be aware of his historical and classical scholarship, which, indeed, were the necessary accompaniments of his accurate knowledge in those bypaths of philosophy for the moderns—the Treatises of Aristotle and of the Scholastic Doctors.

A Scot, then, by ancestry, by training, and in his public career, Mr Veitch was to a large extent national in his cast of thought. When he entered the University of Edinburgh, Wilson (Christopher North) was Professor of Moral Philosophy, Hamilton of Logic and Metaphysics, and Aytoun of Rhetoric. But, despite the imaginative fervour of the first and the fine perception of the last, Hamilton's influence became the main de-

termining element in the pupil's thought; and its force was naturally increased when the student came to be more closely associated with his teacher as Assistant in the Chair of Logic.

It is far from easy, even within forty years of Hamilton's death, sympathetically to reconstruct, as it were, the secret of his masterful formative power. The old problems, truly, still clamour for solution; but the generation that takes its science from Darwin, its psychology from Romanes and Wundt, its metaphysic from the Kantians, its poetry from Goethe and Browning, regards the great questions from a standpoint so peculiarly its own that they appear to be wholly altered. The more pressing the need, then, to revert to the stirring Edinburgh decade of '46 to '56. The salient points, at least, may be recalled.¹

Upon the available historical evidence, it is an exaggeration to say with some that philosophy was dead in Scotland till Hamilton brought it

¹ I gladly acknowledge here my obligations to Professor Calderwood, of Edinburgh University, Professor Veitch's fellow-student, and lifelong friend, who has attempted, in conversation, to impart something of the spirit of this period to me,

ton's analytic of consciousness by a study of Descartes. What he acquired in general from the "Father of modern philosophy," he now obtained in special applications from his new teacher. By reason of his greater maturity and wider preparatory reading, he was in a better position than his fellow-students to react upon Hamilton's instruction. The tendency to concentrate attention upon the "thinking thing," engendered by Mr Veitch's study of Descartes, was thus confirmed by Hamilton, and became the chief formative element in nearly all his later thought. Greatly as he may have admired Hamilton's contributions to logic, which, as an enthusiastic disciple has said, "certainly accomplished more for the science than has been done by any one man since Aristotle," and much as he may have been induced by his opportunities as Assistant to value them, they never were the real source of inspiration. Latterly, too—I mean during the last ten years—Mr Veitch would never have defended Hamilton's metaphysic, even if, as he occasionally hinted with a twinkle of the eye, he could have given a consistent account of its leading principle. Further, Hamilton's psychol-

ogical teaching found a mind prepared for it, not only by previous reflection, but also by natural bent. Analysis rather than synthesis, induction rather than deduction, are the methods which the old psychology, from Descartes to Hamilton, favoured. The tendency to separate and to set forth in succession rather than to organise and regard as a developing whole is characteristic of the mind in which the critical faculty predominates. From the outset and till the last, Mr Veitch's mind was critical; and there can be little question that this natural tendency was fostered and confirmed by the methods with which he became familiar under Hamilton. That a spirit so poetical and artistic, so reverential and even mystical, should have been linked in one personality with an intellect so masterfully acute is the problem, as it is the fascination, of his character. And, passing now from Hamilton's influence, the prevalent features of Mr Veitch's thought may be traced to the interaction of these two distinctive yet co-ordinate leanings.

Like poetry, philosophical reflection may be regarded as an essential expression of life. It appears later, and often settles, or attempts to

settle, the accounts which poetry has incurred. Accordingly, its interest is commonly either living or no more than historical. When a philosophy is said to be unpopular, what is implied is that the problems which it attacks do not press hard at the moment, or that other aspects of them evoke speculative inquiry. Putting it otherwise, and employing a distinctively modern phrase, an unpopular philosophy may be so called mainly because it is at odds with the *Zeitgeist*. In the history of modern philosophy, the second period, inaugurated by Locke, continued to affect British thought with a certain exclusiveness long after the third stage, inaugurated by Kant, had turned the Continental mind to fresh questions. This second period was dominated by a study of individual experience, of knowledge as it is in the inner man, to the rejection of experience as a whole, and of the universe. It may be fairly alleged that Hamilton was the last constructive representative of this stage, on one of its sides, as John Stuart Mill was on the other. The characteristic ideas of the nineteenth century, the principles whereby, so far as one can now venture to forecast, it will be remembered, began

to assert themselves strongly in this country during the fifteen years succeeding Hamilton's death. Since then their influence has become more and more dominant. As a natural consequence, Mr Veitch was not in touch with some of these doctrines, and he was probably opposed to the extreme assertion of any. Carlyle, through whom many relatively of his generation lighted upon the idealistic interpretation of the universe, never attracted him. His well-known predilection for the poetry of personal experience—of aspiration towards the divine, of subjective communing with the natural—constituted another bulwark against that recent form of speculation which explains man, not so much by considering him in himself as by reducing him to the position of a unit in an all-embracing order. By philosophical tradition and training he neither credited, nor cared to accredit, the *Allgemeinheit* which so conspicuously marks post-Fichtean theories of human consciousness. Constitutionally he hated "publicity," and his affinities in literature only served to confirm this partly natural, partly acquired, distaste. Thus his critical faculty found enough and to spare against which to

direct itself. The positive teaching of the Scottish school had, in the main, become of historical interest,¹ and the newer ideas that had supplanted it failing to recommend themselves to his judgment, he set himself to exhibit their shortcomings.

The brief period that has elapsed is not sufficient to admit of anything like a final estimate of the value of these criticisms. It must be enough to point out here, that the enthusiasm

¹ It may be of interest to quote here the judgment of one who was himself trained in the Scottish school, and who cannot be suspected of bias. Professor Masson, of Edinburgh, writing in 1877, thus concludes the third edition of his *Recent British Philosophy*: "On the whole, my impression is that the struggle in Systematic British Philosophy, apart from Didactic Theology, is not now any longer, as it was in 1865, between Hamilton's System of Transcendental Realism *plus* a Metaphysical Agnosticism relieved by strenuous Faith, and Mill's System of Empirical Idealism *plus* a Metaphysical Agnosticism relieved by a slight reserve of possibility for Paley after all, but between Mr Spencer's Knowable Cosmical Evolution blocked off from an Unknowable Absolute, and some less organised Idealistic Philosophy describable as British Hegelianism. But, apart from these two camps, there cluster the Comtists by themselves; and between the two camps, looking into each and borrowing from each, but refusing to belong to either, or to house with the Comtists, move those vagrant Agnostics who still choose to rely mainly on more or less of constitutional postulation."

with which new ideas are greeted on their first inrush is commonly accompanied by some lack of discrimination. Tendencies assert themselves to erect the most recent doctrines into confessions of faith, and to regard opponents of them as "mostly fools," or, at all events, as persons without whom it is safe to reckon. The sudden swing to materialism, which was the immediate consequence of the enunciation of the theory of physical evolution, furnishes a typical example of this. The assumptions which science necessarily makes came to be ignored, or forgotten, for the time, and a world altogether alien to man's experience achieved curious apotheosis as the only explanation of this very experience. Mr Veitch was quick to detect logical errors of this kind, and he exposed them with unsparing scorn, fearing no man and recking nothing of popularity or sarcasm. The rapidly growing tendency to resile from these extreme positions proves how thoroughly justified he was. New conceptions, especially when they happen to be fraught with widest issues, cannot be comprehended in a day. They lay hold of men, and carry them off captive; so they are frequently bad masters ere they can

be reduced to the level of good servants. And it is the critic's office to call a halt for their examination and appraisal. To many zealous minds these stoppages are, of course, irritating and almost meaningless. But, at the last, they actually contribute to advance. Moreover, the operative ideas with which thinkers are now accustomed to work extend so endlessly in their ramifications that there cannot but be a place for the critic. He puts questions — annoying, because often inconvenient — and so, at the close of a somewhat slow process, induces the constructive philosophers to admit that, after all, it is but human to err.

Despite this, one can frankly allow, on the other hand, that the critical attitude has its own dangers. As the record of history attests, these are apt most to abound when the upholders of an older order attack those who are swayed by lately born ideas. In particular, a seeming want of sympathy may tend to repel what, by common consent, is usually known as the "young" generation. I am inclined to believe—but I state it only as a personal opinion—that the adherents of British idealism were thus affected by Mr

Veitch's uncompromising hostility to their most cherished principles. But, nevertheless, I felt sure that, had some of them known his inner personality more intimately, much would have been done to remove this impression. In any case, one who differed from him profoundly on many of the points at issue—certainly on the most important principle—is bound to place it on record that there was no trace of undue dogmatism and no lack of sympathy in his private discussions. He did not see idealism from the inside, and never had any desire thus to view it. Yet, even at this, there were compensating advantages. He perceived defects which the outsider alone could apprehend with similar clearness. And if he insisted on them with strenuous iteration, he not merely made unseen weaknesses manifest to some of the idealists themselves, but also bore his part in that movement towards a re-examination of fundamental philosophical postulates now in process. What Green said as a sympathiser, and with a view to purging idealism of the formal difficulties incident to earlier presentations of it, Veitch stated as a hostile critic. Yet, for some minds, the disciple and

the opponent contributed to a common result. It was the logic of idealism far more than its metaphysic that irritated the critic; and the follower himself seems to be but little satisfied with it.

“If thought and reality are to be identified, if the statement that God is thought is to be more than a presumptuous paradox, thought must be *other than the discursive activity* exhibited in our inferences and analyses, other than a particular mode of consciousness which excludes from itself feeling and will. As little can it be the process of philosophising, though Hegel himself, by what seems to us *the one essential aberration of his doctrine, treats this process as a sort of movement of the absolute thought*. But when we have said that thought, if it is to hold the place which Hegel gives it, must be something else than we take it to be when we seek to ascertain its nature by ‘looking into our own breasts,’ we are bound to make it clear how a truer conception of it is to be obtained. Till this is done more explicitly than it has yet been done by the exponents of Hegel, a suspicion will attach to his doctrine among those best students of philosophy whose

prime wish is to know throughout exactly where they stand. . . . We suspect that all along *Hegel's method* has stood in the way of an acceptance of his conclusion, because he, at any rate, seemed to arrive at his conclusion as to the spirituality of the world, not by interrogating the world, but by interrogating his own thoughts. A well-grounded conviction has made men *refuse to believe that any dialectic of the discursive intelligence* would instruct them in *the reality of the world*, or that this reality could consist in thought in any sense in which thought can be identified with such an intellectual process. It may not, indeed, have been of the essence of Hegel, but an accident explicable from his philosophical antecedents, that *his doctrine was presented in a form which affronted this conviction.*"¹

No one appreciated the fundamental doctrines of idealism more than Green; and, convinced of their ultimate truth as he was, no one more fervently desired to remove these formal trammels. Veitch was an intuitionalist, or a sympathiser with the intuitional standpoint. That

¹ *Works of T. H. Green*, vol. iii. Pp. 142, 143, 146. The italics are mine.

is, he was practically an idealist of another kind. So he only sought to pass effective criticisms on what he considered as a competing and mistaken theory. But, with this difference, the following passages remind one strangely of what Green wrote as above:—

“When we come to the application of results to Man, Self, or Person, we find also a considerable change in the point of view or meaning of terms. Instead of a conscious subject as the one factor in knowledge, we usually hear of a ‘consciousness,’ or ‘thought,’ as doing the work of knowing and making. This is not a correct or justifiable use of words; it is a substitution of the act for the actor, of the knowing for the knower, even of the object of the knowledge for the knowing. . . . The ideas of creation and creative energy are emptied of meaning, and for them is substituted the conception or fiction of an eternally related or double-sided world. . . . The eternal self only is, if the eternal manifold is: the eternal manifold is, if the eternal self is. The one in being the other is or makes itself the one; the other in being the one is or makes itself the other. . . . What may be called the method

in all this kind of reasoning is to take a term or concept already existing and to analyse it, to show what is implied or supposed to be implied in it; to show that it is related or correlated, and in so doing to treat the term and the different terms which are involved as if they were active, or constituting elements in the general concept."¹ Again, "Relation between terms or concepts never constitutes the reality of the term or concept; but is possible only through a definitely apprehended or comprehended object. . . . Relation, ultimately analysed, means one of the accidents or properties of an object or concept. . . . Genus and species are united in the individual. *Animal* and *man* are united in *this man*; but *this man* is not constituted by the union of these simply. Individuality is something higher than mere membership of a logical class."²

The method of idealism which, as Green once said, required to be done over again, remained an irresistible stumbling-block to Mr Veitch. With the removal of this stumbling-block—a process which, as some recent writings appear to prove,

¹ *Knowing and Being*. Pp. 15, 16, 21, 22, 149.

² *Institutes of Logic*. Pp. 177, 163.

has already well begun—it would have been in no way surprising to find Mr Veitch's thought far less "dualistic" than has been popularly supposed. As it is, he assuredly brought home to some minds the indispensableness of this change. To this end, it was along the line of a favourite topic with him that the chief suggestiveness of his criticism lay; and, perchance, even yet it may bear most fruit in this direction. He never wearied in his insistence that "How far and in what way our fundamental intellectual and moral conceptions are rationally predicable of an Infinite Being, is the unsolved problem of Metaphysics." He would probably have added that it was the only problem worth solving; for, surmount it, and all other things will be added unto you. The questions here involved mark the transition in his character from the intellectual acuteness of the critic to the spiritual perception of the poet and the reverential awe of the mystic.

The psychological standpoint of Hamilton, with its analytic method, so far retained sway with Mr Veitch that constructive metaphysic never became of paramount importance in his thought.

He never consciously set himself to systematise experience philosophically. Yet, in his poetical writings, and in those moods whereout his poetry sprang, he often *felt*, not only the

“ Heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,”

but also

“ That serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul ;
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony and the deep power of joy
We see into the life of things.”

What he says of Wordsworth, in this connection, very well sums up his own attitude. “ Wordsworth does not here point to that sublimity of character which is found in a dignified and reasoned acceptance of the inevitable, yielding even a complacency which enables a man to turn to the sunnier side of things and break into song. He leads rather to the composure which arises from a faith whose reflective and scrutinising eye pierces ‘the cloud of destiny,’ and is nourished

by what it feels is above and beyond it. There is all the difference between 'putting by' and seeing beyond.

'Faith in life endless, the sustaining thought
Of human being, Eternity, and God.'¹

To those who knew Mr Veitch best, this constructive mood is probably most characteristically present throughout the exquisite volumes, *The Feeling for Nature in Scottish Poetry*. "Since I was a boy—now, alas! a long time ago—with fishing-rod in hand, I do not remember when I did not take unalloyed delight in the wimplings of the burn, in the sheen of the bracken, in the grey rock, in the purple of the heather, and the solitude of the moorlands. Once I remember, when the gloaming was coming on in the Posso Burn—forty-six years ago—I whipped up my line round my small fishing-rod, hitched my basket on my back, and though it was eight o'clock, and an August evening, would not be comforted until, striking westwards and upwards away from home,—the setting sun perhaps stirring and goading me on,—I climbed the

¹ See below, p. 220.

height,—‘speeled’ it,—wandered down Kirkhope with a curious pathetic heart, for the grey sky overshadowed me, and the burn moaned, and there was an ominous veiling mist on the confronting mass of Dollar Law; and I got home therefrom about midnight, some nine miles away, through the darkness and the calm that had settled, like a dream, in the valley of the Manor. But I did not find then, and I do not find greatly now, that many people share this feeling. . . . I find even the angler, carrying his rod up the beautiful and lovely burn, more intent on filling his basket than in brooding on the braes. I find, too, the citizen out for a holiday and the picnicker laudably enough rejoicing in the open haugh and moorland, but this delight is often unquestionably not very far removed from that which accompanies fresh air and a better digestion. The free pure love of nature is different from all this,—as different as emotion is from sensation. They are few, indeed, who reach a supreme satisfaction on the wilds, who delight in them merely for what they are, and *who find in them, as there may be found, the near presence of a Personal yet Supreme*

*Power, whose communion is never wanting to the solitary lover and worshipper of nature ; and when this feeling rises to its true strength, and finds outlet in sympathetic and imaginative expression—whether in verse or prose—what has been said of poetry in general may emphatically be said of nature poetry: ‘It redeems from decay the visitations of the Divinity in man.’”*¹ In the rare feeling and finely toned perception which prompted this, and much of a similar kind, lay the secret of Mr Veitch’s unique individuality, with its strong self-reliance yet pervading humility. No doubt they do not furnish a reasoned-out metaphysical system, but they presuppose one. Nature may be opposed to man, as he is often inclined to believe at first sight. Yet many of his holiest moments, and the better part of all that is most valuable in his life, implies her co-operation—implies that she is not foreign, but that rather from out of the depths of her indwelling spirit she answers back to him, who is bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh. Man passes forth utterly stricken from some quiet churchyard, and with

¹ Vol. i. Pp. 2, 3, 4, 5. The italics are mine.

song of bird, with dazzling sunshine, with beauty of flower and tree, Nature seems to scoff at his sorrow. But, on the other hand, by these very agencies she slowly assuages the pang and heals the wound. Her lilies and roses, her hedgerows and beeches, speak to man through the eye; through the ear her thrushes and nightingales are swift to soothe his spirit.

“ Bird of the wilderness,
Blithesome and cumberless,
Sweet be thy matin o'er moorland and lea!
Emblem of happiness,
Blest is thy dwelling-place;
Oh! to abide in the desert with thee!

Then, when the gloamin' comes,
Low in the heather blooms
Sweet will thy welcome and bed of love be!
Bird of the wilderness,
Blest is thy dwelling-place;
Oh! to abide in the desert with thee!”¹

Nature persuades man to an eternal quest which, as Mr Veitch not only said but in his inmost soul deeply felt, “ leads on to the one great living Spirit who, while He transcends the world

¹ Cf. *The Feeling for Nature*, vol. i. p. 104.

of experience, is yet in it,—manifesting Himself in all—in light and darkness, sunshine and gloom, holding the balance of opposites in the hollow of His hand—not a magnified man, but a soul, which somehow takes up into one both man and nature :—

‘Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light,—
Were all like workings of one Mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree,
Characters of the great Apocalypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end.’”¹

A philosophy, in the strict sense of the schools, this may not be. Nevertheless, it possesses strength just where abstract systems have, as a rule, proved themselves weak. It is the expression of a life, and, as such, it involves principles which have already come to their only true kingdom—the ordering of a soul in its fundamental relations to the universe and to God. Accordingly, in that fascinating borderland which lies on the marches between poetry and philosophy—partaking in the æsthetic emotion of the one, and in the perma-

¹ *The Feeling for Nature*, vol. i. pp. 75, 76.

ment reality of the other—the absolute spirit of the man most revealed itself. Here he was himself, here he belonged to no school or sect, but shared with those selecter souls who gain a surer immortality such glimpses of the One Eternal in nature and in human life as are vouchsafed to the aspiring spirit here below.

By training and by force of circumstances a scholar and a teacher, Mr Veitch's mastering bent was to be found elsewhere. The "faculties" of the mind, the "laws" of logic, the formal systems of philosophy, stood, with him, among things seen and temporal. He passed his own truest life in the atmosphere of the unseen and eternal. He was a deeply religious man in the best sense of this term. Revealing this side of his character to none but his very few intimate friends, he bulked most, with his students and with others, as a critic. But even they vaguely felt that something more remained to be disclosed. And this instinct was correct. When one pierced through the shell to the inner spirit, a nature, rare in its combination of the poet with the philosopher, revealed itself. Contemplative rather than speculative,

emotional rather than exclusively intellectual, yet of immense moral strength and of a corresponding intensity in righteous indignation, the man's greatness lay in his entire humanity, and not in the special predominance of any one acquirement. Spiritual intuition was the central fire. And with the quenching of this there passed a personality who, in philosophy, affected youthful minds no more than indirectly, but who gained the higher meed of leaving an indelible impression on the characters of those with whom he was brought into close contact, by the unswerving manliness with which he battled, as he found opportunity, for all that was pure, and elevating, and of good report.

R. M. WENLEY.

PREFACE.

IN a former volume, entitled *Knowing and Being* (*Essays in Philosophy, First Series*), I stated and criticised that form of philosophical opinion which represents what may be called the Absolutist view of the world. This may be briefly put as the doctrine that a series of relations, summed up in the phrase an "Absolute or Infinite Self-conscious Ego," is convertible with Reality. In the present volume I deal with what may be regarded as one form of the individualistic view—viz., that mere relations, or a collective sum of relations in something regarded as the individual consciousness, are also so convertible. The latter theory seems to me as inadequate as the former. To give

some reasons for this is the aim of the present volume.

From the presentations of this view I have selected Professor Lionel Dauriac's book, *Croyance et Réalité*,¹ for comment and criticism, as it seems to me one of the clearest and best. I regret that this mode of treatment gives a somewhat polemical appearance to the discussion; but I write with no feeling of disrespect to M. Dauriac, or to any one who differs from me. I merely take this method of getting at the truth.

J. VEITCH

PEEBLES, *July* 1894.

¹ Félix Alcan. Paris : 1889.

DUALISM AND MONISM
OR, RELATION AND REALITY
A CRITICISM

DUALISM AND MONISM.

I.—REALISM AND COMMON-SENSE; DUALISM AND MONISM.

It is with pleasure that I point out and acknowledge that M. Dauriac, in his fresh and interesting treatment of the Realism of "Common-sense," and of Dualism and Monism, is more accurate and just in his dealing with the views of Reid and Hamilton than is at all usual in this country. It is obvious, at least, that he has read the authors whose doctrines he expounds and criticises, and that he seeks fairly to give them their place in the development of philosophical theory. This was to be expected from any one in sympathy with the course of French speculative thought, since, in the first part of this century, it was

raised from the low level of the doctrine of Condillac to what it became in Laromiguière, Maine de Biran, Jouffroy, and Cousin, and on through the men of Cousin's and other schools, who have added so brilliantly to the philosophical literature of France since.

In the first place, M. Dauriac points out that the distinction between strong and weak states of consciousness, which Mr Herbert Spencer adopts, is simply Hume's discrimination of *impressions* and *ideas*. Mr Spencer imagines that vivacity and feebleness in the states of consciousness are sufficient to ground the inference of the distinction between externality and internality; that we can thus get the opposition of *mine* and *not-mine*, of subject and object, both really existing. The feeble states are related to me, the strong states to a not-me. This gives the very opposite of the conclusion which Hume drew from the premiss. He used it to ground the denial of external reality in any proper sense of the term. M. Dauriac holds that Hume was right; that such a distinction as that of external and internal cannot be thus obtained; that all states of consciousness, weak or strong, are to be regarded as equally mine. Hume

here showed a truer appreciation of the position than Mr Spencer.¹ This, of course, was the view of Hume's position taken by Reid and Hamilton alike.

In the second place, M. Dauriac fully admits the reality and importance of the distinction between Sensation and Perception taken by Reid, and subsequently elaborated and somewhat modified by Hamilton. Further, he states Reid's position, at least, very fairly, as follows:—

1. There is Sensation, an affection of me, the conscious subject.

2. This precedes Perception, an intuition of a quality not belonging to me, an attribute not mine, and involving the difference between the *res extensa* and the *res cogitans*.

3. This perception or intuition embraces a knowledge in which the essential qualities of things are given; *I believe, because I know*. Belief in external reality is not blind, but grounded on knowledge.² While M. Dauriac admits the validity of the distinction between Sensation and Perception, he does not admit the metaphysical conclusion which he supposes Reid, and also

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 133.

² *Ibid.*, p. 135.

Hamilton, to have founded upon it—viz., the real and essential distinctness, yet simultaneous co-existence, of the *res extensa* and the *res cogitans*. He would allow only a phenomenal or empirical difference in this connection—an irreducible contrast of consciousness and extension. He proceeds to point out what seems to him to be the difference between Reid and Hamilton. Reid simply said, there is an intuition of external reality, of extension or the reality of an object. Hamilton went further, and showed that there must be such intuition. Reid declared, "It is so;" Hamilton argued, "It is absurd it should not be so." The latter, accordingly, not only admits the reality of the psychological intuition, but demonstrates its metaphysical necessity. Perception universally implies the knowledge of extension, and this knowledge is necessarily adequate to the being of the reality. The external world is more than tangent to the spirit, more than penetration of internal by external; that is, in sensation there is the necessity of the perceived extension. Hamilton thus changed the mere fact of the intuition into law. Extension is necessary to perception proper. In reference to

the subjective phenomenalism of Hume, he therefore takes up a hostile attitude. To the inconclusive distinction of states, strong and weak, he opposes that of states exclusively intensive and exclusively extensive; and, replacing a simple difference of degree by a difference of nature, he legitimatises the pretensions of Common-sense. For he accords it not only the existence, but even the knowledge of reality, and, what is more, necessary and necessarily adequate knowledge of reality.¹ M. Dauriac even goes so far as to say that Hamilton held extension indispensable to consciousness, necessary to any consciousness whatever on our part.² At the same time, he holds that Hamilton adopted the view of Kant as to the ideality of space, and held also the reality of extension as perceived. There is thus an inconsistency, even a contradiction. For extension perceived in an ideal space cannot be real in the sense of independence of consciousness. It is embraced in the sphere of the ideal or subjective.

Naturally, then, in M. Dauriac's opinion, Hamilton has not advanced realism more than Kant. There is no means of distinguishing among the

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 135.

² *Loc. cit.*

qualities, and affirming that extension belongs to them absolutely. For if space be a form of the external sense, and have relation only to the subject, how can extension, situated in this space, survive the disappearance of consciousness? Either there is no extension in itself or there is space in itself. Hamilton has not doubted this; yet there is a conflict in the texts. Sometimes he expresses himself as if the primary qualities were known to us quite as they are, sometimes he appears to admit that they are *represented* in the subject instead of being reflected simply.¹

M. Dauriac's view of Kant's position is, that he did not wish to be idealistic, and that, thanks to his dualistic theory of knowledge, he occasionally fancied he was not. "This theory . . . places the subject under the necessity of determining itself in time, in order to know itself, and this necessity it subordinates to the existence of the external object. . . . But nothing avails to graft the consciousness of the internal, in part at least, on that of the external, for this internal, bathed in an ideal space, can itself be only ideal. The Kantian realism is thus an empirical, superficial

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 148.

realism, a realism according to appearance. Kant admits the dualism of the subject-phenomenon and the object-phenomenon, but he is mistaken in his interpretation of idealism. This does not put in question the phenomenalism of the object. It is the reality of the object-noumenon which alone is in question, and also its distinction from the subject-noumenon. But there is nothing to prove that to this empirical dualism must necessarily correspond a metaphysical dualism. . . . If we admit, with Kant, the necessity, for the knowledge of the subject by itself, of an intervention of the two forms of the sensibility, it is because the subject is not inseparable from them, it is because, making, so to speak, bodies with them, it carries them everywhere with itself. Fichte will not delay long to give an account of this." ¹

With regard to Hamilton's view, I do not think it ought to be allowed that he held extension to be necessary to the fact or reality of consciousness. No doubt he held strongly that there is no consciousness of self or subject apart from a simultaneous consciousness of a not-self, or *non-ego*,

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 147, 148.

or object. But he is careful to distinguish several classes of objects, such as subject-object, object-object. The former is, among other objects, sensation simply. And it is not at all clear that he did not hold the presence of this sufficient as a not-self to awake consciousness, even although the subject were not as yet in a position to refer it to definite extension of an external reality. Hamilton certainly did not hold that a knowledge or perception of extension is necessary to the existence of consciousness. The necessity of object to subject, advocated by him, is not to be so summarily restricted. He may, however, be regarded as admitting that extension as a percept is necessary to *sense-consciousness*, or the consciousness of what we have given in perception proper. There is no consciousness, either actual or possible, of what we regard as the world of the not-self of the senses, apart from a perception of extension — the space-filling and space-bounded. The resisting-extended is, for us, the condition of the existence of the act of consciousness, in which we know the external world, in the ordinary application of the term. But this is very different from holding extension necessary to any con-

sciousness, or to consciousness in general—to the reality, even, of the conscious subject. It seems to be an exceedingly narrow view of conscious reality to regard it as dependent on the possession of an extended object. It might be admitted that there is no conscious act, no conscious reality even, no conscious subject which has not for itself consciousness of an object. But this object is not necessarily extension; and, even if it were, it might still be held that the *perceiving* and the *percept* do not exhaust the reality of consciousness, do not, properly speaking, even constitute it—that there is something more fundamental still in *the percipient himself* as he thus reveals himself to himself.

There is, no doubt, considerable difficulty regarding Hamilton's view as to the independence of extension and space. In one place he seems to adopt the Kantian doctrine as to the independence of extension and space, as simply a necessity of perception or representation. He holds, at the same time, that extension is an object of perception; and he may be taken as holding this to be an attribute, not of mind, but of body, and thus as in a sphere wholly distinct from consciousness.

If we limit this distinctness or independency of the existence of extension—of extension for itself—even to the moment of the given perception, there would be a difficulty in reconciling the possibility of this with the Kantian view, as commonly accepted, of the purely ideal character of space. An extension in an ideal space could only be an ideal extension—not really distinct for a moment from the conscious act which apprehends it, or, if distinct, distinct illusorily. But it is questionable whether Hamilton ever fully or in an unqualified manner adopted the Kantian dogma on this point. It was quite consistent for him, in accordance with his general views, to hold space a form or law of perception, and yet not without its counterpart in the real world of experience. He may have held space to be a necessary law of perception, and yet not simply a merely subjective condition. And in this case he would have held it to be, in a sense, of pure or non-empirical origin. There is no more inconsistency in this—indeed, inconsistency at all—than in holding causality to be at once a law of thought of native origin, and yet a law of things as well. Cause is but the pure form of a

cause, as space might be the pure form of extension. Besides, it is rather a narrow sort of criticism which fixes on a solitary expression that occurs as an interpolation, almost of a passing nature, in one essay, and to set it up in contradiction with the general tenor of an author's teaching.

There is also the difficulty with regard to Hamilton of determining precisely his view about the relation of the primary or essential qualities—extension, &c.—to body. They are, no doubt, regarded as primary and essential in the act of perception, as distinct in nature from the consciousness of the percipient, as referable to something else. But it is not clear whether he regarded these as constituting in body an essential existence, independent of any human perception. The main feature of his realism seems to have been the acknowledgment of distinct reality in the perception, with, certainly, the possibility of the continuousness of this in some form or other apart from the perception. This is, at least, all that Realism need contend for. The “common-sense” doctrine of Realism may be taken, in an irreflective form, as meaning the

continued subsistence of certain qualities of body as perceived. And this seems to be the only "Realism of Common-sense" here contemplated by M. Dauriac.

In reply to the question, What is Realism according to Common-sense? he says: "It is to believe in the existence of objective things; that is, in consequence, to refuse to believe that they disappear when we have ceased to think of them, and by the fact alone that we no longer think of them. After me, when I have ceased to be, the world will continue to subsist; I shall be nothing, but the sun will not cease to shine, the earth to become warm from the contact of its rays, plants to grow and animals to move."¹ Once more: "Reality is not an empty word; it subsists by its peculiar laws, and these laws, known by us, remain independent of those which regulate ourselves. The contrary supposition shocks our instincts, falsifies our most invincible beliefs — those upon which all others depend."²

But Hamilton, in common with every enlightened realist, has recognised the need for reflection upon and analysis of the data—apparent

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 121, 122.

² *Ibid.*, p. 123.

data—of the ordinary common-sense judgments of mankind. Realists have never regarded common-sense as doing more than supplying the materials for analysis—for philosophy—any more than the scientific man regards the data of the senses as being more than the materials for observation, analysis, and generalisation. Probably it will be found that in the common-sense of mankind there is embodied the principle of continuity of an external reality. Philosophy, dealing with this, may discover that there is such a principle, the so-called phenomenalism is not all; and it may propose to itself to find, further, what this principle is. All this would be truly in accordance alike with the spirit of common-sense and with the method of philosophy.

Another point falls to be noted here. It is said that the man of common-sense alleges that the idealist, or Berkeleyan, denies the actual or phenomenal reality of the external world, whereas this is not the case. The question between the idealist and the realist is, truly, as to the interpretation of this perceived or phenomenal reality. Whether, for example, it consists simply of what are called sensations or conscious impressions, or

of these as coming from something beyond themselves; whether these are truly percepts, objects in no way mine, or a property of mine; whether, further, this perceived or phenomenal world has reality only in the moment of perception, or whether it subsists after the perception, and in what form. It is clear that the idealist may be allowed to admit the phenomenal reality of the world, and yet deny its objective reality in the proper sense of the term, and so to deny external reality. A difference of opinion as to the prime nature of the object perceived may fairly be characterised as turning on the reality or non-reality of the external world, even in the phenomenal sphere. This would be apart altogether from the question as to whether the perceived reality subsists after perception, or is representative of a substantial or transcendent world.

But there is more than this. Suppress extension, and consciousness—*i.e.*, the soul—disappears. But equally, suppress consciousness and extension disappears. Extension only exists by relation to the subject; space has only reality of spirit. Between the soul and space there

occurs a perpetual exchange of gifts and restitutions, so that the soul, in order to become conscious, has need of sensation ; this, in its turn, of perception ; this, again, of extension. Extension, in turn, cannot do without the soul.¹

M. Dauriac thus admits the validity of the psychological distinction, of Reid and Hamilton, between sensation and perception. He admits that in perceiving—nay, as necessary to perceiving—there is the confronting opposite, the extended. But here he parts company with them, at least as he understands them. The inference supposed to be drawn from this distinction of mind or conscious subject on the one hand, and body or extended object on the other, as two separate coexisting realities which respectively contribute to the perception, he challenges. What, then, is his own doctrine ?

In the first place, he premises that the notion or consciousness of the soul is the *being* of the soul. Apart from action or consciousness the being of the soul is mere potency. The soul owes its self-consciousness to extension, and

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 145.

thus, though itself unextended, owes its being to the extended. It affirms itself in as far as it limits itself, poses itself in so far as it opposes itself. In this there is no formal contradiction. To know white is to discriminate it from not-white; but this does not in the least imply the identity of whiteness and not-whiteness. In other words, the correlation of opposites does not identify them.

It is, accordingly, impossible to demand which of the two events comes before the other. In order to be capable of perception there is needed the being of relation, and this reciprocally. Accordingly, that which is real is not perception on the one side, sensation on the other, but the connection between the two terms of one and the same relation. "The Me appears in a crisis when it makes the effort to eliminate extension, but this extension, which it drives back, returns to beset its shores, not in vengeance, but rather in compassion, and, as it were, to recall to its antagonist that their rivalry is the condition even of its own reality." ¹

Common-sense is idealistic without "knowing

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 145.

it. Its test of reality is feeling. The proof of reality is contact, touch-impression. Impression is the sign of existence, so said Hume. *Esse* thus is *percipi*: the external world is a permanent possibility of sensations. Common-sense has nothing to reply to this. It holds that things are, because I perceive them. In demanding that things survive the extinction of thought, it cannot represent this survival without supposing, in spite of itself, the resurrection of thought; "the hypothesis is destroyed in its enunciation. Suppose we disappear, then, in order that the world should endure, it would be necessary to leave to our fellows the power of experiencing sensations and localising them instinctively out of self."¹

When summarily stated, the view of M. Dauriac seems to be as follows:—

1. Consciousness and extension are known by us as two opposed objects. The perception, or consciousness, I have of extension is a state wholly different from the extension as object: it belongs to me, is *mine*; the extension does not belong to me, is *not-mine*.

2. These two—consciousness and extension—

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 131.

are reciprocally necessary in order to the reality of each. Consciousness would not be without extension; extension ceases the moment consciousness disappears. There is no consciousness in and for itself; and there is no extension in and for itself.

3. Hence, that which is real is not consciousness by itself, nor extension by itself, "but the relation between the two terms of one and the same relation."¹ What is ultimate is the relation of conflict which arises from consciousness beating back extension from it as foreign to itself; and extension, returning as it were to attack consciousness in order to recall to it that their rivalry is the condition even of its own reality.

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 144

II.— PHENOMENON, PHENOMENALISM.

M. DAURIAC insists very strongly on the point that the reality of appearance, or phenomenal reality, is universally admitted by sceptic and dogmatist alike. The sceptic doubts the objective, not the subjective, reality of the phenomenon. He either denies that something is, or he affirms nothing about it. *Nam quid* is not in doubt, but only *quid*. There is, at the outset of our reflection, an initial matter, the subjective reality of which cannot be put in question; this initial matter is none other than the matter itself of knowledge.¹ No one dreams of contesting this, nor even of transforming it. The fact of being invested with objective reality, in the Kantian sense of the expression, neither adds nor takes away an atom from its objective reality in

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 207.

the Cartesian sense of the term. Reduced to the function of thought solely—that is to say, of conceiving—man would in no way distinguish an idea from its reality.¹

M. Dauriac then institutes a comparison between the real as given in perception and dreaming. The result is that these do not differ essentially; they only differ in certain extrinsic modifications. The phenomenon is not the antipodes of the real, any more than hallucination is the antipodes of perception. We experience a hallucination, and we take no account of it. There appears to our vision, for example, a person who has been dead for years. In place of acting towards him or speaking to him as if he were alive, we remain quiet, “waiting until the true sensations superimpose themselves on the false sensations, and progressively efface them. Unless deprived of reason, the man under hallucination does not regulate his conduct on the imaginary perceptions, but beyond this—that he does not draw from them any conclusion translatable into acts, and that he leaves his perceptions properly called to determine in part the course

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 208.

of his daily life—all other difference between his perceptions and his hallucinations disappears on examination. For all hallucination is not necessarily individual ; sometimes it is collective. . . . Our perceptions become motives or bases of inference, our hallucinations never, save when reason abandons us. This difference is our work ; it is only imposed upon us if we consent to it. We may not consent to it, the sceptics are proof of this. If duty demands it, it is absolutely necessary to consent—in other words, to treat appearance as an objective reality.”¹

On this it may be asked, Is it true that, as a universal rule, we act only on perceptions and not on hallucinations ? And when we do act on hallucination, is it not true that we do so because we take it for perception—that is, for something of a wholly different nature ?

Then we may further ask, Why is it reasonable to act on perceptions, and not on hallucinations, if, in their nature and essence, they are the same ? Unless there is a difference in them as they exist subjectively, what reasonable ground would there be in our choosing to act on the one

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 212, 213.

and remain passive under the other? This extrinsic difference can have no foundation whatever in reason.

When M. Dauriac tells us so persistently that the sceptic and dogmatist start from a common basis of phenomenal reality, he forgets that there may be—are—different interpretations of the nature of this appearance, apart altogether from any question as to its objective, permanent, independent existence. *What* it is now and here is as much a question, and a question giving rise to fundamental difference of opinion, as any question as to its continuous reality out of perception. The *quid* does not apply merely to the latter question; it is first to be asked in regard to the former point.

M. Dauriac's position seems to be—

1. That there is no permanent persistence of things independent of our own—or one analogous. This only means substituting for our personality, destroyed, another personality; it is to put one spirit in the place of another spirit. The world vanishes the moment all consciousness vanishes. If God, who makes, be not there, if God have not delegated the oversight to some created spirit,

things are no longer sensible forms, no longer objects to be perceived. Thus the persistence of external things, their objective permanence, continues to rest uncertain.

2. The objective and substantial permanence of thinking subjects, souls, also fails of proof.

3. Phenomena neighboured by other phenomena—that is, all. Hence hallucination and perception are not (speculatively) distinguishable.

He is opposed to idealism and *a fortiori* scepticism; not less to substantialism and *a fortiori* monism. His position has some approximation to that of Leibniz. But Leibniz was monist in spite of his monadism, and Leibniz was substantialist, and he professes not to be so.

What precisely is the phenomenalism he espouses or professes to hold?

In common usage the term *phenomenon* means an anomaly—something abnormal or extraordinary. But originally and etymologically phenomenon means *what happens, passes, takes place*; and hence it is partially at least identical with *what exists*. *Phenomenon* becomes the substitute for the terms *reality, existence*.

The philosophers, however, speak of pheno-

mena as *not-being*; phenomena are said to be the contrary of *being*. But if phenomena are not, it is necessary to dissociate from them the notions of reality, existence, fact, occurrence. Phenomenon is taken as synonymous with appearance, and a world of appearances is synonymous with a world of phantoms. Hence it is considered as identical with not-being—as opposed to reality. *Appearance* is instantaneous—at least not durable. It is fugitive, a shade, a thing we can see, not touch—almost nothing. Hence *phenomenon* so regarded.

But phenomenon is particular, concrete; it authenticates and describes itself; it is object of perception and memory. It is accompanied with certain characters which concur to isolate it, by abstraction, from other phenomena contiguous and successive, and almost to confer on it an individuality. How then is it regarded as a simulacrum of being? ¹

Duration does not affect the reality or the nature of a phenomenon. The sudden fugitive flash on the night is as real in the second it occupies as if it remained an hour. All notions

¹ *Croyance et Realite*, p. 219.

of a phenomenon as related to duration are unessential, extrinsic. Its intrinsic features are concreteness, particularity, individuality.¹ This perceptible world is the real world; and we may bid adieu to the dreams of the metaphysical substantialists, whether these take the form of existences superior to the phenomenal, intuition of a world of ideas alone real, the affirmation of an Unknowable whose function is to support the indefinite succession of appearances which the vulgar wrongly call beings and things.

Those who hold this view are not to be regarded as Nihilists. It applies rather to the Substantialists. For substantialism says we never attain reality—the sceptics only incline to think that the reality of things escapes us. The Substantialists are illusionists after their kind.²

Scepticism is only possible on the assumption of substance. If there be no thing in itself, I need not seek to avoid an asserting judgment about it. If the hypothesis of substance be gratuitous, we need not interdict speaking about it, nor proclaim it inaccessible. We need not think more about it; and thus scepticism loses

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

its basis. If there be nothing beyond phenomena, we should congratulate ourselves on being incapable of knowledge of it.¹ The death of substance is the enfranchisement of the phenomenon. The remedy for scepticism ought to be sought in phenomenalism.²

It might here be very readily suggested that as, according to M. Dauriac, there are true and false sensations—that is, perceptions and hallucinations—scepticism might still find a sphere in asking for a speculative criterion of the true and the false.

But it may be asked, Wherein precisely does this phenomenal reality lie? What is the true nature of Being—the only being that is? Consciousness and extension must be represented as united in a relation the terms of which abstraction alone can isolate. Mind is not given before matter, nor matter before mind—the one is not the phenomenon, the other the substance. *To be spirit (mind) means to be given for itself. To be body means to be given for another.* No being escapes this double condition, and cannot therefore be exclusively defined either in terms

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 222.

² *Loc. cit.*

of mind or in terms of matter. *Esse est percipere et percipi*, and no *perceiver* can be conceived which is not *a perceived*. Consciousness and space imply each other, and the supposition of a consciousness pre-existent to all extension is equivalent to the unintelligible hypothesis of a being pre-existent to its laws—an existence anterior to its essence.¹

Things exist, not only because they are for us objects of representation, but because they are also for themselves—that is, self-conscious beings—or beings with a consciousness of an object. “Bodies exist” means something *analogous* to “I exist”; and thus the notion of *being* is inseparable from consciousness, or if it have another sense, another word is necessary.² The world is its OWN representation. It is a *whole of beings*, each of which *knows or at least feels itself to be*.

But only phenomena—no substance. We say “*there are only phenomena*,” but not that “*phenomena exist the one apart from the other*” in isolation.

To the statement that the *being* of the soul is *consciousness*, exception might be taken on the ground alike of ambiguity and inaccuracy.

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 245.

² *Loc. cit.*

It seems to be meant that the soul does not exist until it is self-conscious, or consciously realises itself. But we cannot state this in terms even without recognising that it includes a great many more elements than a simple consciousness or act of consciousness, be it a sense-perception or not. It is, in fact, an exclusive dogmatic statement, needing proof which is not given. The consciousness of a given time is not the being of the soul,—adequate to it,—unless on the supposition that this is possible subjectively without the implicate of a subject. And if we extend the statement to the consciousnesses of successive times, these are no more adequate to the being of the soul, unless they are held together in one subject, and so made possible as known successive consciousnesses. But in this case the being of the soul cannot be identified even with the sum of consciousnesses. The statement is, indeed, only consistent as the basis of a theory of Monadism of an extreme sort. It would restrict being not only to individuals, but to the isolated and separate consciousnesses of successive moments. And this is the same as saying that being and impression, or single con-

sciousness, are identical and convertible, that being is no more, other, or wider than the consciousness of the moment. As Hume put it, being must be the same as the impression, perception, or object. There is no distinct impression of being. There is no other kind of existence than those perceptions which appear within ourselves. Being is equally attached, and *only* attached, to every thing we are pleased to conceive.

M. Dauriac,¹ indeed, seems to admit this. He quotes Hume's well-known passage to the effect that every impression or idea is known as existing. The idea of existence must come either from a distinct impression, joined to each perception or object of thought, or it must be the same as the idea of the perception or object. But there is no such distinct impression. Hence being is the same as impression or idea—attaches to every object equally which we are pleased to conceive. There can be no other kind of existence than those perceptions which have appeared within ourselves. J. S. Mill, while holding that we perceive and judge of things, not ideas, and

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 129 seq.

believe in the reality of things judged of,—so accepting the conclusions of common-sense,—does not hold them contrary to idealism.

Thus there is the statement that extension—*i.e.*, perceived extension—is necessary to consciousness, and therefore to being—called the being of the soul. But there is surely a large assumption here. The percept extension we may take as a consciousness of points out of points in coexistence. The percept of time, clothed or filled, as of points in succession, but not necessarily in coexistence. Is it the case that consciousness does not exist unless and until coadjacent points are apprehended in coexistence? To maintain this were a simple contradiction. In order to apprehend, or rather comprehend, the coexistence in one time of the coadjacent points, a previous process of consciousness was needed. For each point had to be successively apprehended ere we could possibly grasp their final coadjacent coexistence. They were known as points one after another ere we knew them as points constituting a surface. It will not be pretended that, if there were no consciousness of each successive point, there could

be any consciousness of the series of points as coadjacent. There was consciousness, therefore, ere there was consciousness of extension or an extended surface. Consciousness in time is needed as a condition. or consciousness of extended things in space. And, what is more, there might be—nay, there is—consciousness in time apart altogether from consciousness in space; for there might be the consciousness of a succession of objects which did not terminate in a knowledge of their final coexistence. Each object might in its turn fall out of consciousness, and thus, while never coexistent, fulfil the conditions of a successive consciousness.

This theory seems to me to admit, in the first place, the distinctness of the two spheres of consciousness and extension—as at least in the act of perceiving—while extension is perceived or known. It even goes so far as to admit attribution and non-attribution to subjects; for it speaks of the perception as *mine*, and the extension perceived as *not-mine*. At the same time it denies the reality of separate subject and separate object. There is no consciousness without extension; there is no extension with-

out consciousness. Neither has for itself any reality. The only reality of each is in the relation of the one to the other. Consciousness of extension as different from consciousness is the ultimate reality—and the only one. It is a species of monadistic phenomenalism. Such a view seems to me to be, in the first place, in contradiction with itself. If extension be *not-mine*, not attributable to me or consciousness, how can it be regarded as essential to the very being of consciousness? If it be so essential—essential as known—and if consciousness exist only, as is alleged, as a knowledge—an actual knowledge—how can extension be said not to be mine, or not to belong essentially to consciousness? Consciousness is nothing apart from extension; extension is nothing apart from consciousness. They are only as they are together, or rather the relation or difference between them is all that is. How, in this case, can you speak at all of *mine* and *not-mine*, or of self and not-self, or of two spheres of being? What is reality here but a fusion of two separate incognisables or non-existents, in which the mine and the not-mine have ceased to have the slightest significance?

But, in the second place, the word relation has actually ceased to have any meaning. No doubt the phrase "terms of relation" is still retained, but it is inapplicable to the statement. The *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* are no longer. They have not in themselves any reality. A product of both, called a relation, is all that is, and they are not there to produce it. There is an effect or result of two factors, but there are no factors. There is a relation of two terms "in one and the same relation," but there are no terms to ground it. Clearly we are no longer in the sphere of relation or the relative. We have an absolute, to be called, it may be, *consciousness of extension*, or *extension for consciousness*, but we have no longer either consciousness or extension. This floating relation so called is free of terms—an irrelative, in which nothing is related. It is ultimate, inexplicable, absolute, unless on the supposition either of an infinite regress of such relations, which but multiplies the anomaly, or on the hypothesis of one all-pervading relationship as the one being of the universe—a fictional abstraction, which is even impossible with no *res cogitans* in time to hold it. It is of no use to

keep repeating the statement that the only real thing is relation, whatever kind of relation this may be or in whatever way it may be described. We cannot have relation either of resemblance or of difference—contrast, opposition—unless we know positively the terms to be set in relation, and this before the relation. We cannot possibly differentiate one thing from another, if we, to begin with, have no knowledge of the things themselves. With the denial of the separately conceived reality of the things as mental objects, and therefore of the consciousness of them, there falls the relation of resemblance or difference. If the so-called relation be a third thing struck out from the two other things, then it is contradictory to say that this third thing is either the only thought or the only reality.

If the doctrine had been that in the conscious relation of perceiving extension, in a given time, there appears the contrast of consciousness and extension, as two qualities or attributes, held together in knowledge, by me the percipient—that the reality of each is revealed only in opposition—that the act of consciousness^a poses itself only in opposing itself to the quality extension—

that this is first of all a psychological, temporal, or empirical contrast—that the metaphysical judgment as to the reality of each term, the mutual effect of the related opposites, is not at once foreclosed,—then there would have been reason. But forthwith to fuse and thus abolish both *res cogitans* and *res extensa* in a necessarily groundless “relation,” or third which is neither, is to misstate the fact, and further to superinduce upon it an illusory metaphysical entity.

The gist of the objection to Dualism as urged by M. Dauriac is to be found in those words: “If the Me is one thing, extension another thing, it is that *extension is an extrinsic property of certain states of consciousness superadded to those states, without assignable reason, and even against every plausible reason*; it is that consciousness exists before itself, that it gives its law to itself. In addition to this supposition being unintelligible, so that no paraphrase can develop it, it immediately calls up another, more strange a thousand times, that of a being giving itself its law, and giving it contrary to its essence.”¹

I confess I do not find in this much that is

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 145.

clear or tangible, and I find a good deal that is inaccurate. I do not quite understand what is meant by saying that "extension is an extrinsic property of certain states of consciousness super-added to these states." Our (alleged) intuition of extension is very inaccurately expressed by calling it "an extrinsic property of certain states of consciousness." Extension is an object of perception or knowledge in a given time. In this sense alone is it a "property" or a state of consciousness, and the whole question is a simple matter of fact as to whether it is so apprehended. Of course if we start with the usual supposition that consciousness knows only its own states, there is an end of the whole matter. But M. Dauriac does not admit this, for he says that extension is a property—not-mine—while consciousness is, and he allows extension to be known, nay, necessarily known, in order that consciousness should be at all. "Superadded to those states without assignable reason" is of no consequence, unless it be assumed that an intuition cannot possibly be ultimate or without assignable reason—a position which would destroy the very possibility of philosophical method, and is in itself utterly unwarrantable.

Then with regard to the alleged consequence, that if consciousness be one thing and extension another, consciousness must exist before itself and give its law to itself, the dualist has only to say that by "consciousness" he does not mean the act of consciousness which apprehends extension in any given case. This could not exist before the given or definite object—the extension of this time and place. The existence of the conscious act and the definite extension would necessarily be simultaneous. But he is entitled to speak of the percipient or conscious subject as well as the temporary act—the *percipiens* which even M. Dauriac recognises—and there is no incongruity in holding this to be the condition of the possibility of the conscious act itself. This may quite well be one thing and extension another—nay, they must be different, unless we suppose that the extension as perceived creates both the conscious act and the percipient. And what greater incongruity is there in the conscious subject, or subject which is capable of the conscious act, giving "the law" to itself, than in supposing that the Object, extension, gives it, or that this law, of contrast apparently, arises from conflict or

collision between a consciousness not yet existent and an extension not yet existent, but becoming existent through a collision in which neither of these terms, as still non-existent, could take part? The truth is, that there is an essential contradiction in this respect in the whole theory. Extension is not *per se*, consciousness is not *per se*, yet extension beats against consciousness for recognition so that it may exist; it is surely already something—something waiting to be recognised for what it is. It is curious that it should be able to assault consciousness, if it be nothing whatever. Dualism is assumed in order to set up a purely monistic theory—or rather a theory of mere relationship—in which the assumed terms disappear.

It may be perfectly true that we cannot conceive the continued future existence of perceived objects—by extension and resistance—unless as objects to a percipient, and a percipient like ourselves. These are qualities of things relative to us—known as so related—having for us a definite meaning as so related. And when we try to conceive their future or continued existence out of our perception, we may need to postulate a per-

percipient image of ourselves, or an image of a percipient like ourselves. But this does not at all imply that this is the only existence of the things of which extension and resistance may be qualities perceivable by us. This is only to transport our actual perception to the future—but such a transference does not take account of the nature of this perception itself—while it is actually ours, or as a simple matter of fact in our experience. It is just possible that the perception by us of these qualities—say extension, resistance—may, in the first instance, imply more than the mere or actual perception. It may be that the so-called *datum* of sense may imply, not only a percipient and a perception, but a ground or giver, known by us, necessarily inferred by us, it may be, as lying behind and beyond the actual or phenomenal perception of the moment. And indeed unless we suppose that the percipient—each percipient, or in Hume's case each perception, confers reality on the object, or percept—that percepts or qualities exist because we perceive, and therefore equally pass away wholly when we do not perceive them—we must have recourse to a ground of the quality perceived—

to that in the objective which renders each individual perception possible, and which helps to differentiate the perceptions. For unless there be an independent objective ground which transcends the percipient act, there can be no reason in the mere act, or in the percipient himself, for the variety of perceptions which form the actual content of experience. Even granting categories, and space and time as wholly subjective forms, these would not enable us to differentiate as we do the contents of experience. The variety of sensations,—of odour, and taste, and sound, and colour—the manifold of perception,—of form, of size, of number, degrees of resistance, distance, and nearness,—all this would stand wholly unaccounted for on any scheme of mere category, and time and space. This is the very *crux* of idealism. Here it is utterly impotent—here is a field from which it is absolutely barred by its own essential limitations. But if this be so—if there be need for some objective ground for our sensations and perceptions, in the very first or actual experience of them—the transference of the form and fact of our experience to a possible future is no explanation of the continuance of per-

ceived reality. It supposes, in fact, a ground of being deeper than and beyond the actual perception; and when we transfer the image or type of our experience in perception to the future, we transfer this objective ground along with the mere perception. It is thus not in the first instance that things exist because we perceive them, but it is that we perceive them because they exist or have a ground in reality which we do not perceive at all, but which yet exists as the condition of our perceiving anything. If we imagine ourselves or a fellow-man perceiving at some future time as we perceive now, we must imagine ourselves or him perceiving under the same conditions under which we actually perceive. These conditions provide for a reality that transcends the perception itself; and we have no warrant whatever for saying that this objective ceases to be the moment we cease to perceive, or depends for its existence at all on any act of perception of ours. It may be, for aught we know, an inexhaustible objective, superior wholly to our perception — to all individual perception, whatever — grounding and dominating the whole world of external reality. When we say, accordingly, that the perceived

external world would be there if we were there to perceive it, we have not explained *how* it would be there, and we cannot even think it as hypothetically there, and as appearing in perception, unless we think that it has in the future as in the past and present a ground beyond each percipient act.

It is thus necessary to say that, if this objective ground of our actual perception continues, and if we, the percipients, are there to perceive, we shall again have experience of the external world, but not simply that we should have this experience if we were there to perceive, or there with the capacity of perception or sentience. But the former supposition is grounded on the conviction of a reality beyond the quality or percept of our actual experience in the first instance, which may continue, which is not exhausted in the perception, which we believe does continue. And this conviction must not be confounded with the crude notion which attributes continued existence to the sensations, or at least percepts of our consciousness, exactly as perceived by us. The analysis of knowledge shows us that this cannot be in most cases, if indeed in any case. As has

been said, the mind is not a mirror which simply reflects objects as they are,—it is a medium of refraction, and the sensation or percept is always more or less a composite product; but it is a composite product from two factors, the reality of both of which it is necessary to admit before it can be conceived as even possible.

Again, to say that that alone exists or can exist which is self-conscious—which is for itself—is arbitrarily to narrow the denotation of existence. It is further by a definition to foreclose the question as to whether the unconscious—say, extension, resistance, movement, atom—can or cannot be described as existing, supposing it not to possess self-consciousness.

Further, to say that no thing exists, unless there be a consciousness to whom or which it is an object, is not to guarantee the continued existence of material things—extension, atom, molecule—but only to say that if there be a consciousness, or if a consciousness arise to whom they become objects, they will have existence. They have thus only a hypothetical existence. They have no being apart or by themselves. But they would be called into being, if a consciousness

· arose so to call them or confer existence upon them. Nothing exists that is not an object of my · consciousness or some one like me. But we have a more profound difficulty here, for, according to the doctrine, there is no conscious subject *per se*, no substance called soul or spirit, only a consciousness—object, extension, matter—and hence, unless both conscious subject and matter or extension be supposed, there can be no continuity of the latter, of either, or of both. But this is to suppose the continuance of spirit through the continuance of matter,—the very point which the continuance of spirit is adduced to explain.

Again, to say that because external reality springs up and dies in human or animal consciousness, therefore it only exists in and by those consciousnesses, is to confound (known) external reality with unknown or possibly absolute external reality, and thus to beg the question at issue.

If the continued existence of the object of perception be dependent on a subject or subjects to which it is an object of consciousness,—this subject being always finite like ourselves,—then the continued independent existence of those subjects must be postulated. It must be held

that there is a continuity or series of existing self-conscious subjects, to which the object perceived appears, and in which it subsists. Externality to me would thus mean a series of independent conscious or perceiving subjects—different from me, but yet perceiving what I perceived, and so keeping it in being. If things are thus to continue in being, after I as a conscious subject have ceased to be or to perceive, what, it may be asked, is the guarantee I have of their continued and independent reality ?

By a certain process of inference or induction I have come to accept as a fact—to believe—that other conscious subjects, like myself, exist around me. And while I have an apprehension of the signs or grounds on which I hold my fellows to be, I may suppose that the object I perceive is also perceived by ~~them~~, and thus that when my perception ceases for the time, the object still subsists in the perception of one or more of those percipients. But what guarantee have I that after my consciousness ceases or is withdrawn from the world—after I cease to apprehend' the signs on which I infer the actual existence of minds around me now and here—

minds similar to me or to these will continue to exist and to perceive ?

I may think it probable or likely that with the withdrawal of my consciousness from the world other consciousnesses will not cease, that in the future there may be—probably will be—other conscious subjects percipient like myself. There have been others before me in time ; there probably will be others after me. But I have no absolute or complete guarantee of this. I can never, therefore, say with certainty that things will continue to exist after my consciousness is withdrawn from the world. I can thus have no guarantee whatever of the continued reality of objects after my individual perception has ceased.

III.—THE INDEPENDENCE OF THINGS.

M. DAURIAC interprets the realism of common-sense as founding on the distinction of strong and feeble states of consciousness—in fact, the impressions and ideas of Hume—and at the same time as holding that the reality of things is wholly independent of their perception by me, the individual. Things do not cease to be when I cease absolutely to perceive them. *Reality* is not a vain term; it subsists by its proper laws, and these laws, known by us, remain independent of those which regulate us ¹

But the question arises, Wherein precisely lies the nature of the conception of reality as entertained by common-sense? An idealist, according to common-sense, is a man who pretends not to be sure of experiencing what he experiences, or

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 122, 123.

of perceiving what he perceives. Hence when he is struck with a stick he is inconsistent in complaining or crying out on account of the blows. But common-sense alleges that the reality of things does not admit of demonstration. The reality of the object is indemonstrable, because of its immediate evidence. But the meaning at the bottom of this view of common-sense is truly the philosophical distinction of Hume and Mr Herbert Spencer between strong and feeble states of consciousness—impressions and ideas, or images of impressions, memories, or expectations. Common-sense, in a word, is idealistic without knowing it. But the idealist does not deny the distinction between those two states of consciousness, the strong and the weak. Hume expressly admitted this, yet he restricted being to these states. There is no impression of being distinct from the impression experienced or the idea conceived. *Esse* is *percipi*. What the idealist *quod* idealist is concerned to deny is the continued existence of the objects of perception—that is, impressions, in Hume's language—apart from a mind or percipient. It is argued: Suppose that we disappear; then in order that

the world should endure, it would be necessary to leave to our fellows the power of experiencing sensations and localising them instinctively out of themselves. Continued existence of objects of sense means the substitution of others for us when we fail.

But it may be further asked, Have I truly in these signs of others like myself, any guarantee, on the doctrine in question, that my fellows are really independent of me, that they are true externalities—distinct and for themselves—are more than the extension or the motion or the resistance which I perceive? How do I know another consciousness than my own? Not directly, only through *media*. And what are these *media*? The bodies in which they are clothed, the movements or actions which they manifest, the sounds which they utter, and so on. But these are all forms of extension, motion, material qualities. They exist for me as objects of my perception. Only perception or consciousness, we are told, truly confers a reality upon them, as it does upon all material qualities. How, then, can they be anything but existences *for me*? How am I to transcend the magic circle of my subjectivity, in

respect of these particular qualities, when I cannot do it in respect of the qualities of matter in general? It is obvious that if these qualities be real only as I perceive them, and because I perceive them, then the conscious subject, as a percipient which they are supposed to imply and reveal, is also real only in as far as this exists in my consciousness of inference, that is, in my consciousness. And the possibility of a self-existing conscious subject, independent of me, is wholly excluded from knowledge.

But it may be fairly asked, Does what is called common-sense actually mean only this? Does it mean only, as with J. S. Mill, a permanent possibility of sensation? Surely it seeks in some way to account for this possibility, to ground it. A permanent possibility of sensation is as yet but a possibility. How is this possibility to be made actual? By some condition surely, or ground in the objective, in the nature of the world or things. Even suppose we had our fellows, others than ourselves, continuing to exist after us—a supposition which in itself implies independent reality—would the mere possibility on their part of experiencing sensations amount

to the actual or continued existence of these sensations, or even to any cause of them? What we mean by the continued existence of the objects of perception is not a possible but an actual existence, and these conceptions are not at all interchangeable. But it is urged, "If things survive the extinction of our thought, we cannot represent this survival without supposing, in spite of it, the resurrection of thought: the hypothesis destroys itself in its enunciation."¹ This is idealism, and it is, as is alleged, what common-sense itself supposes, for it ultimately refers to contact as the test or sign of reality, and contact is an impression. But does this "resurrection of thought" mean some one like ourselves actually perceiving or feeling as we now do? In this case, we have to explain the power at the root of the resurrection. We have to fall back on that objective ground of perception and sensation which is confessedly independent of us in our own actual experience. And we are no nearer a solution of the continuity of things than we were before. Or we must take the alternative that the actual seeing by these other individuals is the

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 131.

being or making of the things, in which case there is no continuity at all, but a constant reproduction or creation of a certain number of individuals supposed to subsist continuously through time. And this comes pretty well to making the world the idiosyncrasy or peculiar property of each individual, without the slightest guarantee of any community of knowledge.

But the whole conception of the continued existence here sought to be got through the supposition of other egos like me is a narrow one, and this bare being is only obtained through the postulating of a continuous externality higher than the narrow one. Objects of perception continue to exist, if a percipient continues to perceive them; but a percipient continuing to perceive is an existence, and an existence external to and independent of me. And if this sphere of reality be, and be continuous, then I have supposed a continuous external reality of a higher kind—viz., personal—to account for the continuance of a lower reality—viz., the impersonal objects of perception.

If matter be a permanent possibility of sensation, then we are bound to inquire, Does “pos-

sibility of sensation " mean the possibility of the actual occurrence or experience of sensations? If so, two things are needed, and must be postulated—

(a) A permanent cause of the sensations, on which their passage from possibility to actuality will depend.

(b) A sentient, sentience, or consciousness in or for which the sensation will occur, or by which it will be experienced.

Further, if the possibility of the experience be a permanent one, then these two factors must be postulated as permanent. But they are neither of them sensations, though con-causes, and the question of the continued experience of sensations is not solved by the phrase permanent possibility; but this itself, if alleged as a fact or law of experience, depends on what lies beyond itself for its meaning and possibility.

But M. Dauriac's theory is neither consistent with itself nor with the facts of experience. Thus, to take only a few instances—

1. If consciousness demands the opposition of subject and object, every " datum for itself " is at the same time " given for another than itself."

Thus to Berkeley's *esse* is *percipi* we must add *Esse est percipere*, and every *perceptum* is the sign of a *percipiens*.¹ If so, how is this consistent with the author's doctrine that soul or mind means not simple coexistence of opposites—the phenomena, consciousness, and extension,—but, as he says, a fusion, interpenetration of these? And when we are told that the “qualitative irreducibility of phenomena becomes the criterion of the independent existence of things,”² we may well ask what is the meaning of “independent” here, if there be no coexistence but only fusion? And how, further, if there be “qualitative irreducibility,” is there complete fusion? The confusion of the coexistence of the opposed phenomena—consciousness and extension—with their real fusion as truly a single entity, seems to me to run through nearly the whole of M. Dauriac's statements and reasonings. Thus he tells us that Leibniz in his Pre-established Harmony stated a fact of daily experience—viz., that there are two distinct orders of phenomena in relation to each other. But certainly the distinctness referred to by Leibniz is a distinctness of coexist-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 225.

² *Ibid*, p. 226.

ence, not of inseparable fusion or penetration—in fact, an independent coexistence. Never was reciprocal finite independence more completely realised than in the monadistic theory of Leibniz.

• In the following passage it seems to me that M. Dauriac both denies and affirms more than fusion of consciousness and extension—more even than coexistent phenomenal reality: “As soon as the reality of substance is a gratuitous hypothesis, the thesis of the unity of substance has no longer to be discussed, and there is no longer ground for doubting of *the plurality of beings: the extensive proves the external*, for it is hereafter the legalised *sign of it*, therefore incontestable. Consequently, judgments of non-attribution as such are rendered valid, and *every perception* of the extended, that is to say, every percept, becomes immediately the index of *a percipient*. Hence everything represented extended will be henceforward connected, in the consciousness of *the representee*, with the sudden (instantaneous) irresistible conception of an external representing (representer), that is to say, ‘another consciousness.’”¹

• It seems to me that a theory which denies

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 240, 241. (The italics are Prof. Veitch's.)

reality alike to independent consciousness and to independent extension, and which holds reality to lie in these two combined, or fused, or interpenetrated, has no right to recognise a "plurality of beings," or to say that "the extensive proves the external," or that it is "a sign of it," or that every "perception becomes the index of a percipient." And further, it seems to me that the idea of "other representers" or "other consciousnesses" existing independently of ours, while reality is only this twofold, inexplicable fusion of consciousness and extension in us, neither pre-existing, neither independently coexisting, is a simple contradiction in terms. "Other consciousnesses" can only be to us our own consciousness *plus* extension conceived, imagined as duplicated here and now, or duplicated hereafter—then and there; but this imaginary duplication would never make them "other consciousnesses," or anything but a fictional concept of our consciousness. Let being be restricted to the relation M. Dauriac describes, it must stay in that relation—this and nothing more.

2. Again, we are told that body and soul are phenomenal. "They are given in a primitive

synthesis, abstractly decomposable, really indissoluble. The soul is a sum (*ensemble*) of successive phenomena, co-ordinated in one and the same consciousness. Body is a sum of phenomena annexed to the same consciousness, its own in certain respects, and yet excluded from its internality (*intimité*), for extension is common to them, and space contains them. There is no soul without body, and without body spirit is inconceivable.”¹ On the author’s theory, it is impossible there can be “one and the same consciousness.” Consciousness is the term for the one side, or rather element, in a fusion of which extension is the other element,—and this phenomenal reality is necessarily restricted to the condition of succession, and is thus indefinitely varied,—never thus can there be “one and the same consciousness,” except in a purely abstract or generic sense. In fact, it is not properly consciousness at all, but the resultant of what is called consciousness and extension. Further, if body be annexed to the same consciousness and also excluded from it, on the ground of its spatial character or essence, there must be more in existence than

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 233.

the phenomenal fusion of consciousness and extension.

3. M. Dauriac thinks he cuts away the ground of Fichte's position by his theory. The datum in Fichte's view is given by me, and hence there is the restoration of substance or substantial reality. The Ego is duplicated. There is an empirical and a transcendent Ego. The Me is the absolute. But if the Me, as according to M. Dauriac, only exists in opposition to external object, subjective idealism becomes impossible.¹ But surely in this case, the problem as to how the extension is given—it not being created by the consciousness—is left unsolved. It has no reality for itself, any more than the consciousness. There is thus neither a given nor a real recipient.

4. M. Dauriac states and criticises Descartes' view. Descartes would say extended things remain after perception. They are matter of possible perceptions; they remain to be perceived as soon as spirit joined to body appears. Matter is not simply a permanent possibility of sensation. There is persistent substance, and this substance

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 232.

is known; it is *res extensa*. Hence extension, geometrical extension, is the essence of matter. Extension expresses the essence of a reality profoundly heterogeneous from mind—"a thing in itself" wholly distinct from the thing in itself which in us thinks and knows that it thinks.¹ In order to be, this substance has need only of the concurrence of Deity. It is not created by our thought; it exists "in itself," not "for itself," as a consciousness or conscious being does.

M. Dauriac urges against this view that extension as a given percept involves contradiction. Matter is extended and comprehends an actual infinity of parts. But an infinity of parts cannot be given in act; yet, if the whole be given, the number of parts is also given. Extension, therefore, cannot be a given percept or mere concept—it would as such be finite and infinite at once. Hence extension—the extension of intuition—cannot be objectively real; and this holds even of intelligible extension, for it is spatial, and this implies divisibility to infinity.

It may be said, however, that this division without termination is our work,—that it is

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 238.

imaginary,—and hence the infinity of parts is not given, only exists in imagination. Nay, the ultimate analysis of a particle of matter shows it to be composed of a definite, and therefore finite, number of physical indivisibles, whose juxtaposition makes up extension. Hence material extension is not indefinitely divisible. But it is said, in reply, the limits of distinct perception do not coincide with those of possible division,—and the division will thus never be arrested until the mind finishes it, which it never will. Hence if extension exists, it is not indefinitely divisible; but indefinite divisibility is essential to it, hence extension does not exist.

The given extension of intuition—any material extended thing—is of course finite, bounded in space. If this is indefinitely divisible, is there necessarily a contradiction of its finitude as a percept? Division to infinity is never actually realised. There is no *actual* infinity of parts confronting or alongside the actually perceived or conceived finitude or limitation in space. This finite material extension is possibly divisible in our thought indefinitely—it may be infinitely through all time—but it is never

actually so divided ; and it cannot, therefore, be said that this possible division conflicts with the actual finitude of the object perceived. To perceive or conceive a finite extension, and to imagine that this extension is indefinitely divisible, is not to negate the finitude of the percept by the actual infinity of another percept or even concept.

But the argument, if valid at all, goes a great deal further than M. Dauriac would allow ; for if intelligible extension be essentially contradictory, it can never even be subjective—can never be a concept at all—and thus his whole theory collapses. If the consciousness be dependent for its reality on an intelligible essentially contradictory—an object conceived finite, yet at the same time necessarily infinite—this is fatal to the reality of the relation in which it appears or is conceived. In the relation of reality made up by consciousness *plus* extension, extension has at least an ideal or intelligible existence. This it cannot have, if the very concept of it, as both limited and unlimited, be essentially contradictory. It is no concept at all ; and the argument not only destroys its “objective reali-

sation," but its subjective existence as ideal or intelligible.

The truth is, that perceived extension as always necessarily limited means not properly extension itself, but matter extended or in space — space - occupying. And when we speak of indefinite divisibility in this connection, we do not properly refer to the matter perceived, but to the space which it necessarily occupies. We always perceive the matter, we always think it in space. But it is not the space we perceive, but the bounded matter in the space. And this — the matter — while conceived as indefinitely divisible, is never indefinitely, far less infinitely, extended. The actual extent of the matter is never increased by the possibility of even its infinite divisibility — not one whit. And there is no contradiction whatever in supposing that this finite extended matter remains precisely the same finite extended matter, while from the condition of its occupying space it always admits of being conceived as divisible. The infinite or definite divisibility does not make the matter perceived more than it is perceived — more in coextension — much less infinite, but it opens up a relation of

the matter to indefinite or infinite time—a relation which by us can never be actually realised; and this relation, as truly a time-relation, in no way conflicts with or opposes the definite bounded space-relation of coexistence of the parts. Matter, the smallest portion of it, we conceive as in respect of space bounded, as in respect of time divisible to infinity; but this time possibility is of a wholly different order of conception from that of matter actually perceived or conceived, and has no function either of addition or diminution of its quantum. So far as this argument goes, accordingly, extended matter may or may not have objective reality.

M. Dauriac will have nothing to do with “substance,”—that is, as he views it, a reality existing out of relation to another. This of course obscures the true idea of substance, but meanwhile let it pass. The fundamental relation is of consciousness to extension, of extension to consciousness, as wholly opposed—mine and not-mine, me and not-me. Here all is phenomenal, and phenomenal only as in the relation. The phenomenon isolated from all relation on one side, and, on the other, the relation isolated from

all term,—these are the abstractions. Re-establish the interrupted communication, and the concretes reappear. Renounce the concretes, and the words Being and Reality are meaningless. Beyond the relation and the terms—that is, phenomena—there is nothing.¹ He contends thus for more than mere relation. He holds by terms, called phenomena. But to allow them to exist out of the relation, is to set up substances. There are only phenomena, but it is not maintained that phenomena exist apart from each other.²

But it is quite clear that on this theory not only substance—that is, a reality subsisting in and for itself—disappears, but we cannot even maintain the coexistence of the phenomena in any sense of the word; and with the abolition of this coexistence the relation itself is annulled. All that really exists is a relation or opposition in which one term is necessarily posited as opposed to another. There is mutual, reciprocal opposition. But opposition apart from coexisting opposites, either actual or ideal, is an impossibility. A relation of opposition is a point in which two coexisting things, call them pheno-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 247, 248.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

mena or what you will, are conceived as opposed. It is utterly impossible that this opposition can be anything unless there are coexisting opposites which are opposed in this particular, and which are known to me as a cognitive subject in the first place apart from the particular opposition. I cannot speak of, cannot conceive, an opposition between terms neither of which I beforehand know. This is the true meaning of a term or terms in an opposition. Terms imply objects cognised by me as real, or concepts as at least ideally existent, and as affording thereupon or thereafter a point or relation of opposition. To say that the opposition—the relation—affords or gives me the terms, that the terms only exist in and through the opposition, is to make the relation which is purely secondary and derivative the very essence of the terms themselves—to make, in fact, the child the parent, and thus to confuse the whole conditions of intelligible thinking. The necessity of the pre-existence and coexistence of the terms of a relation annihilates the whole theory of the exclusive reality of the terms as related or rather known to be related. And this is the essence of the whole of M. Dauriac's theory.

There is still another point of importance. Between the terms consciousness and extension, as in the relation, there is opposition and nothing but opposition, and each is real only as opposed, as in conflict. Now, is there any such relation as that of absolute opposition between two terms possible? Must there not be some community of character or nature between two positive terms said to be opposed? In contrary opposition there is necessarily a community of nature. This holds between terms of the same class—species or genus—as *black* and *white*, *virtuous* and *vicious*. However opposed, they still belong to the same universe, and hence the mere opposition does not exhaust their nature or being. Even in contradictory opposition between positives—as *extended* and *unextended*, *animate* and *inanimate*—there is a community of nature. The terms belong to the sphere of the existent—real or ideal. You cannot escape community of nature in the most absolute opposition conceivable, provided you deal with positive terms, as you do in the case in consciousness and extension. But if this be so, their *whole* reality cannot lie in their opposition. They have a nature besides—they

are, they are existent really or ideally. In order to be known as opposed, they must be known to be, and they must be known further as fulfilling the conditions of the conceivable. Reality merged in simple absolute opposition is the very vainest of concepts.

M. Dauriac's treatment of the monadology of Leibniz is both fresh and instructive. First the idea of the Pre-established Harmony is recognised as simply a fact of our daily experience. The world as a sum of beings, not the totality of being, commends itself to M. Dauriac. This answers well to the monadology. But Leibniz has not proved the reality of his monads.¹ He has postulated the monads, and found the condition, fundamental if not sufficient, which all reality is held to fulfil. He has not demonstrated realism. He has found, however, the formula of it. That is, all being is a consciousness — "a datum for itself."² Thus Leibniz denied the essential point in Berkeleyanism. He said practically *esse* is not *percipi*; it is *percipere*. This would certainly be true if we regarded each monad as a centre of representations

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 225.

² *Loc. cit.*

—a conscious unity, capable of representing the universe from its own point of view, though that universe never appears to it or can be phenomenally presented to it. Leibniz filled the world with an actual infinity of monads, ranging from the unconscious to the conscious substance. This is the very counterpart of the Berkeleyan conception — of a single Divine Unity upon which every perception or percipient depends. Each of us is a monad—conscious, percipient; but each is only one amid the infinity in which all are placed. These substances constitute the universe, each, it may be, sharing in a dim degree of perception, from the lowest to the highest. Where I am not, these others are, and so the universe subsists.

M. Dauriac would apparently accept this view, although it goes far beyond his definite statement, as implying real substantial coexistence of the elements of the world. He no doubt objects to “an actual infinity of monads” as contradictory of the actual universe. But he says, “Let us people our world with an unimaginable, yet not unassignable, number of psychical individuals, be it monads, that is to say, units of

perception *always in some degree conscious*," and we might supposably have the theory of the universe. The idea of "unconscious perception" is as contradictory as that of extension in itself. Leibniz may have meant simply by unconscious the limit towards which perception would tend without ever attaining it, a perception of indefinitely decreasing intensity.¹

The modification is needed. Leibniz tells us the monad has "no doors or windows." Consciousnesses, no doubt, are reciprocally impenetrable; no consciousness can become that of another. But can one consciousness not penetrate, not know another? Each monad is a closed whole. It knows only itself shut up within the *enccinte* of its own perceptions. This leads to Monism, the opposite of Monadism. If the monad is not aware that other monads near it coexist with it, this implies Monism, for it is no longer the author of its own representations. These depend on the primary Monad. A monad which knows the changes of other monads, and of the universe, and has no communication with these—any one or all—is necessarily dependent

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 242. .

for its representations on the one monad at the root of all; and this applies necessarily to all the changes of the monads, and thus to all the changes in the universe. But unless there be reciprocal knowledge and action as between the coexisting monads, there could be no ground or change in any one. We could not change if nothing around us changed.¹

M. Dauriac no doubt supposes his theory to be analogous to that of Leibniz, but it is certainly not identical in the essential point; and in speaking of it as a "monadistic phenomenalism," he indicates clearly that it is much more extreme than that of Leibniz. If to *perceive* with Leibniz implies a *percipiens*, or (conscious) subject, we are already far beyond the mere phenomenal relationism of consciousness and extension. We are, in truth, back to the idea of substance, or the subsistent, in one main sense of the term.

M. Dauriac's view of the Divine is a very fair test of the application of his theory. "If there be a divinity," he tells us, "this is either the Absolute—that is, an unintelligible—or it is a

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 243.

person, and a person which it is impossible not to *incarnate* in the profound sense of the term. It is not only when Christ descends into the bosom of Mary that God becomes man; in creation, God makes himself Word. But the day the first Word was, there were beings who understood it. Unfortunately, it escapes the defenders of Christian metaphysics that personality excludes pure spirituality, not less than immensity and eternity; and that if the world, in order to be, has need of God, in order that God should be there is need of the world. And if it be objected that we lessen God by taking from him that by which his idea surpasses us, it is perhaps because the religious problems—even within the limits of reason—are not, properly speaking, philosophical problems. Picture to yourselves a time when time was not, an immensity anterior to space, a consciousness capable of self-consciousness without determining itself, of determining itself without limiting itself, of limiting itself without dividing itself (se segmenter), and you will have the idea of a God anterior and superior to the world; you will have a contradictory concept—that is, a pseudo-concept.

Imagine, now, a being flowing into time, knowing that it exists and thinks, and capable of thinking without experiencing sensations. Do you try it in vain? Be it so; introduce sensation, and extension will follow. Not-me, body, extension—these are distinct terms, signs of one and the same reality. But there is no me without a not-me. The Me, the successive conscious being (conscient), that which implies the synthesis of the changing and the enduring—time,—these are the distinct terms by which the ideas are designated. Time is born with consciousness; but with this space appears. Hence time and space are twin brothers—twins equally, those pretended hostile brothers which are called soul and body. No spirit without matter.¹

In so far as this passage criticises a current conception of Deity, taken in its literality as at once absolute and relative, undetermined and determined—and of Personality as qualified by immensity and eternity—there is nothing to object. But exception certainly may be taken to the statements that Personality excludes “pure spirituality,” and that an extended world, even

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 233, 234.

this world apparently, is necessary to constitute God. This dogmatism is rash and unguarded, and, as I have attempted already to show, even in regard to the concept of a finite consciousness, not founded in reason or fact. It may be that we can form no concept of a God who is not a Person—nay, that we ought not in reason to seek to form any such concept—and that a self-conscious personality is not conceivable unless as implying an object of knowledge. But we are not, therefore, warranted in saying that this personality is only possible as joined to or immanent in an extended world—in body or matter—that it is necessarily incarnate in this, and that this is as necessary to God as he is to it. There is nothing in the analogy of our own experience to warrant this—much indeed against it. And it would legitimately end in supposing that the present world or system is the only one possible, because coeternal with God, as necessary to his very consciousness, and therefore to his being. If he is not, until or as *a* world is, then this must be *the* world that is; for as only co-conscious with the world, he is helpless to create any world that is not.

IV.—BEING AND LAW.

M. DAURIAC, carrying with him the doctrine that existence in any form, material or other, is inseparable from that of consciousness or consciousness and object known—a centre or representation—proceeds to sketch what he calls a phenomenal theory of being which should wholly exclude “substance.” This under the heading of “Being and Law.”¹ In Section III. he comes to deal especially with the relations of Being and Law.² We must attend carefully to his definition of phenomenon. In reality, according to his view, there is not one phenomenon, or a phenomenon by itself. There is always at the lowest (1) sensation and (2) subject of sensation. “Every phenomenon is a term in a relation; but a relation implies always more than one term. Hence

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 223.

² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

the phenomenon does not exist in isolation." If it did so, this would be substance. Again, being is not the result of juxtaposition, such as putting together the parts of a clock, nor is it the result of composition, for the composite elements do not pre-exist. There is no phenomenon apart from relation, as there is no relation apart from phenomena. We have a habit of supposing every relation to be of the mathematical order—abstract. We have another habit of supposing that this relation has a certain logical anteriority, and this is readily converted into an imaginary pre-existence.¹

It is generally held that a rigorous phenomenalism excludes both substance and law. But this is apparently denied. The idea of phenomenon implies that of relation, and that of relation implies stability and periodicity. Absolute change is contradictory. All change is perceived in a consciousness; and unity of apperception is indispensable to the perception of change. And to conceive change we need to assume the persistence and psychical identity of the spectator.

But were being the result of the association of

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 248, 249.

phenomenon and law, the conclusion would seem to be that the individual is absorbed in the genus, or at least in the species. Law is general; phenomenon is particular (individual). Hence phenomenon is absorbed in law, or law is dissipated among phenomena. Phenomenon is thus prior and superior to law. There are more individuals than types, more facts than laws. Hence the principle of individuation is deeper than law. We fall back on the doctrine of substance. The essence of law consists in generality and constancy. A law must be permanent or periodic in its manifestations, and consequently envelop a multiplicity either stable or moving. The principle of individuation—if not substance—ought to be sought, and if possible found, in relations, general, constant, immanent in the individual itself. But can general relations be realised and coexist in one individual?—relations constituting it member of a species? We profess to find the law in the individual without going out of it, without comparing it with others than itself.¹

In one point of view there is a good deal in

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 251.

this doctrine which is sound. It is true that the essential features of the individual constitute its character, as opposed to the accidental and passing,—that what is constant or periodic is more characteristic than what is not. It is true also in a sense that the essential features of the individual are not transmissible to another coexisting individual even of the same species. They are real for him, and only for him, though it is forgotten that precisely the same thing might be said of the accidents or peculiarities of the individual. These too are real for him, and for him alone. It is true, further, that the essentials of the species or class are found realised in the single individual as marks or features,—that it is through comparison of similarly constituted individuals that we form conceptions of classes,—that the perfect or typical individual of the class is the ultimate test in experience by which to determine the essentials of the class, though it may fairly be said that the inspection of the individual merely—its comparison with itself—could never lead us to fix on those essential qualities which it may possess in common with other and varying individuals. To fix on essential qualities in the

individual is a process of abstraction from its accidents, and these essential features are suggested to us by observation of them in others. They are just as essential to the class as to the individual itself. Besides, in order to know the essential properties of any individual we have to set it in various relations to other individuals.

But the question must be met as to how individuals are distinguished, and how they are regarded each as an identity? Whence comes it that the individual recognises itself, and that we recognise it? Whence comes its identity? This has its source in "the persistence of character." Hypnotism establishes the fact that it is sufficient to efface the memory of a person in order to take from him his personality, and substitute for his natural character an artificial one.¹ But character is a sum of habitudes, and every habitude is "a general mode of being." Habitude is a law—that is, it is either without intermission, or it is periodical. In either case, it is a law. As every individual has its habitudes, every one has its laws. The office of these is to restrain accident within just limits. The individual can share his

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 252.

beliefs and sympathies with its fellows, but only share them. The individual always retains something which cannot be transmitted, and this something is not accident¹

From this it is inferred, following Lotze, that individuality consists in a general rule dominating the development of the individual, but not extending beyond it. If, in place of comparing a thing with others, we compare it with itself in its different states, it will be found that the continuity and legality which we have noticed in its development are such as not to be incapable of reproduction by another as its own. Hence it is wrong to consider the essence of the thing as an instance of a general law under which it comes. It is admitted that the necessary order of research leads us to regard general laws as the *archetype* to which naturally the real with its diversity ought later to subordinate itself as an example. But we ought to remember that all general laws spring up for us from the comparison of isolated cases. These are really the *archetype*, and the general law which we deduce from them is at first only a product of our thought, the validity

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 252.

of which rests upon the comparison of numerous experiences which have given rise to it.

The statement about hypnotism suggests the weakness of the theory. There must be an identity below the characters, otherwise an artificial character could not take the place of a natural one in the same individual. Unless the unity and identity of the individual be supposed, there would be not merely the substitution of one character for another, but the succession of two individuals. The real or metaphysical identity of the subject cannot thus be disposed of, and to say that the different successive characters are two individuals is simply to beg the question at issue.

A theory of this sort obviously cannot be described as phenomenism in any proper sense of the term. It may be called Individualism or Monadism. The phenomenon is not the only existence; it has, indeed, no existence *per se*. It exists only as it is in relation to a conscious subject; and the world is conceived as made up of a plurality or totality of such conscious subjects, each holding an object or phenomenon or representation. This is properly substantialism—sub-

jective substantialism. We really fall back on the idea of substance—or of self-centred subjects, an indefinite number of which make up the world. These are supposed to be really independent. But it may be asked, How is this reciprocal independence of existence compatible with the condition of knowledge already laid down? If knowledge be simply a relation in which “I” the knower apprehend a phenomenon or object, and if the object *be* only as thus apprehended, each monad must exist only as it exists in the knowing of it by “me” or some conscious intelligence. It never can exist independently of “me” or a conscious subject. No one monad can exist independently of “me” the knower, and there cannot thus be a plurality of independently existing monads in the world.

All this leaves the two fundamental questions at issue wholly untouched—viz., (1) the true ground or essence of individuality, and (2) the question of an archetype, in the form of an idea, transcending experience, and grounding even, it may be, that realisation of it which we find in the individual.

In the first place, the comparison of the indi-

vidual with itself, and the consequent contrast of essential and accidental in its states, points to a reality in the individual itself as more than either the essential or the accidental features, and even as containing both. The nature, so to speak, of the individual comprehends both—is more than either—and cannot therefore lie in the former, in either, or in both.

In the second place, the fact that there is a type or idea realised in the individual is not explained by the fact that it is so realised. There is just as much difficulty in accounting for the single realisation as for the many common realisations which we gather together and classify. It is true that the reality of law in our experience ultimately depends on the individuals which are conformed to it. Its reality as a fact of experience would disappear with the extinction of the individuals which exemplify it. And this reality would still subsist, although it were not true or proved to be true that the law exists as an ideal in a transcendent intelligible world. But the question still remains as to how the order implied in the law has been constituted—whether this depends on an Intelligence supreme

and transcending experience, or whether the order is immanent in the individuals which exhibit it. A law conceived by us may be an abstraction from individual facts, and we may not impose it on the facts, but the question always remains as to how it has come to be in the facts at all.

M. Dauriac's answer to the question as to the origin of genera, species, laws, is simply the agnostic one. He puts the position thus: We are not the authors of our natural character, still less of the features which make us human. We are the authors neither of the world nor of the ideas which regulate it. These ideas do not seem to be capable of subsisting themselves, floating above beings and presiding over their development. Why not then seek a seat in an understanding the archetype of ours, capable of producing them, coexisting with a power capable of making them pass into actuality?

But he asks, Can we maintain that all consciousnesses come from one supreme consciousness? If so, this supreme consciousness would either imply (involve) them, in which case their derivation would be illusory, or it would exist before them, in which case it would abolish itself.

Besides, all consciousness implies conflict—plurality. Monism is the necessary result of either alternative. The world and God would be contemporaneous, and Being would result from their union; or God, before making himself Lord, and, abandoning himself to the full and free expansion of his power, would remain folded up in himself in the state of essence, not yet determined to exist. It would be Substance anterior to its attributes. He alone would be, and from him all would emanate. To touch those questions, and to reduce all reality to phenomena and their laws, without asking whence these are derived, is the mark of wisdom. The first duty of thought to itself is the recognition of its just limits, and this recognition imposes the resolution of not going beyond them.¹

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 257.

V.—PHENOMENAL MONADISM.

THE conceptions of Substance and Phenomenon in speculative use have of late been subjected to much searching criticism by writers in Germany and France. Lotze, Renouvier, Pilon, and lastly Dauriac, have taken part in the analysis of those concepts. The result, in the case of those authors, is a philosophical system which returns in a measure to Leibniz. It accepts a form of his Monadism, but throws out the idea of Substance, and substitutes as a new conception what may be called Phenomenal Monadism. This new line—a certain foreign form of Neo-Kantianism—merits some attention. The analysis as given by M. Dauriac is sufficiently clear, though presented in a somewhat fragmentary form. We may try to gather up the threads, and form a sort of a conclusion about it.

M. Dauriac at the outset notes two meanings of the term Substance.¹ It may mean that which subsists (*id quod subsistit*); in this case there is a contrast between the permanency of being and the passing character of the modes of being. Or it may mean that which stands under, as a substrate (*id quod substat*), which is the ground of the properties and modes of the thing. This substrate will be one, while the properties or modes may be manifold. It cannot be doubted that we naturally regard what we call *being* in both these aspects. We believe that something subsists or is permanent in our shifting experience of things; we suppose that change is possible only through permanency; that there is a transition or transmutation in things or qualities; and this implies a something in the sphere of being, which subsists and persists, and in which this change takes place or is accomplished. There is a course or order in things, but this is of some being or beings in the course. This conception of subsistence is very closely connected with that of substance proper. We suppose a substrate or substance as the per-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 179.

manent that underlies, as it were, those qualities or manifestations which fill up the sphere of our empirical apprehension.

M. Dauriac here calls upon us to note that, while the concept of substrate implies that of permanency, the concept of permanency does not imply that of substrate. The reason he gives seems to be that because "the qualities remain always adherent to the same *core* or nucleus (*noyau*), and because a certain number of them, distinct from accidents, cannot be conceived isolated from the substance without this disappearing, it does not follow that this nucleus is distinct from the qualities."¹ We are the dupes of abstraction: we take one quality out of the indecomposable whole and name it, and insensibly attach to it an independent existence. We restore it to the whole to which it belongs, and in so doing have recourse to the entity of substance. But there never was any concrete separation. Let the abstraction cease, and the reality will show itself as it is, and as it had never ceased to be.

This does not seem to me to be either a pro-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 179.

found or a satisfactory criticism. The phrase "distinct from the qualities," as applied to the nucleus, is not an accurate description of substance as substrate. "Distinct" from its qualities it obviously cannot be, or even be conceived. We do not need to contend for this in the conception of substance proper, and in order to show that the concept of permanency implies that of substrate. The question truly refers to the meaning and implication of permanence of being amid explained change of being. Looking at the changing course of things, or, if you choose, appearances as given in experience, the question is, Can this be conceived by us without supposing that at the root of the whole there is a substrate or ground—that is, being which undergoes the change or manifests it? It seems to me that this change, orderly change as it is, cannot be conceived by itself—cannot be conceived apart from a ground in the objective itself—which, as subsisting in time through change, is essentially independent of the successive passing forms or qualities which it may present to our knowledge.

This substance or ground of manifested being is of course not a percept or representation of

experience. It is a concept implied in the perceptions or representations of experience. But it is not necessary to contend for what is called a pure concept of substance, or a concept of substance in itself or *per se*. There is no more a concept of this sort than there is a concept of phenomenon *per se*. The substance conceived is the term or ground of a relation, and is known to us only in this relation, but not as the relation. And its reality is not necessarily exhausted in any one of its relations that we do know, or in all of its relations that we can know.

In this connection it may at once be conceded that there is in our experience no pure or mere spiritual substance in the sense of a pure Ego, or self apart from states of consciousness. Of this we have neither intuition nor conception. We can no doubt abstract from this or that individual state of consciousness, and think of the Ego as common to both or all. We might even go the length in abstraction of thinking of one Self or Ego as in the Universe—of one Supreme Personality, of which all finite personalities are as the type to the prototype. But the one finite Ego can be conceived by us only as in this or

that determinate form of consciousness; and the Supreme Ego can, as conceived by us, only be conceived under the same limitation—that is, we must think it as a finite Ego, and take our concept simply analogically as the type of the Supreme. Nor need we care to object to the description of the subject of consciousness as not a substrate but a personality, if by substrate be meant anything distinct from personality. We need not contend for anything but an empirical Ego or Self—certainly not “a void consciousness which makes of itself two parts, and localises each of these parts in distinct portions of duration.”¹ But the self in personality and identity is a substrate in this sense, that it is the ground of the continuous and successively known states of consciousness; that it is never wholly in them or exhausted by the sum of them; that in a true significance it is their support; that self is by nature prior, while the state is in knowledge the revealer of the self.

Schopenhauer holds that we can know the thing-in-itself, because we ourselves are to ourselves objects of knowledge, and because in ex-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 176.

exercising will we put forth from the interior of self an act of the thing-in-itself. Every time a voluntary act penetrates the consciousness of the knowing subject, we have an instance of the thing-in-itself, whose being is not subject to time, effectuating its direct appearance in the phenomenon.¹ We are things-in-themselves, and we appear, or come into consciousness. But it is alleged, on the other hand, either that the term volition has no meaning, or that it designates a class of representations of which consciousness is the genus and self-activity the species. This may be readily conceded; but it does not touch the question as to volition being possibly the ultimate manifestation of personality, and personality an unconditioned cause; although this is probably the nearest approach to the thing-in-itself we shall be able to find or to conceive.

It is held that the notion of substance is not of any use in the explanation of the stable part of beings and things. It is maintained that substance, when identified with cause is contradictory, since every act of causation implies

a change, not only in its term, but in its principle. At the same time, the partisans of substance—at least the spiritualists—have held it to be not inert, but endowed with activity, even self-activity. But, it is said, to act is to change, and to attribute the capacity of change to substance is to suppress it. Either, therefore, substance as inert is an empty concept, or, acting, it ceases to be substance.

This may be met at once by a direct denial of the assumption involved. Substance as cause does imply influence and change in the object affected; it does imply change in the subject affecting. An act of volition is a change in the subject of it, and the object upon which it is exercised also undergoes change; but it does not follow that the subject or substance is suppressed. It is not so necessarily. If a definite quantity of motion passes into heat, the motion may be said to be suppressed or to cease to be. But this is phenomenal change—the change of one quality into another. But the volition which I put forth in no way suppresses me, any more than the act of knowledge which I exercise. The concept and reality of substance still remain. These are

unaffected as to their essential nature by the passing act. It is not necessary to the conception of substance that it should be regarded as absolutely immobile. It may quite readily be taken as an active—even self-active—but unexhausted cause. All total or absolute change or transmutation would certainly destroy it; but partial change as in this or that manifestation does not destroy it—nay, it shows its permanent or unexhausted nature.

Lotze, while denying substance, admits substantiality. The change in the world is not capricious or wholly incessant. Hence there is substantiality. This means “that things do not exist by a substance which is in them, but they exist when they can produce in themselves an appearance of substance.”¹

It is urged against this that it is the “appearance” of substance which denotes its reality. The thesis of Parmenides was “no phenomenon, nothing but substance.” The phenomenalism of Hume admitted mental laws of association. Hence not pure or mere phenomenalism does not follow, for there is a regulated becoming;

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 182.

and this implies a something which dominates it and imposes modifications and conditions.¹

Must we therefore admit substance? No; for the *becoming*, of which the *permanent* does not give an account, is a primitive datum and as such is inexplicable. The definite direction of the course of things, and the reality of the order of the world, will then be posited as primary truths; and this order will be expressed, not explained, by the concept of law. Hence we say, "Substance is not, but wherever law reigns there is an appearance of substance." But it may be alleged, If there be law, there is volition; and as the law is regulative, it is the volition of a Being anterior and supreme. What is this but the Absolute Substance, in some form or other—Spinozistic or post-Kantian?

Kant's view of the noumenon as wholly incognisable does not seem compatible with his view that its existence is necessitated by the phenomenal. If this noumenon have any relation to the phenomenal whatever, it will be necessary to say that it appears in various forms in the phenomenal, and therefore, relatively at

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 183.

least, is cognisable. Kant himself, in the *Practical Reason*, attributes to man a super-temporal freedom. In one aspect, man belongs to the world of experience, where all is determined; in another, he belongs to or participates in the noumenon and thing-in-itself, and as such he is free. Hence moral obligation is possible.¹ The Absolute thus descends into the sphere of experience in the form of freewill. Hence "the resurrection" of the Absolute in the post-Kantian philosophers of Germany.²

This Absolute will vary according to the conception of its essence in the different systems. Its determinations will follow the conception of its essence. But, as a rule, the Absolute has in all the same fundamental character—"that of being immanent in the world, of realising itself in its phenomena, and of arriving in man at the highest degree of perfection capable of being attained by an absolute, which from the moment it is incarnate necessarily decays."³

The other form of the Absolute—that of Descartes—is the conception, the spiritualistic conception, of the Infinite—perfect, transcen-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 184, 185.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Loc. cit.*

dent—author and father of the world. It is held, however, that this absolute is not ultimately known. It is not pretended that here knowing and being are coadequate or as to extent convertible. Thus, as M. Paul Janet remarks, Descartes said we can conceive God, but not comprehend him. Malebranche said we can know God only by his idea—that is, so as to be able to deduce his properties from his essence, as is the procedure of Geometry. We are immersed in God as in light, by which we see all things without knowing what it is in itself. Spinoza said that we know but two attributes of God, while he possesses an infinity. Theology says that God is a God concealed. Philosophy, as illustrated by these thinkers, may thus be taken as the relative knowledge of the absolute, or the human knowledge of the divine.¹

On the other hand, it is alleged that while Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza held only a partial knowledge of the Absolute or God, they yet held this knowledge to be adequate, true, and real so far as it went. They believed that in the human mind the being of God was par-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 186.

tially at least reflected—that it was a mirror so far showing God as he is. They had no conception of the modern view of the relativity of knowledge,—as understood, for example, by Kant,—with whom our knowledge may be said to be a refraction from, not a reflection of, things. Theirs was a dogmatic system in which knowledge was held to be at least partially adequate to the reality of Deity.¹ He was not an existing something wholly unknown as to predicate or attribute.

The partial but *quasi*-adequate knowledge of the absolute asserted in Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza is a dogmatism, and proceeds on the assumption of the capacity of the understanding to reflect things as they are, whether in respect of the invisible or the intelligible world. But since Kant we cannot maintain such a knowledge of the absolute. We must be contented with a knowledge relative to our means of knowing.²

But when we come “to define” Deity—that is, to assign him certain predicates, so as to bring him within knowledge—the question arises as to their connotation or meaning. Descartes ex-

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, pp. 187, 188.

² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

plains that by the name God he understands "a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, &c."¹ Are the words "infinite," "eternal," &c., not simply synonyms? Can each of these terms or concepts be regarded as representing the fulness of being—the positing of the real without any limit, either in respect of quality or quantity? Is the elaboration of each of these concepts taken by itself possible? Or is not the elaboration arrested at the very commencement by a sudden contradiction?²

It is maintained, further, that the conception of any absolute whatever is interdicted to us. Mr Spencer attempts to found on the distinction of special and general existence. "The distinction which we feel between special and general existence is the distinction between that which changes in us and that which does not change. The contrast between the absolute and the relative in our minds is at bottom only the contrast between the mental element which exists absolutely and the elements which exist relatively."³ To this it is objected that, even if

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 188. ² *Ibid.*, p. 189. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

it were so, there is not implied the superposition of a non-empirical consciousness of Absolute Being upon the empirical consciousness of individual being.

Hamilton, as is well known, excluded the Absolute or Unconditioned from thought, on the ground that to think is to condition. M. Carrau challenges the universality of this statement. It has a logical but not a psychological reference; it holds within the limits of the empirical consciousness; but there is a deeper consciousness than this, which is the principle or ground of it. "This higher consciousness is not, however, transcendent, as the noumenal ME of Kant, but immanent in the closest manner in ourselves. It is definable as the sentiment or intuition of being. This is identical with the *νόησις* of Plato, the active intellect of Aristotle; it subsists even in the ecstasy of the Alexandrian school; it is the idea of being which Leibniz lays down as at the foundation of all our judgments; it is the idea of God with Spinoza, the intellectual intuition of Schelling, the immediate intuition of the Infinite of Cousin. It is not conditioned and it does not condition, in the sense that it is the principle of

every particular and discursive thought, and that its object is being which no negation limits." Logically, the duality of subject and object always subsists, and hence thought is always necessarily conditioned. But the thesis is psychological. "It is affirmed that in the subject there is apprehended an element of pure thought, thought of being, anterior to all particular thoughts, of particular and fugitive things; that is the unconditioned; not, if you wish, the logical unconditioned, but the real unconditioned: it is, in other words, the primordial and fundamental intuition which renders possible all others, and is not itself determined by any."¹

The objection made to this is that the object here supposed to be apprehended is only abstract, or rather virtual thinking—possible thought as yet undetermined as to object. It is the conception of what I do not yet think, but which I could think. But as soon as such a thought should reach act or actuality, it would cease to be unconditioned, and so would its object.²

¹ L. Carrau, *La Philosophie Religieuse en Angleterre*, pp. 175, 176.

² *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 192.

It might be added further, by way of criticism, that it is very difficult to understand what is meant by an intuition of being psychologically, that is, anterior in time to any definite thought or intuition. Has such an alleged intuition or act of consciousness any meaning at all? It is not a purely logical priority, according to which we might think one concept or object as ground of another; it is a real priority as a matter of fact. It is as much, then, to be apprehended in an intuition, as the colour, or sound, or figure I perceive, and it is before all. I confess I can attach no meaning to any such alleged act or object of consciousness.

But the difficulty is increased when we consider that it has no content, it is wholly unconditioned; has no limit or quality of any sort. I do not see how this can be called an object of intuition; and if it were such, I do not see of what profit it would be in helping us to the knowledge of the Absolute, or, for that matter, to any knowledge whatever. We should still be left to our actual experience or empirical consciousness to fill up its content; and however extensive as a concept *being* might be, it would

still only mean for us what the empirical consciousness might be able to put into it. Being as here used is obviously an abstraction—the object of a concept—partly founded on particular intuitions, and partly regulating them. It is the revelation of something wider than itself which each individual intuition carries with it. A logical priority may be detected in it, after or along with our particular experience; but prior to this experience we do not know it, and apart from some particular experience we cannot think it. Nor has it any power of a principle—at least as causative of experience—whatever regulative function it may have.

Then it should not be lightly admitted that any psychological act can transcend the conditions of logical law. These acts—the psychological and the logical—are within the sphere of one and the same consciousness. And if the former can yield knowledge which transcends the conditions of the latter—if we can perceive, for example, what we cannot think—say, what is repugnant to the conditions of the thinkable—we have something very near contradiction, which makes it difficult for us to say on which

side knowledge and truth lie. If we can perceive an object which is not only undetermined, but unconditioned, and if at the same time we cannot think this object consistently with the relation of subject and object at all, our intuitional consciousness gives us as true and real what we cannot conceive or even consistently know. This is going much further than holding, as some do, that the inconceivable *may* be real. It is saying that it actually is, that though inconceivable—in the degree of reuniting the distinction of subject and object—it is within consciousness. This is not a reasonable position. On a system which denies to thought the power of realising aught save the conditioned or determinate, it is inconsistent to hold the direct intuition or consciousness of an unconditioned being. We cannot perceive that which is inconceivable. We may conceive what we do not—even cannot—perceive, but we cannot perceive that which we are unable to conceive in the widest sense of the term.

*It is remarked by M. Dauriac that Mr Spencer's doctrine carries him further than he desires to go. He applies to the Absolute or Unconditioned

the term unknowable. But what cannot be known cannot be thought. The alleged concept of the Absolute is something that floats between non-being and the phantom of being.¹ Mr Spencer very possibly means, however, that this Absolute is unknowable simply as to its attributes or determinations,—if an Absolute can be considered capable of such,—and that its reality is a necessity of actual knowledge. In itself Mr Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute as at once a free and incognisable, seems to be inconsistent. It is defined or specified as *force*, and however vague the notion may be, it cannot be said to be absolutely incognisable. And in the second place, if Spencer holds, as he seems to do, some sort of relation of this force—causal or substantial—to things or experience, it is still less incognisable. We have its manifestations before us. We know what it can do, and how it is related. Absolutely incognisable, therefore, it is not.

It may be said that the experience of the Absolute is equivalent to the dismemberment or dissolution of the spirit. One of its fundamental

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 193.

laws is the simultaneous position of antagonistic concepts. The notion of the Infinite has for complement the idea of the finite; the notion of the relative has for complement that of the absolute. This is the view of Descartes and Cousin.

The reply to this by M. Dauriac and the relationists is, that we here extend to the alleged concepts a power whose influence is felt on words, and on words alone. A positive term, we are told, may always be converted into its corresponding negative. Hence it is inferred that a positive concept, clear and distinct, admits a negative concept of the same genus, but of a diametrically contrary species. "The Infinite is supposed by the finite"—"the absolute by the relative." But on the same principle "presence supposes absence," "being supposes nothing."

"A finite being" does not suppose an infinite being. Everything limited supposes a limit, a being which limits it and which it limits. "A relative being" does not suppose an absolute being, but a relative with which it may be in relation. The finite supposes the *other* finite; the relative supposes the *other* relative.¹

¹ *Croyance et Réalité*, p. 194.

It is quite true that the limited or finite supposes a limiting, and the relative a related. But this is not all, nor is it the point of contrast in question. The finite is opposed to the *non-finite*, and the relative to the *non-relative*. It is possible that the non-finite and the non-relative as thus thought may mean the mere absence of limit in the one case, and of relation in the other. So that the terms are wholly negative, while we know what they mean. As thus regarded, these terms would not imply any reality corresponding to them—any positive existence capable of being described as the non-finite or non-relative. But this leaves the question wholly untouched as to whether anything corresponding to an Infinite or an Absolute can be known, and whether, being knowable, it can be established as a reality. Its possibility is certainly not excluded by the finite implying another finite, and the relative another relative; just as its existence is not established by the finite implying a non-finite, or the relative a non-relative.

There is no foundation in the laws of grammar for the idea of substance. An object is simply a group of sensations. We fix on one out of the

many before us, name it, and thus give the name to the object,—as in *fluvius* (*flowing*), *navis* (*floating*), and so on. We connect the other sensations with this, and so make up the conception of the object. Thus every substantive is essentially predicative; then there is the adjective stage, then the abstract noun—as *horse*, *equestrian*, or *fluvius*, *flowing*, *fluidity*. All substantives are in their nature abstract; and their signification is exclusively potential. They denote either the possibilities of being, or the possibilities of the modes of being. The hypothetical realisation of the characters connoted—as of horse—is not sufficient to produce the perception. These characters cannot designate a being, an individual; yet the individual alone is real. “We ought not to speak substantively but only adjectively of all that which is real.”¹ The distinction of substantive and adjective is founded on nothing supersensible. It has nothing to do with substance. The element round which we group the qualities of an object is itself simply a quality—abstracted—with which we associate the others.

On this it may be remarked that, even if we

¹ Lotze, *Metaphysics*, § 31, p. 64.

admit the genesis of the substantive as described, the question of the *principium individuationis* remains untouched. The object or group of sensations is not created by us; it has its own character and unity; and the question of its so being one or a group of qualities remains to be dealt with. Substantives may not *prove* substances; but the former *may* be the expression of the latter all the same.

The system I have been describing has its parentage in a system which clothes itself in a somewhat different—certainly more pretentious—phraseology. But in the end I suspect Impressionalism or Relationalism and Absolutism come precisely to the same result. No definite independent subject in time; no definite independent object in space; no transcendent power real in itself or in himself,—dependent for reality on its manifestation and real only in its manifestation,—these are points common to the two systems. Reality is only in passing movement—phenomenal, becoming—never fixed, never definite—always only the passing into, or fusion of consciousness and something not conscious,—call it extension, or object, or anything you

choose. Take away relation, and there is nothing save possibility of relation,—a possibility not provided for by impressionism, and provided for only metaphorically by absolutism.

The defect of Spinoza, as we have frequently been told, is conceiving the absolute as substance and not as subject—that is, as action, life, and movement. The philosophy of Spinoza is rather *acosmism* than pantheism. “The totality of things as the last definition of God—that is pantheism. This is to make the world God in its natural or immediate state. The world is only God in its truth.”

The identity of the two opposite sides of the universal development ought to be conceived in such a way as not to make abstraction of the phenomenal difference which is real and, which constantly destroyed, proceeds eternally from the only substance without ever really producing a dualism. Phenomenal reality is thus simply action or motion, or that which never really is, but is always becoming. There is never at any point in time or space either finite mind or matter; there is but the constant passing of the universal spirit. This is in plain words to relegate

the whole sphere of finite mind and material phenomena to non-reality or illusion: a dualism which never exists in time is no dualism; a dualism which exists in thought only, to be abolished or trampled out by that in which it exists, is only illusorily thought to be real.

But action or motion when and of what? In the universal spirit—in thought working out its development? What is that to me or my consciousness? Can this ever be phenomenal to me or to any finite thinker? What is phenomenal is an appearance to me? During a long part of the development, I do not exist as conscious. There is nothing to which this diremption of the universal can be phenomenal, unless to itself; and how do I know that the phenomena for it are identical with what is now phenomenal to me?

But it is clear that if our perceptions exist in the Divine Intelligence, as they are in us,—and they would not be ours if they existed in a different mode,—then the Divine Intelligence is, so to speak, a double or other of ours. Can we maintain this? Again, if only perceptions exist in the Divine Mind,—not ours or like ours,—what becomes of the permanency of our percep-

tions, or of the world we perceive? Of course, there is no such permanency. An ordered course of things—incarnate with the thoughts of the Divine—as to reality entirely independent of us—the medium and mediator between the Divine and the Human,—in plain words, a dualism real as an order of things and real as an order of perceptions, yet with a community of constitution and law, is the only adequate solution of the problem of experience and the world.

An action or motion in two opposite ways—consciousness and extension, personality and impersonality, self and not-self,—and yet not a dualism at every point of thought or every moment of time, is a contradiction in terms; and the assertion that it is and that it is not truly a dualism but a manifestation of a universal spirit or something, is not a solution of the contradiction, but a mere slurring over of the difficulty. And it could easily be shown that such an evolution, or any evolution of an impersonal (conscious) entity called idea or thought, or of pure being, or of what is really an indeterminate, into anything whatever, is a piece of mere unintelligibility. It is to seek to bring the logical

or reasonable out of the alogical and primarily unreasonable.

But what is it on the side of the Absolute? What is the reality here spoken of? And where does it reside?

(a) Not in the Absolute itself, be it substance, subject, or spirit. It by itself is as much a non-reality as the finite development of consciousness and extension. It needs and waits for the finite in order to become real, or at least to get the only reality it can. This is in abstract language M. Dauriac's essential fusion of consciousness and extension, of thought and body—first in man, and then in the Divine, if the latter be at all.

(b) Nor is the reality in the finite by itself, for that is dependent on the infinite, and is simply a passing manifestation of it. In fact it is a negation of the real, as we are constantly told.

Where, then, lies reality? Obviously only in the action or motion, the everlasting becoming or transition of the absolute into finite things. The process is all—all that actually is; the first term or absolute is only potentially; IT IS ACTUALLY ONLY IN THE MOMENT; and it is ABSOLUTELY only at the end of it. But then there

is no end to the process; there is an everlasting recommencement of the whole business at every point in the process. What the absolute might do after it has become absolute spirit with full self-consciousness, it might be difficult to conjecture; but as it has thus completely wound itself up, perhaps it will set about winding itself down again. This is necessary, otherwise we shall have reality defined as a process, and then at the end absolute reality or absolute stagnation, or a complete lock-up, which is very far from a process metaphysically, or ethically from what we understand as freedom. The absolute can surely never remain imprisoned in its own identity.

But if this be absolute reality, what becomes of the theory of process as the only reality? An infinite or everlasting on-going is needed to keep the absolute alive; it is an eternal movement which, if it were to complete itself—fulfil its own end or needs—would reach stagnation, and so annihilate itself. Yet it never reaches its truth till it grasps *all* in absolute identity—that is, it never reaches truth till it annihilates itself and its own movement. Perhaps the simile

of organic growth—of tree or plant—applies in a way. The Idea goes from the indeterminate through growth and symmetry up to leaf, flower, fruit, and seed, and so completes itself—completes itself in the seed, which wraps all up in itself. The analogy somewhat fails. The life of the seed is from life and seed, and still keeps its distinctive vitality; the ultimate absolute identity of all in the Idea leaves no room for life more than death, position more than negation, possibility of action or movement, for all are equal—even all are one. The possibility of conflict or exclusion is abolished in the fusion in one Identity of all contradictions. Impressionalism and Absolutism here meet and shake hands. The metaphor of the Idea goes down before the fragment of the reality of the moment.

HISTORY

AND

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

I.—HISTORY, AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

“THE well-grounded instruction by the past can be acquired only by our withdrawing occasionally from the present age, and seeking out antiquity in and for itself. It is only this abstraction from what is before us that can lead us to an intimate and conscious living with the present. The experience of our age can only be attained by our repeating within the consciousness the experiments of which it is the result and the expression. More quickly shall we pass through them than the human race did; for they had to overcome substantive obstacles in the realities of nature, we, however, only in conception. And this indeed is the main feature of instruction—that it enables the learner, by a shorter road, to run through what the first discoverer could arrive

at only by a longer route. And so the older time grows, the greater need we stand in of instruction and learning.”¹

It has been observed that in dealing with the history of philosophy there are two tendencies which assert themselves more or less. The one is the tendency to present details, opinions and systems, without any attempt at discovering and unfolding a connection between them, whether a successive influence or a governing idea running through the whole. Such a method recognises a variety without connection or unity.

The other and opposite tendency is to represent “the essence of history as consisting entirely in the recognition of this unity,” caring little about the multiplicity of details. The erudite type of mind will be drawn to the first, the speculative mind to the second, of these methods.

In regard to a single system of philosophising it is clear that but little good can come out of the former method, for a philosophy to have any value at all must have something in the shape of a principle or idea, through which to co-ordinate, rate, and explain details. A philosophy really

¹ Ritter, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, Pref., iv, v.

means, even when directed only to the phenomena before it,—of its time or age,—an attempt to bring the multiplicity under a concept. This may be very varied,—either the mixture and separation of the early Ionians, or the Mind of Anaxagoras, or the God of Xenophanes, or the Being of Parmenides,—but still something that performs the function of a unifying conception. The opposite method has been called the constructive,—or the construction of history,—and this is the method or tendency which has very considerably prevailed of late, especially in philosophy.

The general method, or condition of the method, of construction is that of ideal evolution or deduction according to necessary order—in co-ordination and succession—of certain stages, and then of the end or destination of the subject-matter of the history.¹ The starting-point of the whole is a concept or idea of the matter, and of its end or final perfection. You are to have, first, the idea, and the concept of the end or destination of the matter, and you will be able ideally, through the sheer force of thought, or by thinking out what is involved in the idea, to develop stage after stage

¹ Ritter, vol. i. p. 18.

in the history or process of the idea, until the view is completed in the full-drawn, full-conscious conception of the whole. Thus it is maintained that the history—that is, the ideal yet true, pre-eminently true, history of humanity—may be evolved from the concept or notion of it; that, in particular, the historical course of the various systems of philosophy may be thus ideally and necessarily evolved. If only we can get the idea of man, or knowledge, to begin with, we shall be able to unfold and deploy all the stages or moments in the history of each, apart altogether from any reference to experience, to observation, induction, generalisation,—which deal only with the isolation of details, with the divided, successive, and coexistent. We may have thus the history of spirit and the history of nature—of the scientific conceptions in all their length and breadth—set forth, if only we are furnished with this entity called *idea*.

Now, without meanwhile seeking to point out the real element of truth in such a view, I say, in the first place, that such an evolution, even if it could be dressed up for ideal or imaginative satisfaction, is not history, nor the construc-

tion of history in any proper sense of the words. Such a scheme, even if it were drawn out in any case,—either in reference to humanity, or to society, or to the world in general, or to the subject-matter of science,—would never touch the real—the facts of time in their succession or the facts of space in their co-ordination. The mirror which would hold up the necessary successive and co-ordinate relations of the various stages would show only the *modes* and *relations* in which the things—events, thoughts—occurred. It would leave out entirely any explanation of the true historical fact, as to how and whence such an order arose and was actually carried on in time and space alongside, it may be, this speculative representation. You cannot be said to construe history when you do not give the dynamical power at the root of it, and that which also pervades its course, and is as powerful at any moment of the development as it was at the beginning, which, in fact, appears to us at least to be unexhausted and inexhaustible—as fresh now as on the dawn of creation.

Ideal development, or evolution from Ideas, is at the utmost but a mental sketching of a process,

with various stages and relations. It should not be assumed, and it cannot be proved, that these stages, even though shown to be necessarily connected, are the powers at work in the actual fact of succession. At the best this ideal is an abstract process, and it leaves wholly out of account the ground or cause of the realisation of the stages in time. And further, it is simply an intellectual process; it is an ideal scheme founded on notion or cognition alone; its necessary relations are purely intellectual, and the real forces at work in history are a great deal more than this—often wholly different from this. They are individual, moral, and social, æsthetical and political, and can never be comprised in any intellectual formula. Nor can there be discovered in their relations anything the least approaching to a logical or metaphysical necessity.

One other remark occurs in this connection. The constructive method is necessary—essential in the order of its development. Now, I ask, do we really find in the history of humanity, of reason or philosophy, of morals or æsthetics, “that what ought necessarily to come to pass has really happened”? I cannot now go into details, but I

make bold to say this, that we do not find this correspondence or harmony as a matter of fact. We do not find the *a priori* prediction verified, even as to the order of happening; and what is more, we find a great deal in the actual history that never was predicted at all—that has no place in the speculative anticipation. And how is this latter element dealt with? It is simply set aside as “unimportant,” “non-essential,” or “accidental,” even as “unreal.” It belongs to the by-wash of history. Of course we might expect that, in a lofty reasoned or *a priori* deduction from the idea, there should emerge only the most general, shadowy abstractions, that make no provision for individual life, effort, contingency, for such crossing of forces as happens in actual life and history. When these cannot be set in the frame of the universal, or the universal of the epoch, they are passed over as insignificant or unreal. The man or the system does not fit into the speculative schema, therefore he is to be ignored or declared non-existent—as, for example, the inconvenient Diogenes of Apollonia in Greek philosophy, or the number of Pythagoras beyond the triad in detailed opinion. But the

element of apparent irregularity in the succession, and that of anomaly in the fact, are *there*—are *real*—and not to be set aside, because we cannot embrace them in our narrow speculative system. The truth is, that in history, as in science, nothing whatever—not the meanest fact or the slightest apparent departure from the order we conceive—is insignificant. When we speak of insignificance we show only our own ignorance, our non-comprehension, and, I add, our arrogance.

But a further, even closer, question arises, Where and how is this “idea,” which is at the root of the whole, got? What is your guarantee for such an idea, or so-called piece of knowledge? How, further, can you show that it is a complete knowledge of the matter or object whose history you profess to construct?

In reply to these questions, it may be said that it is impossible to form or acquire the idea of anything which can be matter of history, apart from or above the history of the thing itself. If we seek the idea of man, it is not to be found in consciousness in general, or in reason, or in any abstract sphere, but simply in the individual and sum of individuals to be met with in experience

—in their history, in fact. It will be a generalisation, and nothing but a generalisation. This generalisation will not exclude necessary elements in the conception; but even these will be in a sense generalised by us—they will be acknowledged through experiment as actually a part of humanity. And nothing can be clearer than that any idea we may be able to form of society, or humanity, will be largely determined by the time and epoch in which we live, and in which the idea is formed. Different constructors of history might thus start from the most varying and inadequate ideas of humanity—the subject-matter—and their history would be constructed simply in accordance with their limited idea. To know man, to know knowledge, to know nature in its whole or in its varied subject-matter, to know goodness and beauty, “the idea” of it as thus supposed to be got will not help us, it will only lead us into narrow, inadequate views, and arrogant limitations of the character of the matter with which we are dealing. Can we *a priori* have any complete idea of humanity, or any idea of it at all, in the true sense of the word? Is not

our most complete, our fullest idea of humanity, obtained from an observation of the activities of man in their varied directions through the course of history itself? Is not this idea—and every idea of what is matter of fact, of what is and lives in time—to be got and filled up from the developments which take place in time, and which never can be identified with any ideal or merely speculative evolution which we can frame? Nay, it is further true that even with all the help of history,—with all that we know of the past,—it would not be possible at any given moment of time or epoch in history to give a complete idea of humanity, its nature and destination. If we take even the limited problem of immortal individual life, or of absorption in a universal soul or consciousness, or of complete annihilation in the naught, it is impossible for us, from any idea we can form of humanity, either by reason or history, to demonstrate or deduce the *necessity* of such a destiny—to show from the idea of humanity that *any* one of these possibilities *must* be so. And the whole point of the construction of history is the un-

folding of the "real strain of necessity" in events, in the stages of the subject-matter. If the constructive method cannot do this, it fails essentially. It professes to be founded on reason and the necessity of reason, and if it fail in showing that the destination of man is so and so, and is a necessary deduction from its ground or idea, it fails absolutely. We are just where we were,—without light from this source,—and have to fall back on the empirical history.

The readiness with which what is called the Idea or the Universal is accepted, first in this or that department of knowledge, and then for all knowledge, rests on certain obvious principles of our nature—not the highest or the best. "Nothing," says a shrewd writer, "is nearer the ignorance of a principle than its excessive generalisation. The imagination receives it from the hand of the man of genius who first brings it to light, and carries it in triumph to the summit of our cognitions; the imagination gratifies itself by lending to it an empire without bounds; indolence, vanity conspire with imagination to affirm it. It is so convenient and so beautiful to ex-

plain everything by a common solution, and to have the need of knowing only a single part [or principle] in order to know everything, or at least to appear to do so. There is fashion for opinions as for costumes; novelty constitutes its charm, and imitation propagates it.”¹

Condillac’s formula for knowledge and science affords a striking illustration of the truth of this passage. It was a seductive prospect for the friends of truth to find that there was to be an end of all disputes, the prevention of all errors, the opening of the way to all truths, simply by the reform of language. “The study of a science is only the learning of a language.” “A science well treated is only a language well made.” One suspects that the questions regarding “a well-made language” would themselves require such attention as to raise those very fundamental points about knowledge and science which the “well-made language” is supposed to solve or quiet.

“When there is excessive generalisation of a principle, the reason always is that we have not sufficiently analysed it in order to render an

¹ Degerando, *Des Signes*, p. ix.

exact account of the conditions which it encloses. All objects are like when we see them at a distance; hence the *demi-savans* think they can judge of all, and are the most dogmatic of men.”¹

While I say all this regarding history and the constructive method, I do not deny—nay, I maintain—a purpose in historical event. Only it is not a purpose to be got in accordance with the constructive method. But it seems to me—taking together the spheres of man or self-consciousness, of outward nature, of the history of thought and of mankind, of the course and progress of science in revealing the order of the world, especially the sphere of free-determination in man, and what it can achieve, what it has achieved in the development of the past—there is a purpose or end in things,—in the world,—otherwise I at once admit the whole would be meaningless. Man is bound up inseparably with this purpose, and we can form some conception of it. We can see that the tendency is to a full and complete development of potencies—of *δύναμις* into *ἐνέργεια*—in man and the world. Self-consciousness and experience have to some extent

¹ Degerando, *Des Signes*, p. xxiii.

revealed these to us. I do not think thus that "the civilisation of humanity, taken, as a whole, remains equable and constant."¹ I think, on the contrary, it has fallen and risen in the course of history; but, on the whole, risen. I do not further believe that human progress is "circular," as has been maintained—coming back merely to the point whence it set out, again to evolve itself endlessly and fruitlessly. I sympathise with the view that all things are working to an end, a consummation which will be a perfection. And this perfection will consist in a fuller development and in a harmony, which we can only faintly depict in outline. But an end, I believe, there is. What that end is, how it is to be reached, are to be known only by scanning closely the successive steps of order and progress in the world of nature and thought. It is that to which the successive stages point, so far as we can discern, which is or shows the end of the whole. There does not seem to be anything like successive absorption—one period being taken up and annulled, and thereby marked as completed in process, so that you can say of the succeeding, It is better

¹ Ritter, vol. i. p. 25.

always than what was before. All that you can say is, There is fuller power, freer life, a better moral advance, than anything hitherto met with. Take it all round, the world is better as it grows older—higher on the line of progress than it was before. Let us pray that this course of advancement may not be broken or interrupted by violence from without, by inroad of barbarian, by war and conquests, or any form of the brutal,—be it the selfishness, the sordidness, the avarice, the worldliness of society, which are quite as deadly as any hand of Goth or Visigoth. The abolition or annulment of a dualistic force in history, which interrupts its course and throws it back on its beginning, is a mere dream. The individual of a given time has always to contend with this force, however the speculative philosopher may ideally view it. It may be that the advance—social, moral, spiritual—is not actually spread over the whole surface of the planet, or even of a given society or nation; but if the higher thought be only in the mind and heart of certain individuals of the race, there is a true advance, and always hope for the diffusion of the thought and life,—for one thing that marks grow-

ing and higher life is the impulse to communicate the diviner element to others, even at the cost of self-sacrifice.

The one thing that should not, either in reason or morality, be tolerated is the position, not simply tacked on to, but inseparable from, the evanishing formula of trinitarian development of the Idea,—the position that because there is progress in opinions and systems, it is through the untruth (non-reality) of the preceding moment or dogma. Each undermines itself—vanishes in another, becomes another—in the course of time. It is nothing to be told that the Idea takes up all in the end. No man has ever seen the Idea or ever will rise to its totality. It is as much the incognisable as the God of the direst agnosticism. Man may put it in words, but he cannot know it as absolutely timeless. His sphere is in time, and his point of view the moment of time. He is destined thus to the sphere of the endlessly untrue. What he contemplates is a long continuous suicide; the material of which is furnished by the Idea—the successive ideas. This is his sphere now and for ever. It is this relation, this dissolving between

things or ideas which he knows, and which is thus the real for him. In plain words, there never is either a true or real for the creature of time. The passing is all that is, just as much as the flux of Heraclitus. The terms are not, the relation of evanishing and reappearing is. This is all. The Idea is a metaphorical personality, that inhabits the sphere of the impossible of attainment, conjured up to give a plausible substantiality to the whole. No succeeding system of truth can ever be made out of untruth. If every moment be essentially untrue, and only its relation to something else be true,—which again is equally untrue, unless in relation to something else,—there is no truth at all. The whole is a mere passing phantasmagoria. A complete system, as far as this can be achieved, is not made up of a fusion of untruths, but of an eclecticism of truths. And unless there be truth, reality,—things in the moment, stable and permanent for us,—the conceit of an Absolute Idea, over, above, and in all, is a mere dream—the dream of a dream.

II.—HEGEL'S VIEW.

It should be noted regarding the history of philosophy that it is only, so to speak, a fragment of the history of man and the world. We may say regarding it that it is a history of the attempts made in different and successive times by reflective men to account for the fact (or being) and the cause of events and things. Philosophy is at least an effort after a fuller consciousness of the nature and meaning of things—man and the world—than is to be found in the observation of their actual happening. But the things that exist and happen are thus intimately connected with philosophy, or the reflection on their nature and ends. And the reflective or philosophical effort cannot either create or control these things on which it speculates. The philosopher is the spectator,

not the creator, of the universe. Hence those results.

1. The question the philosopher puts in successive periods will vary, as to subject-matter at least, with the varying—it may be developing—facts of these periods.

2. The conceptions, thoughts, or categories in the light of which he seeks to set the facts of experience will also vary with these varying—evolving—facts.

3. It will be found impossible to detect in the successive periods conceptions or categories that are in harmony with any predevised scheme of thought or thought-arrangement. Development or deduction of conceptions or categories from any ground we can lay down *a priori*—called idea or notion, or anything else—will never be found adequate to the course of the history even of philosophy, or even to correspond in succession to that course.

4. And, closely connected with this last-mentioned point, the changes in the events themselves, in succession or in successive epochs, will tend to break up any predetermined order in the logical arrangement of categories. So that you

will have an event—*i.e.*, in philosophy, for example, a system of thought—sometimes earlier than it ought to have come according to the ideal arrangement, or later than it ought to have appeared, and sometimes even a stage of the so-called dialectical process will not be represented in history at all.

There is but one truth,—unity is the great point,—and the end of philosophy is to recognise it as the source whence all things flow,—all the laws of nature, all the phenomena of life and consciousness,—and to refer all these phenomena to this source in order to comprehend their derivation from it.

The following utterances illustrate this:—

“To give understanding of what is, such is the problem of all philosophy; for *all that is is reason realised.*”¹

Again: “*The natural and spontaneous development of thought creates an actual world; reflection, the reflected thought of this world, destroys it and threatens it with imminent ruin.*”

“History is the development of the universal spirit in time. This is God. He develops him-

¹ See Werke, vol. viii. pp. 18-20.

self in time and the world; becomes explicitly what he implicitly is. Reason or God is *the substance of all infinite power, infinite matter of life*. . . .¹ The domain of history is spirit; and the domain of the spirit is freedom. Man as man is free." The Germans were the first to teach this. The effort to apply this principle, which is admitted in religion, to civil society constitutes a main feature of modern history.

The aim of the *Lectures on History* of Hegel "is to show in history the same spirit or λόγος as in Nature, the Soul, Right. The categories elsewhere established are applied to the facts of human freedom, without doing violence to the events given. The Idea interprets, explains them, without changing anything in them. It is to be understood, however, that all in the external facts cannot be explained by the ideas, just as in Nature one cannot construct *a priori* any animal, the least vegetable, the least stone. The ideas form the skeleton (*squelette*), or, better, the nervous system of the phenomenal world—that is, the necessary thing to show while neglect-

¹ Anaxagoras was the first to recognise that Reason governs the world—i.e., a self-conscious intelligence, with general laws,

ing the details, and that which is purely accidental." ¹

Looking especially to the history of philosophy, without meanwhile considering the test of the essential and accidental therein, we are told that this history is not a fortuitous succession of opinions or systems, but an organic whole which develops itself according to necessary laws, and finally terminates in the Hegelian theory. "In the historic development of thought there is always the same real content; the last philosophy is only the truest expression of this. Each philosophy is but a part of one and the same whole. The last, *if true*, is the most developed, rich, and concrete." ² But, corresponding apparently to the accidental in the facts of history, there is an exterior history of philosophy, of opinions purely subjective. Philosophy is the objective science of truth, of necessity, comprehending knowledge. Diversity of opinion is essential to the existence of philosophy as a science—that is, to its development. It is the history of free and methodic thought applied to

¹ Willm, *Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande*, vol. iii. pp. 422, 423.

² *Ibid.*, p. 431.

comprehend and explain the spontaneous products of natural thought. And we must strip these of their subjective elements to find a supreme rule.¹

The history of philosophy, or philosophy itself, is an organic development; but obviously it is not a chronological development, or a spontaneous development in time; for we have the subjective systems, which do not follow, apparently, the order of the formula, according to Reason or Idea. We must pierce through certain subjective or accidental systems, which are still matters of fact in time, to get at the rule which regulates their development. It seems odd, one might say, to find that there is a Universal Spirit or Idea which develops itself necessarily—which is the sole necessary power in the movements of the world of mind or thought—and yet is apparently unable to carry out its development in time, according to its nature. Whence come, in the first place, these subjective systems which we have wholly or in part to set aside? What is the power at the root of them, if it be not this exclusive, omnipotent, universal, and necessary Spirit?

¹ Willm, vol. iii. pp. 431, *seq.*

But further, we are to pierce through these subjective systems—that is, the actual facts or systems in the history of philosophy—to get at this rule or law, represented by the formula of the Logic, and which is at their inner heart or core. But can this procedure afford any true verification of the *a priori* formula, if we select only such facts or parts of the facts as may happen to coincide with it? Would any scientific man in these days, in attempting to verify a hypothesis regarding a number of observed facts, dream of acting in such a way—selecting only such facts or elements as might fit in with his hypothesis? What is the dynamical force at work in this organic development? It is something inherent in the Notion, or Idea, or Universal Spirit, as represented in the immanent dialectic. “Tradition, we are told, is full of life, like a powerful stream which grows in proportion as it removes itself from its source. A notion may be stationary; but the Universal Spirit does not rest—its life is action. The spiritual heritage of the past is the soul of the new generation; it is transformed and enriched.”¹

¹ Willm., vol. iii. p. 433.

Taking this conception of organic development, let us see how and why there is a development at all. All the laws of nature and the phenomena of life and consciousness are to be developed or derived from a single source; and the unity of truth is to be realised. What is the process—what the power at work—what is the analogy of the process and power?

The process and the power with Hegel are in fact identified. He thinks it enough to specify a certain process of development of what he calls Thought, and at the same time to say that this process is itself the power of development, or that the moments of the process pass from one to the other, and that they have an inherent power to do so. Given the one or first, the second necessarily follows, and so on. Where and how he got the first we are not told. But meanwhile, let us see this process and power. First of all we have, or are said to have—which is very much the Hegelian way of having—three kinds of Thought:

1. Formal Thought. This is independent of all content. Perhaps we might call this abstraction, the mere possibility of Thought.

2. We have the Notion or *Begriff*. This is de-

terminate thought—the thought, I should suppose, of *this* or *that*, as in or under category.

3. We have Idea, and the Idea. This is thought in its totality. It is the nature of the Idea to develop itself, to comprehend itself by its development, and to become thereby what it is—what it is from the first.

Language of this sort is supposed to be applicable to consciousness and experience. The process and the power of development are here stated in words as near to terms of ordinary experience as may be sufficient to make them intelligible and plausible.

There are two states of the Idea, or whatever it is that develops into all that is. There is (1) The state of virtuality. This is *an-sich-seyn*, or Being-in-itself. It is Power.

We have (2) Virtuality realised. This is *fur-sich-seyn*—that is, for itself being, or being in act.

But apparently this in-itself-being does not exist for us, until it becomes an object of consciousness, until, I presume, it becomes for-itself-being, though how we can tell so much, supposing this in-itself-being is at all, it is difficult to say.

This seems playing fast and loose—particularly the latter—with words and intelligibility. At any rate, it appears that man, in becoming what he is virtually, does not become another—he becomes actually what he is or was virtually. To reach existence, he undergoes a change, and yet remains the same. In other words, the in-itself being, which is not an object of consciousness as such, is yet regarded as the same with the for-itself-being, which is an object of consciousness—that is, although knowing it, we yet predicate identity of the unconscious and the conscious. A pretty little juggle of words indeed, and a pretty mess of the unmeaning.

This first moment of in-itselfness, or “the concrete in itself and virtual, must become for itself or actualise itself.” Why? we ask. The answer is. “It is different, and yet simple in itself. This contradiction, which is primitively in the virtual concrete, is the principle of its development.”¹

The course of the development of the process is determined by the virtual content of the in-itself-state or moment of thought. The analogy given in exemplification or illustration is that of the

¹ Werke, vol. xiii. pp. 36-38.

germ into the plant, and into a particular kind of plant. All in the plant, we are told, is ideally contained in the germ—the development has a predetermined end. This is the fruit, or reproduction of the germ, and consequent return to the primitive state. The germ tends to reproduce itself, to return to itself. The germ and fruit are thus individuals, but they are identical to content. There is the same analogy in an life. But in the life of the spirit it is different. Spirit in developing itself goes out of itself and at the same time returns to itself, and thus acquires consciousness of itself. Development supposes a content—that is, an activity. Power and actuality are moments of the active development. This activity is one, with differences contained. The march of the development is its content. It is the IDEA.

Of this we have an illustration in the flower. This is one, in spite of its diversity. None of its qualities can fail in any of its leaves, and each part of the leaf has all the properties of the entire leaf. Each particle possesses exactly the same qualities as the mass. Differences are reunited in physical things.

What this development accomplishes in spirit is thus the conciliation or identification of differences or opposites. In the mind, the understanding opposes one to another, as liberty and necessity. But the spirit is *concrete*, and its qualities are liberty and necessity at once. It is free in being necessitated. The fruit of development is a result of the movement; this, again, is the point of departure to arrive at a new degree of development. "A formation becomes always the matter of another formation," says Goethe. The evolution of the concrete is a series of developments not linear, but circular.

What, it may be asked, is this concrete, or absolute content, which makes the evolution? It is activity. Power and actuality are moments of activity, of the active development. This activity is one, though it comprehends differences. The march of the development is the Idea. In its first moment it contains a contradiction; and this is the essential principle of its activity and development.

"The concrete in itself or virtual must become for itself or actualise itself. It is different and yet simple in itself. This contradiction, which is

primitively in the virtual concrete, is the principle of its development. By the development differences and oppositions are brought to light, but in order to vanish immediately and to be anew reduced to unity. Their truth is only in being one. The idea is not an abstract thing, the supreme being without other determination. This abstract God is a product of the modern spirit.”¹

Again, we are told: “The spirit is essentially action, and its action is to learn to know itself. As living organism, I am immediately; but as spirit, I am only as I know that I know myself. The consciousness of self consists essentially in this, that I am become object for myself. It is thus in distinguishing itself from itself that the spirit reaches existence, and that it posits itself out of itself.”

The concrete idea which develops itself is an organic system, a totality which encloses many degrees and diverse moments. Philosophy is the knowledge of this development, and, as reflective thought, it is this development itself. Philosophy perfects and completes itself in so far as

¹ Werke, vol. xiii. pp. 36-38.

the development approaches its term. Such is the nature of philosophy; the same idea reigns in its totality and in all its parts, as in a living individual; the same life rules and expands. From the immanent evolution of the Idea, or of the absolute content of the mind, the knowledge of which is philosophy, it follows that philosophy is identical with its history. The history of philosophy is thus the progressive and necessary development of the Idea or of thought in its totality, and philosophy is the knowledge of this development. The history of philosophy and philosophy are thus identical.

This development is conceivable and possible in two ways: first, with the consciousness of the necessity with which one degree succeeds another, and is derived from it; secondly, without this consciousness, apparently accidental but really necessary. In a plant the latter is the way of development. Branches, leaves, flower, fruit of the same plant proceed from it each for itself, yet it is the internal nature of the plant which necessarily determines the succession of all the parts of the same whole. The aim of philosophy is, however, to realise the conscious-

ness of the necessary connections of succession of the parts of the organised whole of knowledge. It is according to the second mode that the diverse moments of the evolution present themselves in time, under the form of facts that have happened in such places, with such peoples, under the empire of such circumstances. This is the spectacle for philosophy to contemplate, and, I presume, to exhibit the unity and necessary connections.

There is here the question of the relation of the logical development or formula to time, and to the actual occurrence of facts and systems in time. What precisely is Hegel's view on this point? Is it alleged, for example, that the actual occurrence and development of facts and systems in time correspond precisely with the order of the logical development of the formula? This is the first question, and has to be settled before we can even consider whether the formula has a dynamical function or not.

We are told expressly that the succession of the systems of philosophy in history is the same with that of the logical determinations of the Idea, so that, if you strip the fundamental prin-

ciples of the historical systems of all that holds to form, you recognise in them the diverse degrees of the necessary development of the Idea, and reciprocally the logical movement of the Idea represents the principal moments of the historical movement. This statement is certainly at variance with others, in which the chronological order is said not to be identical in development with the logical order. We are told here, however, virtually that these orders correspond, and that we have only to strip the historical systems of their accidental forms to find that they correspond with the logical order or idea.

It is thus obviously reflection of philosophy at work which detects the still unconscious necessary order of the moments or systems in time. According to the analogy of the plant which is adduced, we must suppose that the systems or moments have actually been developed in time in a chronological order corresponding to the necessary or logical order, and that all that is left for philosophy to do is to exhibit to consciousness the necessary links that bind together the successive systems. They bear the same chronological relation to each other as

the parts of the developed plant, and what philosophy has got to do is to make the link or connection manifest. Now, there is the question here as to whether in point of fact the systems of philosophy have succeeded each other or proceeded in this way. Even if they have, it is difficult to see how a dualism is avoided; for obviously a power has been at work in developing the systems according to a necessary order, though unconscious of the order or its principle. And this must be one kind of potency in the universe. And then philosophy comes and reveals the order to consciousness, makes it an object of consciousness, shows a different kind of reality,—a conscious reality,—which proceeds exactly as the unconscious order did. The unconscious order or process, therefore, created the facts; and the conscious process, retracing the steps, revealed or created the necessary links of connection. The unconscious actually did what the conscious only came to know later. There are thus two powers at work in the universe, an unconscious and a conscious: the one does what the other comes to know. Yet the rational—the consciousness of necessary connection—is the only

reality. There is either such an essential contradiction within the whole system as to destroy it, or there is a clothing of commonplace fact and doctrine in heavy, cumbrous, and misleading language.

III.—WHAT REMAINS OF THE HEGELIAN VIEW ?

ACCORDING to Schwegler, Hegel's view of the history of philosophy is that "the various systems constitute together but a single organic movement, a rational, inwardly articulated whole, a series of evolutions, founded in the tendency of the mind to raise its *natural* more and more into *conscious* being, into knowledge, and to recognise the entire spiritual and natural universe more and more as its life and outward existence, as its actuality and reality, as the mirror of itself." Hegel, it seems, was "the first to enunciate these views, and to regard the history of philosophy in the unity of a single process."¹ But Schwegler accompanies his statement of Hegel's view with a very distinct warning and note of criticism.

¹ Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 2.

The fundamental idea is true in principle, but it has been overstrained by Hegel, and this "in a manner that threatens to destroy, as well the freedom of the human will, as the notion of contingency, or of a certain existent unreason. Hegel holds *the succession* of the systems in history to be the same as that of the categories in logic."¹ "We have only to free the fundamental thoughts of the various systems from all that attaches to their mere externality of form or particularity of application, and we obtain the various steps of the logical notion (being, becoming, particular being, individual being, quantity, &c.); while, conversely, if we but take the logical progress by itself, we have in it the essential process of the results of history."²

"This conception," according to Schwegler, "can neither be justified in principle nor established by history. It fails in principle; for history is a combination of liberty and necessity, and exhibits, therefore, only on the whole any connection of reason, while in its particulars, again, it presents but a play of endless contingency. It is thus, too, that nature, as a whole, displays

¹ Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 2. ² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

rationality and system, but mocks all attempts, at *a priori schemata* in detail. Further, in history it is individuals who have the initiative—free subjectivities—what consequently is directly incommensurable. For, reduce as we may the individual under the influence of the universal—in the form of his time, his circumstances, his nationality—to the value of a mere cipher, no free-will can be reduced. History, generally, is no school-sum to be exactly cast up; there must be no talk, therefore, of any *a priori* construction in the history of philosophy either. The facts of experience will not adapt themselves as mere examples to any ready-made logical schema. If at all to stand a critical investigation, what is given in experience must be taken as *given*, as handed to us; and then the rational connection of this that is so given must be referred to analysis. The speculative idea can be expected at best—and only for the scientific arrangement of the given material—to afford but a regulative.”¹

But the hardest thing said against the Hegelian view is that the historical development is almost

¹ Schwegeler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 3.

always different from the logical—that, in fact, chronology, contradicts the logic. The logical process is from the abstract to the concrete; the historical process is the very reverse—from concrete to abstract, as we see especially and markedly in early Greek philosophy. Philosophy is synthetic; the history of thought analytic. The concrete—the Ionian philosophy—is the first; and even the Being of Parmenides and the Becoming of Heraclitus are not to be represented in abstract categories, but in materially coloured conceptions.¹ The conception involved in each system is never pure, but is mixed with physical, psychological, ethical elements. It is as it appears in the nature of man and the state of circumstances. “Hegel would have been more consistent logically had he put chronology entirely to the rout.”²

If this be so, what remains of the Hegelian profession? We are to be content if, in reproducing to thought the course which reflection has taken as a whole, there exhibit itself, in the main historical stations, *a rational progress*, and if the historian of philosophy, surveying

¹ Schwegeler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 4. ² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

the serial development, find really in it a philosophical acquisition, the acquisition of a new idea; but we shall be chary of applying to each transition and to the whole detail the postulate of immanent law and logical nexus. History marches often in serpentine lines, often apparently in retreat. "History, as the domain of free-will, will only in the last of days reveal itself as a work of reason."¹

But is it true, as a matter of fact, that the systems have followed this so-called necessary order? Is the supposition even consistent with the Hegelian rejection of the so-called accidental or contingent in the facts of time?

The "successions of the systems of philosophy in history" is ambiguous. Is it meant that this succession extends to the whole thought-history of the world? Is it the case that contemporaneously all over the world there has been precisely the same moment of development of spontaneous thought, or of thought at its stage of unconsciousness of self? If it does not refer to this, why does it not? If it does, what is the historical truth of it?

¹ Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 5.

Is it meant that the systems of philosophy in a given country or nation have observed this order—unconsciously, of course? Is this the case in the most philosophic country we have known—Greece? Has it been so in our own country? or in France? or in Germany itself? This will be found to be true neither of the world from Genesis to Hegel, nor of any country under the sun. There is no actual development of philosophy in the form of which he speaks.

But, if the movement of development have been unequal,—vacillating, sometimes retrograde, crossing and recrossing the so-called logical order,—what becomes of the correspondence? What even becomes of the omnipotent power of the Idea? Further, if the systems have been developed in a manner wholly unconscious of the link which connects one with the other, how has the one been able to influence the other? Must not the system be known and the link be known, ere one system of thought could truly influence a succeeding one? Have systems of philosophy not influenced each other precisely as the succeeding was actually con-

scious of the nature and limits of the preceding system? Is this not true of our own philosophy, from Locke, through Berkeley, Hume, and Reid? And how, then, is the link still undiscovered until Philosophy (or Hegel) arises?

The illustrations of *plant* and *child*—of potentiality and actuality—are not to the point. These are definite individualities or realities in time and space to begin with. They cannot be applied either to prove or to illustrate the nature and development of a *notion without content*. It is quite clear, however, that as Hegel abstracts Being from finite or phenomenal Being, he also illegitimately abstracts the notions of *potency* and *change* from actual phenomena, and uses them to explain the development of the phenomenal itself from or in the Idea. *Potency* is only possible on the supposition of undeveloped content; and *change* is only possible on the supposition that this content is distinguishable from the state into which it passes. Activity is not possible by itself or as content. It is possible only on the supposition of that which passes into action.

* *In self* and *for self* are also purely definite

distinctions, borrowed from our conscious experience. They are simply individuality, as in consciousness, capable of development. But they in no way help us to transcend our consciousness, or to raise that consciousness to a knowledge where there is no real difference between self and its object. What the mystery of existence be, before self-consciousness arises, we know not and cannot know, so long as we retain self-consciousness itself.

“But as the spirit posits itself out of itself, it finds itself submitted to the condition of time. The idea, considered in its repose, is independent of time, but the idea in so far as concrete, as unity of diverse forms, develops itself by thought, and posits itself externally. It is thus that philosophy appears as an existence which developed itself in time.

“The spirit considered as the activity of an individual consciousness is an abstraction, and the spirit is, not only individual and finite consciousness, but universal and concrete spirit. This concrete universality comprehends all the modes and all the aspects under which, according to the content of the idea, the spirit becomes object for

itself. Its development is not carried in the thought of an individual, in one soul and the same consciousness. The richness of its forms fills the history of the world. In this universal evolution of the spirit, it happens that such form or such degree of the idea manifests itself with such a people rather than with such another, so that a people in a given time only expresses this form, whilst the form superior to this only manifests itself ages later, and in another nation.”¹

The conscious spirit thus does not develop itself wholly, either in one individual, or in one and the same people, or in a given epoch, but in humanity all entire.

All the variations of philosophy are only the movements by which the spirit develops and actualises itself. Nothing sceptical in them; nothing fixed or absolute.

“The concrete idea of philosophy is the activity of development tending to produce the differences which are virtually contained in it. The differences contain the idea under a particular form, and each form is a philosophy—a system which has the pretension of representing the idea

¹ Werke, vol. xiii. pp. 43, 44.

all entire; but the different systems only represent the content of the idea collectively. They disappear as moments of transition. To expansion succeeds contraction, the return to unity. Then a new period of development. But this progress is not indefinite; it has an absolute term. The temple of reason is constructed rationally by an internal architect.”¹

The length of time required for development is no objection. The universal spirit has sufficient time before it; it is eternal. Nature reaches its end by the promptest means—not so the spirit. Generations are sacrificed to this development; but to each notion the form under which it makes its place and its universe is sufficient.

But how does the Spirit or Idea get into time at all? “As it posits itself out of itself, it finds itself submitted to the condition of time. The idea considered in its repose is independent of time, but the idea in so far as concrete, as unity of diverse forms, develops itself by thought, and posits itself externally. It is thus that philosophy appears as an existence which develops itself in time.”² No doubt, if it posits itself out

¹ Werke, vol. xiii. pp. 47, 48.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 44.

of itself, it will find itself submitted to the condition of time, and a good many other conditions. What one would like to know is how such a positing is conceivable or has any meaning, or how one is to construe the passage of the logical formula of Identity, Contradiction, and Becoming, as anything but a logical formula? or how a stage of thought, called in-itselfness, can be anything really or actually, or become anything, but what the term indicates? Or how, if we get an external position for it, this can be anything more than it is, a purely logical conception or state? How, if the in-itself-moment be not already in time, can its simple correlate or development pass into time, or need any time to pass into? When these questions are answered fairly, or even apprehended, we shall consider the hypothetical statement that "as it posits itself out of itself, it finds itself submitted to the condition of time." This is a very fair specimen of the constantly recurring Hegelian fallacy of hypothesis converted into assertion. It is the constant art resorted to at essential points of connection. As so and so is, if so and so is, then so and so is,—this is the reasoning. It is but a poor cloak to

cover the ever-recurring fallacy of *petitio principii* which invalidates Hegelian reasoning, and makes it as bad a school as possible as a propædæutic for ordinary and straightforward thinking.

Then, in order to bridge the gulf between the first moment of the formula, or the formula itself, and existence, we have the wholly concrete word "spirit" introduced without warrant or proof of any sort. Then, founding on experience, spirit is described as "essentially action." It is described in terms of ordinary consciousness, and we are told: "I am only as I know that I know myself. The consciousness of self consists essentially in this, that I am become object for myself. It is thus in distinguishing itself from itself that the spirit reaches existence, and that it posits itself out of itself." In other words, a process professing to give the explanation of spirit and the consciousness of reality, begs or borrows terms from the spirit of consciousness, applies these to the process, and thinks it has explained the actual consciousness or experience from which it has borrowed the terms. And there is the absurdity in it all of assuming that these terms have a meaning, and the same mean-

ing, ere the definite consciousness is reached, as they have in this definite consciousness itself.

We may quite readily admit that the truth of existence,—the truth of the fulness of experience,—in its varied and complex forms of knowledge itself, of morality, æsthetics, theology, is not to be got in a day, is to be got only by development, the development even of humanity all entire, and that at no epoch in the world's history can we say that we have reached a term of finality on such a point. We may say also that no individual, however normal a representative of humanity, typifies or mirrors the Universe of Being, and that we can gather up only the collective idea, if we can even obtain this, through the scattered parts.

The different forms of the spirit thus appear at different and wholly separate times, in different and separated people, in different individuals, never in one people or in one and the same individual. The weight of the Universal is too great for the individual consciousness, yet apparently the individual speculative philosopher is able to bear the unified and necessarily related burden

of the whole systems—to grasp the relations, and thus truly give them reality.

But this has no bearing whatever in the way of proof or even illustration on the Hegelian formula. It is compatible with any theory which allows simply the coexistence in the individual of truths, laws, convictions common to him with humanity, and the necessary limitation under which such truths are to be conceived and realised in the individual consciousness. Beware of supposing at any time, or in any individual, the term of finality, in regard at least to the content of intellectual conception, moral, æsthetical, theological truth. But this is a lesson which history in connection with a theory of relativity, or with individuality in any form, will teach us, as well as the idea of a divine purpose in things and progress towards the divine. We do not need to postulate the absorption of the individuals in the Universal or spirit, while the Universal or spirit has no meaning, or even conscious being, except as spread over the individuals. We may admit a progress through the varied unity of the race, as that political history is the progress of consciousness and liberty; but we are not quite shut

up to say that the history of philosophy is the progress of the spirit to the consciousness of identity with the absolute—that is, to so-called freedom, the freedom of construction that admits of no opposite or datum.

We have here the following statements:—

1. That the aim of history is to explain, in accordance with the logical formula, the facts and systems in time. This would certainly imply at the least their connection, development, concatenation.

2. There is a spontaneous development of thought or spirit in time, and all that is, or is actual, is reason realised—*i.e.*, it is fact in accordance with the formula. The rational is the real, and the real is the rational.

3. There is, however, thirdly, a reference to details which may be neglected, even though they be matters of fact in time; to what is accidental or contingent. The test of this would seem to be simply that these facts are outside the formula, do not fit into it, cannot be explained by it.

4. Even, therefore, supposing certain facts or systems to follow certain others in chronological development, these are to be set aside as acci-

dental, because they do not fit into the logical formula. The logical formula, therefore, cannot be upheld as representing the chronological development of facts or systems. It may be—*is*—in contradiction with “the spontaneous development of thought” in time, and it is regarded as of higher authority than the actual facts, yet all that is is reason—*i.e.*, the formula realised. *I.e.*, we “impose” a formula on the facts—on certain of the facts—which we may select, and reject the others as not facts, because they are outside the formula.

5. The reason, spirit, or formula is at the same time the skeleton or nervous system of the facts—of all the facts—the facts of reality. Yet there are facts which do not fit into it, and the facts in their actual occurrence do not follow the order of development of the formula. We cannot from one term of the formula predict the logical or necessary moment.

This method is obviously, as has been well remarked,¹ neither properly *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but a bad mixture of both. It is not

¹ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, p. 538 (first edition).

wholly *a priori* or deductive, for the facts are first looked to, or supposed to be looked to, and the formula which unites them is apparently suggested by them. It is not truly inductive, for the facts are not consulted purely, but for the purpose of obtaining the formula, and so constituting a system. There is no independent application of either method, and therefore no verification. The method is thus in bad repute with physicists, psychologists, and accurate historians. It is not the method of research.

How do I know the facts of history? The existence of nations, of men, their deeds, their chronological succession? Do I excogitate these by pure thought? Can I find them as necessary emanations of the virtual concrete, the idea? I don't suppose that this is alleged, though I don't see why it should not be, on the system. It is proposed at any rate to show *how* they succeed each other, and *must* succeed each other, in virtue of the *moments* of the logical notion. Still they are given somehow in experience, and empirically or in time, just as the parts of the plant are given in necessary succession, though we do not know it, until philosophy gets hold of

its inner developing principle. Historical facts, then—the history of civil deeds and of systems of philosophy—are given in experience. They are to be found in books, and in institutions, past and present, non-existing and existing, by testimony and by present experience. Well, then, I must have an organon or instrument of fact? What is that? Not the pure thought, not the evolution of the idea. We can only find necessary relations when we have got objects to be related—at least we must have the first term of the relation. What is this but the testimony of mankind, the common experience, the common consciousness or historical experience? Speculative philosophy has to vindicate its pretensions to acceptance by explaining all historical development in accordance with the law of the evolution of all thought human and divine. If we take away human testimony—common experience and common-sense—where are the facts to be explained, or put in order by the law? The only alternative is the absurdity, which is explicitly stated, that the evolution is identical with the facts, or creates them. But then if it is thus identical, what becomes of the evidence of

the law said to be found in the fact of harmony between the development of history, and philosophical systems with the so-called law of pure thought, or concentered Idea ?

As to progress under this system—progress in knowledge and science—I believe the supposition of it proceeds on a wholly false analogy. Humanity, intellectually or morally, has no real analogy with the organic development of plant or tree, even supposing that these accomplish their end or completion in the way of the dialectical method, and through the fulness of life pass to death, again to emerge to a new circular movement out of the germ or seed. I hold that, as a matter of fact, history, whether civil, intellectual, or moral, is in no way really analogous to this. Humanity is not a continuous life; it is at the best a transitory aggregate constituted by individualities or units of a common type. These come and go, and they exemplify more or less the characteristics of the type, and they may leave some memories behind them, or their life and doings may be transmitted in the consciences of succeeding generations. The common heritage of the race may thus be increased and enriched.

But it is not humanity itself, ever renewed, which starts from or is born of the common heritage; it is but the individual or unit, and he must work out even the best type of it for himself literally from the beginning. His experience need not die; it may go as an addition to the heritage of memory. Yet his successor must personally serve himself heir to this, to what is before him. But a progress in human knowledge, morality, and feeling, carried on in this way, is not an organic development. The successive portions are not necessarily connected; they are not necessarily evolved in any department of science, in any special national history, in the history either of actions or of thoughts. Neither the progress made by the individual, nor the progress made by the race, can be described, explained—not to say predicted—in virtue of any *a priori* formula, be it an abstract recipe, or named “the actual living pulse of actual living thought.”

THE THEISM OF WORDSWORTH

THE THEISM OF WORDSWORTH.

IF I were to seek to express the main characteristic of the poetic mood of Wordsworth at its highest reach, I should say that his mind was open equally to the world of sense—the finite, and to the sphere of the infinite which borders and surrounds this world of ours. Most reflective minds realise both worlds—that the finite is set somehow in the midst, and as but a part, of infinitude itself. Our own limitation suggests this. From the sense-world we go out to the boundless in space, in time, and in power. Our shortcoming in presence of the moral ideal links us by a personal bond to the conception of absolute duty and unswerving will. Each finite life truly lived passes under the shadow of infinity.

But to Wordsworth both spheres were equally real, or rather the infinite was the more real of the two. In the full consciousness of infinitude and the limitless, Wordsworth recalls Lucretius; but there was this difference—with the ancient poet infinitude was unpeopled, “a melancholy space and doleful time,” transcending and dwarfing human life and its powers, holding for it neither love nor sympathy, vacuous and inexorable: while with the modern poet it was the abode of living powers, even ultimately of one supreme Power of life, closely related to and influencing the soul and heart of man. Now this sense of the boundless, the transcendent in limit, is one of the most powerful conceptions in Wordsworth’s life and poetry. And it is at the root of his theistic view of the world. It is by no means the whole of this view, but without it as a direct conception his theism—any theism in fact—is impossible. This is the frame, as it were, in which God is to be set; and without this opening into the transcendent, the finite world—the world of our experience—must remain to us as the whole of reality. But what does he say?—

“In such strength
 Of usurpation, when the light of sense
 Goes out, *but with a flash that has revealed*
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode,
 There harbours ; whether we be young or old,
 Our destiny, our being's heart and home,
Is with infinitude, and only there ;
 With hope it is, hope that can never die,
 Effort, and expectation, and desire,
And something evermore to be.”

Speaking again of the view from the ascent of
 Snowdon, he says:—

“There I beheld the emblem of a mind
That feeds upon infinity, that broods
 Over the dark abyss, intent to hear
 Its voices issuing forth to silent light
 In one continuous stream ; *a mind sustained*
By recognitions of transcendent power,
In sense conducting to ideal form,
In soul of more than mortal privilege.”

There are several other passages which indicate
 the same elevating consciousness, and the ennob-
 ling practical, moral influence of it on his life
 and poetry. It is especially in those lines:—
 Hence

“an obscure sense
 Of possible sublimity, whereto
 With growing faculties she doth aspire,

With faculties still growing, feeling still
That whatsoever point they gain, they yet
Have something to pursue."

This feeling was manifest in him even from earliest childhood, "the disappearing line" of the public highway

"that crossed
The naked summit of a far-off hill,
Beyond the limits that my feet had trod
Was like an invitation into space,
Boundless, or guide into eternity."

There is in a view of this sort the opening up of the deepest contrasts in human life, thought, and imagination. We find this brief life of ours standing out as but a small speck, now bright, now darkened, against the whole of the past and the future in time; our individual experience and knowledge set against the boundless possibilities which time and space may unfold; our selfhood, our personality—mysterious, deep, and significant as it is—in contrast somehow not only with the impersonal in things, but with the great, perhaps ungraspable, conception of selfhood in the universe. This rising above limit in our experience is the first breaking, so to speak, with the finite world—the world of the senses—the sphere of

purely earthly regards and earthly interests, and, in the very realisation of our own limit, there is revealed to us that far wider and higher sphere of being which holds for us awe, reverence, and rebuke, incentives to action here that can never allow us to rest in the mere contentment of earthly enjoyment or bounded prospect. Once this sphere dawns upon us, but not until it dawns, are we on the way, however devious and perplexing, by turns in brightness and in shadow, that leads to the Presence which men call God. The root-difference between the mind of the purely earthly man and the God-visioned man, not the whole difference, but the deepest, is just this point of the sufficiency or insufficiency of finite experience—or a bounded life in time. On this point Wordsworth and Pascal are at one. "Man," says the latter, "was born only for infinity."

This, then, is the first stage in the progress of the Poet's mind to his peculiar theism. But there is a second even more important stage. There is a sense, a consciousness of a power or powers in the infinite sphere which surrounds us, and of their presence, in some of our moods of

mind, to the senses — certainly to the soul and heart—especially when the conscience is quickened or alert. There are of course ordinary passages innumerable in which a sense of powers higher than the world yet in it is indicated. For example—

“Ye Presences of Nature in the sky
And on the earth ! Ye Visions of the hills!
And Souls of lonely places.”

“Moon and stars
Were shining o’er my head. I was alone,
And seemed to be a trouble to the peace
That dwelt among them.”

But in this connection there are two passages especially which recur to the student of Wordsworth.

The first is the memorable passage in the *Prelude*, in which the Poet tells us of that night, when rowing alone on Esthwaite Lake, suddenly

“A huge peak, black and huge,
As if with voluntary power instinct
Upreared its head. I struck and struck again,
And growing still in stature the grim shape
Towered up between me and the stars, and still,
For so it seemed, *with purpose of its own*
And measured motion like a living thing,
Strode after me. . . .

After I had seen
 That spectacle, for many days, my brain
 Worked with a *dim and undetermined sense*
Of unknown modes of being ; o'er my thoughts
 There hung a darkness, call it solitude
 Or blank desertion. No familiar shapes
 Remained, no pleasant images of trees,
 Of sea or sky, no colours of green fields ;
 But huge and mighty forms, *that do not live*
Like living men, moved slowly through the mind
 By day, and were a trouble to my dreams."

The other passage is when in the night he had thoughtlessly taken, as he tells he, "the captive of another's toil."

"When the deed was done
 I heard among the solitary hills
Low breathings coming after me, and sounds
Of undistinguishable motion, steps
Almost as silent as the turf they trod."

Let us note here the mingling of reality and indefinitude, a reality all the more and more impressive because it is unaffected by human limits. There was "purpose," "motion," "life," yet "unknown mode of being ;" "a living thing, that did not live like living men," yet "mighty," boundless, uncircumscribable in its power, before which the individual—solitary, alone—confronting it, is as naught. It is real all the while, yet

it is a reality with which thought cannot cope, and which will cannot withstand.

In such circumstances an ordinary mind, it impressed at all, would have been simply overcome with fear. Wordsworth's emotion was that of awe—the awe of a new revelation of the unseen—that cast its shadow over all his imagination, and solemnised and purified the inner heart of his moral life. Indeed, in both the instances referred to, the unseen power was bodied forth as an impersonation of a suddenly quickened and highly sensitive conscience. A link was formed between the moral world of the finite spirit and the unseen, as if the soul were in the presence of a higher, purer consciousness than its own, unknown until suddenly revealed.

In its essence this feeling was not new to Wordsworth; it was not new to him even in some of the aspects which he felt and delineated. "Unknown modes of being"—mighty, limitless by us, surrounding, overshadowing this sense-world of ours; a consciousness of this kind had been a marked and powerful influence in the popular feeling and current ballad literature in the district from the Derwent to the Tweed. Its

hills, glens, wide-spreading solitary moorlands had nourished it, for nowhere does a man feel his own littleness more, nowhere does he feel the awing, purifying power of solitude and mystery greater than on the far-reaching, often mist-darkened, moorlands of "the north cuntré." We have it in the expressions of "the darke forest, awesome for to see;" "the dowie dens" and "the dowie houns;" "the brown" and "waesome bent," and even in "the lee"—*i.e.*, lonesome—light of the moon. This feeling very readily passed into a sense of supernatural power and presences surrounding the steps of the traveller, so that we have the common word "corie" expressing the emotion which comes from the felt nearness of the super-sensible and the unearthly, and we have all the long-cherished beliefs regarding that mysterious spirit-world and "middle erd"—that "other cuntré," intermediate between heaven and hell—chequered neither by mortal change or calamity, nor cheered by mortal hopes, removed from agony and shut out from bliss, which yet might at any moment flash in weird shape on the lonely traveller on the moor. The shadow of this lay on the life of the earliest Border minstrel,

Thomas the Rhymer, waiting his call through the years, and then calmly, resignedly passing, at the beck of the gentle white hart, to the mysterious land, by a way so awesome and weird :—

“O they rade on, and further on,
And they waded through rivers abune the knee,
And they saw neither sun nor moon,
But they heard the roaring o’ the sea.”

In the fairy ballad of the young Tamlane there are circumstances and feelings delineated as experienced by the heroine not essentially different from the imaginative mood of Wordsworth, as depicted in the passages quoted :—

“Gloomy, gloomy was the night,
And eerie was the way ;
And fair Janet, in her green mantle,
To Miles Cross she did gae.

The heavens were black, the night was dark,
And dreary was the place ;
But Janet stood with eager wish
Her lover to embrace.

Betwixt the hours of twelve and one,
A north wind tore the bent ;
And straight she heard strange clritch sounds
Upon the wind that went.”

Do we not realise here a certain parallel to

“The conflict and the sounds that live in darkness,”

or the

“Notes that are

The ghostly language of the ancient earth,

Or make their dim abode in distant winds?”

Obviously this emotional sense of the unseen in the soul of Wordsworth had its source deep down in a certain heredity of feeling, due to the past, and nourished by circumstances of scenery and of race. In him it was sublined. What had been but a dim working through the ages on the fears of the older Cymric and Scandinavian people became in him, as he lived and grew with open and fervid heart, a revelation of moral and spiritual truth, and thus an inspiration for mankind. And this was at the root of his moral and theistic feeling.

Essentially connected with the consciousness of infinitude in Wordsworth is the tendency to seek to grasp the world as a whole, to rise to a point above details, to seek relation, connectedness, unity, in the phenomena of sense; to centre all phenomena, all appearances, in one—a Unity of Being. This with Wordsworth is not a mere

unity; there is somehow the consciousness of a Spirit—call it infinite or absolute—which permeates all the forms of existence, all the world of created things, working therein as a power, and therein manifesting its nature. To this high sense or faith the whole education of his life, as described especially in the *Prelude*, unconsciously led him—unconsciously, I mean, as to its steps and process. In this conviction he found rest, consolation, practical power. It was not with him a process of conscious seeking; it was rather a process of conscious finding through the abandonment of himself to the gradual revelation of a Personality higher than his own, that hovered over him from his infancy, and spoke to him in many ways ere he knew the Speaker, and finally realised the Presence that filled the temple of earth and heaven.

The questions here arise—(1) What precisely was the nature of this unity, the sense or consciousness of which so powerfully influenced the thought and imagination of Wordsworth? (2) How generally did it arise in his mind, and with what guarantee or warrant?

Now, on the first of these points we must

keep in mind that there are three, and but three, views of this world of our experience, and its relation to what may transcend it. We may hold, first, the simple independence of each fact in the world—that all is originally unconnected, single, isolated; any connection which now subsists has arisen through accident—call it chance, custom, association. In the words of David Hume, “Things are conjoined but are not connected.” Laws would mean on such a system merely the common modes in which things have, without guiding principle, come to be uniformly associated. This is Atheism in the proper sense of the term. It is the absence or denial of the Θεός, Ultimate Principle, or God. This view is, I need not say, alien to the whole spirit of Wordsworth, who constantly proclaims the interconnectedness of the outward world—the action and reaction between Man and Nature—and the unity of the scheme of which these are parts. In its moral and spiritual consequences this theory is not less opposed to the teaching of Wordsworth; for, in making each thing independent, it makes it self-sufficient, and it entirely ignores the question of origin, as it precludes

any question of destiny. But what says the Poet?—

“I was only then
Contented, when with bliss ineffable
I felt the sentiment of Being spread
O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still ;
O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
And human knowledge, to the human eye
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart ;
O'er all that leaps and runs, and shouts and sings,
Or beats the gladsome air ; o'er all that glides
Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself,
And mighty depth of waters. Wonder not
If high the transport, great the joy I felt,
Communing in this sort through earth and heaven
With every form of creature, as it looked
Towards the Uncreated with a countenance
Of adoration, with an eye of love.
One song they sang, and it was audible,
Most audible, then, when the fleshly ear,
O'ercome by humblest prelude of that strain,
Forgot her functions, and slept undisturbed.”

Every reader of the *Prelude* knows how powerful was the influence of Coleridge on the mind and heart of Wordsworth at the period of his life when that poem was written (1799 to 1805). But there is no point on which Coleridge and his sympathetic rather than intelligent acquaintance with the rising Absolutism of the Germany of

the time impressed Wordsworth more than in the matter of the transcendental unity of being. He says, speaking of Coleridge and his superiority to the ordinary way of looking at things—

“To thee, unblinded by these formal acts,
The unity of all hath been revealed.”

And we have a characteristic passage of the so-called “speculative” order in lines like those:—

“Hard task, vain hope, to analyse the mind,
If each most obvious and particular thought,
Not in a mystical and idle sense,
But in the words of Reason deeply weighed,
Hath no beginning.”

The Poet's own good sense and strong concrete sympathy, fortunately for himself and his poetic work, speedily stayed this line of confusion between the relations in time and the beginningless beyond intelligibility.

In the second place we may admit—may be driven to admit—that there is more in things than accidental conjunction; that somehow one thing is through another thing; that there are essential connections; that there are ends, even purposes, reasons, in the order and arrangements

of things. This leads us to the conception of a Power—a Power of some sort—transcending experience, yet, it may be, working in it. This is entirely opposed to the atheistic or atomistic view of the world. There is a Power above things, more than things—a Power which subsists while these pass; and through the working, unconscious or conscious, of this Power things are as they are. But here there are two subordinate views, for we may regard this one transcendent Power as unconscious or conscious. It is, on either supposition, a substantial or abiding Power, underlying all, working through all that is, has been, or will be. But if not conscious of itself and its workings, it is an impersonal force; and it matters little whether it be regarded as known or unknowable by us. On this I may remark in passing there has been a great deal of useless controversy; but it is obvious that no force which is allowed to manifest itself can be unknowable—even unknown; for in its manifestations it is, and these are known by us. It might be added even that that which does not manifest itself in some form is not, is never, actually. On the other hand,

if the transcendent Power be conscious—conscious of itself, conscious of its workings—it is a personal power, with intellect and will—shall I say emotion? For I am not now speaking anthropologically, I am speaking analogically, and, as I hope to show, strictly in conformity on this point with the view of Wordsworth. I am simply using words which, however inadequate, are the best we have to indicate the character of the transcendent reality. This is the proper Theistic view.

Now the position of Wordsworth lies, as it were, within the scope of the last-mentioned view. He holds by a Unity, a transcendent yet manifested Unity, a Unity amid a multiplicity, yet not a blind or unconscious power; a Spirit, Soul, Personality, yet not as the human—not a magnified man. This is the ground, the reason, the living, quickening principle of things—of Nature and Man alike. Of Him we may rise to consciousness, and He may become to us a source of inspiration, imaginative, moral, and spiritual, giving us

“Truths that wake to perish never.”

The other view, the Pantheistic, Wordsworth

would have repudiated—not perhaps on what may be called speculative grounds, but simply from the feeling that it is utterly unsuited to our experience—in fact, contradictory of it. The speculative difficulties of it he might not have appreciated or even apprehended. That a formless, indeterminate force should be, and should pass, one knows not why or how, into the formed, definite, unending variety of the beautiful world; that the conscious should rise out of the unconscious; that the individual self-conscious, the personality of man, should spring from the abyss of formless, undirected energy—all this Wordsworth would probably not have thought of. But brought face to face with facts, he would certainly have recognised the essential incongruity of the alleged worthlessness of the individual in the world; the indifference of his existence before the supreme Power; his coming and going without care or love or concern on the part of the Absolute; the worthlessness, even absurdity, of individual effort after moral and spiritual progress, in face of the certainty of final absorption in the formless abyss out of which each one has come we know not how, and to which each one

can but return and be no more—the evil as the good, the good as the evil. All this he would feel and recognise, for the one central conception of his moral theory was the worth of the individual—of man as man; the deep sense of personal responsibility for character and effort; above all, the conscious relation of the human to the divine. Higher minds

“Are Powers; and hence the highest bliss
That flesh can know is theirs; the consciousness
Of Whom they are, habitually infused
Through every image and through every thought,
And all affections by communion raised
From earth to heaven, from human to divine.”

On the scheme of Pantheism, man—the finite, conscious spirit—is both an accident and an anomaly. There is no reason for the being of a conscious personality on the hypothesis of an Absolute which is in itself unconscious; and effort to develop this personality in the line of the higher, intellectual, moral, spiritual life is merely to violate the law of its being, eventually to court disaster and pain in the process of final absorption within the unconscious. Individuality and freedom are the haunting shadows

and the mockery of such a life. Wordsworth's view, on the other hand, is that man, taken at his highest and best, is the nearest type to God, and that every step we take in nobler effort is a stage of assimilation with the Divine.

What I have said of the nature of the Theism of Wordsworth may be proved and illustrated by reference to passages with which all are familiar. I merely indicate briefly the points in those passages which bear on the matter in hand. One of the strongest and most pertinent is in the first book of the *Prelude*, and therefore written as early as 1799: it begins with the lines—

“Wisdom and Spirit of the universe !
Thou Soul that art the Eternity of thought,
And givest to forms and images a breath
And everlasting motion, not in vain
By day or starlight thus from my first dawn
Of childhood didst thou intertwine for me
The passions that build up our human soul ;
Not with the mean and vulgar works of man,
But with high objects, with enduring things—
With life and nature—purifying thus
The elements of feeling and of thought,
And sanctifying, by such discipline,
Both pain and fear, until we recognise
A grandeur in the beatings of the heart.”

There is here the consciousness of a transcendent Spirit, a spiritual Power above and beyond the order of experience. It is Soul, living Soul or Spirit, analogous thus to us, to our spirit, yet in contrast to ours and all its workings, for it is "the Eternity of Thought,"—not the mere everlastingness of successive thoughts in time, not the mere order of perceptions or thoughts ever going on, not a mere perpetual series of relations—but "the Eternity of Thought," the ground, the substratum, the very permanent in all thinking. It is in contrast to our finitude, to our successive thinkings, gropings, in time, until we get what we call "the truth"; it is "the Eternity," the Soul or Consciousness above time and succession and finite effort or struggle, in whom all this is grasped and held, as it were, in one indivisible act. It is, in the language of Aristotle, the *Θεός*—the one Eternal Energy. And as Plato put intelligence first, and as grounding all things, so the poet in his own method sets Man and Nature as grounded and inspired by the Eternal Soul.

But though transcendent in itself, in a sense above experience, it is not a *caput mortuum*, or

'empty abstraction. It is not even a power dwelling apart, set high up in the heavens, no one knows where or truly what. It lays its touch upon earth, on what we call the outward or material world, and on what we name the soul of man.

“Thou givest to forms and images a breath
And everlasting motion ;”

and through these—in a word, through the outward and symbolical world—this Soul that is the “Eternity of Thought,” that gives breath to the passing scene around us—

“Intertwines for us
The passions that build up our human soul.”

And thus we share in its workings, are drawn into communion with the Transcendent Spirit, and “pain and fear are sanctified for us,” and we no longer are mere passing, individual organisms, but a link in the life, the solemn life, within the fold of the Eternal Thought; and so we rise in the scale of being, and “recognise a grandeur in the beatings of the heart.”

In the classical lines, *Tintern Abbey*, written about the same time (1798), we have the sense of

the nearness, the immediacy, so to speak, of the mysterious Spirit of all emphasised—

“I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :
A Motion and a Spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.”

I do not see that the poet has given us any theory of the mode of this touch of the Eternal Spirit, the *how* of the connection between the infinite and the finite. In this he was right, eminently sound and healthful in feeling. Obviously indeed no such theory can be given on a doctrine which makes the touch that of a Power which is essentially superhuman, and not to be formulated in the language of the modes of human consciousness. There is “the burthen of the mystery of this unintelligible world ;” unintelligible to the mere understanding of man. To any such attempt there is but one or other of two results—the transcendent ceases to be God ;

or man, the finite, usurps the place of the Infinite, and becomes the only ultimate reality. There is either the degradation of God or the deification of man; and this is but another expression for the degradation of God. I know no theory of the relation of Infinite to finite which is not merely a wandering in cloudland. True philosophy is not that all things—*yes* and *no*—are true; sound ethics is not that all things—*good* and *evil*—are good; and true theology is not that God is all things—*Man* and *Nature*—or that all things make God. Yet no theory of the necessary emanation of the finite from the Infinite can escape these consequences; and unless it be necessary, it is not a reasoned or demonstrated theory; it is simply a matter of faith, of analogy and probability.

I shall not take up your time with any detailed reference to the *Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*; but it is impossible wholly to pass it by in this connection. In it we have the poet's fullest, most explicit statement of the intuition of God, and, so far, of man's relation to Him; the assertion of the pre-existence of the soul; the hope of immortality; the prefigurement of an unearthly life:—

“ The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar :
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.”

There is “ the soul that rises with us, our life’s star,” as if the body and the bodily life were simple accidents, conditions which allow the God-descended, God-given soul to accommodate itself to the brief passing through this time-limited world. It hath set before, to rise again with us, the individual. It is ours, and we are in it ; but it holds more of heaven than of earth, more of God than of us. It is but as a wanderer from its home, orphaned until it again return to God, to dwell with Him in His presence, in that sphere of light, and knowledge, and love, from which it had so mysteriously emerged, almost fallen. Our relation to earth is represented very much as that of a guest, a wayfarer, to whom earth is kind:—

“ The homely Nurse doth all she can
To make her Foster-child, her Inmate Man,
Forget the glories he hath known,
And that imperial palace whence he came.”

The impress of our origin and destiny is on us in the childhood-time. The soul is not originally a mere *tabula rasa*, or blank sheet of paper, on which Nature has to write its impressions. It is not a mere receptacle for the tracings of the senses, so that the greatest reach of our knowledge afterwards is only the combining and generalising of these; and the very possibility of the notions of God, and personality, and immortality, and all purely moral and spiritual conceptions, is absolutely excluded even from our consciousness. From our very birth we have a certain community with God, and this is shown most in the simplicity of heart which is self-contained and self-contented, almost self-joyous, while

“Heaven lies about us in our infancy,”

and “the earth” and “every common sight” is

“Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.”

But there is more than this: there is the feeling and the glimpse of a type or ideal over all our life, towards which, from this early revelation, we are almost constrained to aspire. Gradually

the world comes in, and this ideal fades, but is never absolutely lost; it never wholly dies, and we have as the very saving of our life all through this worldliness—

“Those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings;
Blank misgivings of a Creature
Moving about in worlds not realised.”

It is thus

“Those first affections,
Those shadowy recollections,
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing;
Uphold us, cherish, and have power to make
Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal Silence.”

Their issue, their final teaching, is—

“The faith that looks through Death.”

Of the intensity of the Nature-feeling in childhood alleged by Wordsworth, it may fairly enough be said that it does not hold universally. But I set little store on this as discrediting or derogating from the importance of the feeling where it does exist. The physical organisation, with its peculiarities in individuals, has much to do

both with the furtherance and the repression of natural intuition and feeling. Man is by no means a mere mind, and even the natural outflowings of mind are greatly modified and determined by bodily conditions. That a special feeling or form of intuition does not appear at a particular stage is no proof either that it is unnatural or that it has not a latent reality.

But this may be said, that the intensity of the Nature-feeling alleged by Wordsworth is not sufficient to found a proof, if we may use that expression, of its relation to former perceptions or intuitions in a previous state of existence. This reference, indeed, may be taken as a poetic way of putting the truth of the first fresh intuition of the outward world as fulfilling in various ways certain primary intellectual and emotional needs of our own nature—eliciting the free, fresh outflow of the faculties, soothing the heart, touching the imagination, giving us the impression that we have not been ushered into a strange land, uncouth and bewildering, but into a sphere where has been at work, and is still working, the same Hand which is felt in this inner, conscious

life of ours. The poet himself has touched this very point when he speaks of—

“That calm delight

Which, if I err not, surely must belong

To those first-born affinities that fit

Our new existence to existing things,

And in our dawn of being constitute

The bond of union between life and joy.”

And infancy or youth is here a relative term. We may not have the feeling in childhood—it may come at a later period of life; but when it comes it brings with it youth—a new-born spirit, which will survive all through life as a glory which never fades, and a heart which never grows old. And every time we feel the presence of the Transcendent Power in things, there is a freshening of all the springs of life. I do not think I use exaggerated or inappropriate language when I say that to such a heart the journeying through this often arid and conventional world is as if by the banks of a river, the streams of which do glad the city of our God.

To a man of the type of Condillac or David Hume; to any one whose whole view and feeling of the universe is merely that it is a series of sense-impressions, sensations, perceptions—asso-

ciated, generalised, transformed,—the gospel of the *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality* must appear simply meaningless drivel—in a word, “foolishness.” Yet to Wordsworth the reminiscence and the intuition of the Divine Reality and the Transcendent Ideal are as real as any sense-impression, and a great deal more influential on the regulation of life, moral and spiritual, than either a series of impressions, or any prudential code of ethics generated out of them—any rules for the avoidance of pain and the securing of pleasure. Such a conception, such an ideal as that which overshadowed, solemnised, purified, and elevated the soul of Wordsworth in this immortal Ode, and in those other kindred utterances which might be quoted, withered to the core self-seeking and prudential calculation, and strengthened and beautified this earthly life with a wholly unique sense of the littleness and yet the grandeur of self, as a travelling not from grave to grave, but from God to God.

This Theistic view of Wordsworth is not, as I have remarked, anthropomorphic in the ordinary sense of this word. While the essence of it is the recognition of a Spirit in the world, and in

mān, and above both, it is a long way removed from the kind of conceptions that ruled Greek and Roman mythology. The Spirit he feels has no taint of earthly passion, nor is it to be measured by human intelligence. It is not fashioned merely in this image. It is something above and beyond, yet in Nature and man. In the sonnet to the

“Brook, whose society the Poet seeks,”

we have one of the finest and subtlest expressions of this relationship:—

“It seems the Eternal Soul is clothed in thee
With purer robes than those of flesh and blood,
And hath bestowed on thee a better good ;
Unwearied joy, and life without its cares.”

No word is more ambiguously employed than the term anthropomorphic. It is thought a sufficient objection to Theism to say that it makes God anthropomorphic. Anthropomorphic may be taken as meaning fashioned exactly as man is—conceived as to personality, intelligence, and will,—or as we find man to be, but somehow indefinitely or infinitely greater than man. If Deity be regarded as infinitely greater than a conscious personality, as above limit in intelligence,

above law of thought and conceived law of being, then undoubtedly we have a contradiction; for we cannot conceive either consciousness or personality wholly without limit, definiteness, or determination. And a God merely man, but indefinitely greater than man, is no true Deity. But anthropomorphic in the sense that Deity, as an object of thought, must be regarded in and through the highest conceptions of our experience—that is, self-consciousness, personality, intelligence, free-will, generally conscious activity—this every theory of Theism must assume. If Deity is to be held an object of knowledge at all, as anything more than a mere indefinite, limitless substratum of substance—a mere *caput mortuum*, or at best indefinable force—the conception must have in it those features, must reflect them in their highest reach and purity. We at least must think of Him through these, if we are to think of Him at all. Anthropomorphic, therefore, in this sense, Deity is, and is conceived by us to be. This is the true meaning of the scholastic phrase *ex eminentiâ* as opposed to *actualiter*. In a word, Deity, if cognisable, is cognisable only through relation or analogy to what is highest, best, most

perfectly formed in our experience. This will be found to be mind—conscious being—in its ultimate ground of free power or self-activity. He is

“ A Power
That is the visible quality and shape
And image of Right Reason ”

He is this, for the simple reason that He, the highest Power of all, cannot be less than we are or can conceive at our best. Wordsworth's view of the Eternal Soul, while it is opposed to a literal anthropomorphism, is not, as seems to me, opposed to the view that this Soul flows into and fills all our highest conceptions; but it is a fountain whose overflow no human vessel can contain.

There thus appears to be no incompatibility between the Theism of Wordsworth as expressed in his general poems and the views to which he gives utterance in the *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*. These, while breathing a pure, solemn, elevating spirit, have never appeared to me to be pervaded with the native inspiration and characteristic suggestion of the poet's genius and imaginative growth. They reflect his historical and traditional feeling. But the Church forms and service, even the doctrines of the Personality of God, His manifesta-

tion in Christ, the sense of sin and the quickening of the Holy Spirit, are readily folded in the embrace of the poet's Theism. This takes in all that is highest in these; keeps it while it transcends it. These are for us the best and highest definite expressions of what is necessarily transcendent, not adequate even to this transcendency; but they contain the profoundest symbolism for us, and so thoroughly the essence of the true that, while in the ages to come, in this life or in another, this aspect of the highest reality may be sublimed, it will never be contradicted by aught to be evolved.

After all this it may be said that this view of Wordsworth may be only a peculiarity of his experience as an individual; it may be something which he has felt and known, but which no one else is likely to feel or know. It may, in a word, be valid for the individual, but not for mankind. This touches the question of the warrant or guarantee for the view of the poet. Now on this generally I should like to say that we ought to keep in mind one prerequisite, one condition of all knowledge, and that is the possession of a certain degree of faculty, and

the placing of ourselves in circumstances in which this faculty may have play or exercise. It is so in the sphere of the senses. The eye must be there to recognise form and colour. For the colour-blind, ordinary diversity in colour does not exist. The ear must be there to hear sound, and it must be attuned to harmony, ere harmony exists for it. The man who lives absorbed in the material world knows nothing of the world of mind or consciousness, its modes, forms, varieties, which nevertheless is his very self. A man may live all his days and never know what he is; never know the spiritual world within him; never rise beyond organic impulses. Yet there is a possibility of colour, and sound, and experience of the spiritual world, whether the individual have the faculty for the two former or not, whether he turn in upon himself or not. It is possible even that circumstances, heredity, the power of the organic life in us, may, partly through the power of the past, and partly through the circumstances of the individual, shut him out from a whole world of reality, and that of the highest, purest, noblest kind—nay, from the knowledge of his true or highest self.

And just as the prophet, the seer of old, was needed to recall men to the reality of things—the insight of moral and spiritual truths—so the seer-poet in these times may be needed to open the eyes of mankind through his individual vision to what is a universal reality, even the common though foregone heritage of the race. This is what Wordsworth believed he did, and I for one venture to think *that he was right in so believing*. What does he say of his vision and himself? In his solitary walks at Cambridge he felt

“ Incumbencies more awful, visitings
Of the Upholder of the tranquil soul,
That tolerates the indignities of Time,
And, from the centre of Eternity
All finite motions overruling, lives
In glory immutable. . . .
I had a world about me—’twas my own ;
I made it, for it only lived to me,
And to the God who sees into the heart. . . .
Some called it madness—so indeed it was,
If childlike fruitfulness in passing joy,
If steady moods of thoughtfulness matured
To inspiration, sort with such a name ;
If prophecy be madness ; if things viewed
By poets in old time, and higher up
By the first men, earth’s first inhabitants,
May in these tutored days no more be seen
With undisturbed sight.”

Again, poet, like prophet, has "a sense that fits him" to perceive "objects unseen before."

"Prophets of Nature, we to them will speak
A lasting inspiration, sanctified
By reason, blest by faith : what we have loved
Others will love, and we will teach them how."

Wordsworth was what is known as individual or individualistic in the highest degree. There is not one personality as a writer in this century more singularly unique than his. But his individuality was not an idiosyncrasy; it was not abnormal, or merely subjective. Rather it was normal, and of the highest type. We speak of two selves in man, and we do so rightly. There is the lower self, finding its gratification in worldly interest, commonplace objects, and, it may be, low passion; the everyday self, dwelling in its little world, its microcosm, which it mostly values for itself, and which finally encloses it as a bounded prisoner. There is, however, a higher self—unworldly, spiritual, reverential,—living under the shadow of the Unseen; keenly alive to all suggestions from the transcendent and supersensible world; seeing faces looking, as it were, through the veil of sense; living more in this conscious-

ness than in the ordinary worldly routine; prizing it, in fact, as the true life. In most people this higher self is but a wavering ideal that comes and goes, with only a temporary influence. The characteristic of Wordsworth was that this was the highest, strongest, most constant power in his life. In this lay his individuality, but as such it was a typical individuality, normal in the highest degree; representative, not certainly of what is common among the individuals of the race, but representative of what is certainly the true type of human life, of what that life ought to seek and to be. And if such a man habitually, or even in his frequently recurring best moments, felt and knew a Transcendent Power in the world around him, in his own soul, as a divine but very real atmosphere of the higher life, we may well suppose that this is a catholic element, not a peculiarity of the individual, but open to every man who has singleness of vision and purity of heart. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

Wordsworth had a strong feeling regarding intuitions or primary truths as a revelation and a strength to man. To these book-lore was in his

view wholly secondary. This opinion was held by him perhaps even to exaggeration. But it is in this line that we are to seek what for him at least was the ultimate warrant of the faith in the one abiding Transcendent Power manifested in all things. And it is something to have the testimony of a pure unworldly spirit to the consciousness, at least, of such a reality, amid the blindness, heedlessness, limited and noisy worldly self-content of our own time.

The Transcendent Power which held Wordsworth through life was not discovered by him, or got through a process of dialectical exercise; it was revealed to him as a Being external to himself, which laid its hand upon him absolutely, overpoweringly. The light which shone and the voice which called from heaven on Saul of Tarsus were not more distinctly influences which unconditionally seized and swayed the apostle, than was the Power in the outward world which surrounded, revealed itself, and made the poet-seer its own, its daily vassal and its impassioned voice—

“Speaking no dream but things oracular.”

On that memorable morning after the night's

dance and rural festivity, when the dawn rose before him in "memorable pomp," he tells us—

"My heart was full ; I made no vows, but vows
Were then made for me ; bond unknown to me
Was given, that I should be, else sinning greatly,
A dedicated Spirit."

Wordsworth, to sum up what I have said, seems to me to stand in two great relations to thought—past and present, to medieval mysticism and to modern science.

In the first place, what he felt and taught was not a mere mystical intuition of a God or Being apart from the world, leading to absorption in His contemplation, love, and worship, but the consciousness of the Divine as present in the world of sense, speaking through it to the soul, and thus directly regulating the life in the present—raising the actual world to the divine,—not depreciating it, or leading to its being regarded as worthless, as something to be despised and crucified. His point of view is indeed the highest reach of the reaction of the modern spirit against that unhealthy phase of medievalism, not yet extinct among us, which regarded the earth and earthly things of whatever sort as vile, to be eradicated

and stamped out of human life. Wordsworth fused for us the spirit of worship and the spirit of imagination—religion and poetry. He saved us from substituting

“A universe of death
For that which moves with light and life informed,
Actual, divine, and true.”

In the second place, we may be disposed to ask in these times, Is science the only interpretation of Nature? does it tell us all we can know about her? Science is no doubt an interpretation in this way, that the intellect comes to the aid of sense, and discovers the relations among things, and the ideas which things exemplify. But we must keep in mind that these ideas, these relations, are not themselves sensible things, although without them these things are to us meaningless. Is it a great stretch to ask one to go a little further in the line of unpicturable relations, to rise a little higher above impressions to ideas, and to inquire whether the gathered uniformities of science are not themselves to be run back to a system ruled by an intellectual conception and dependent on transcendental power? This would be to go above or beyond science, but the pro-

cedure is not unscientific; it is the simple carrying out of what science itself postulates for its own existence, the application of those unpicturable, even unverifiable, notions of time and space, and cause and end, without which science cannot move a step; for whatever is universal in truth is unverifiable in our actual experience. What Wordsworth found, what was revealed to him as an intuition—not an inference certainly,—was the simple correlative of the cosmos, of the ordered system, the one ordering power, the *Θεός*. His was the science of science, the knowledge of knowledge. In this relation one word more. Science, in its true essence, has always sought the universal. It has sought this by different methods and in different spheres, but always the universal; so Plato, so Aristotle. This, at least, was their common aim. With them it was the necessary, therefore the universal. Bacon sought the same thing by generalisation from particulars. There was still another form of interpretation left unapplied. This Wordsworth gave. He read the appearances of sense into moral or spiritual truths, thus finding in the individual shifting forms of the sense-world ideas fitted to

regulate and elevate the higher life of man, and so rising above not only sense but individual appearances to universal, unchangeable truths. He showed that these moral and spiritual lessons are in the outward things, are at least the product of the interaction of Nature and mind, are true and real meanings, are open and designed for us to learn, and that, as the prophet of old revealed new truth, so the seer-poet discloses even to ordinary vision this constant, this profound, this all-hallowing revelation. And thus Poetry came to complete Science, to show that in and through phenomena there is a community of knowledge between man and God, a community of consciousness in "the Eternity of Thought," a fellowship even of moral and spiritual feeling.

There are many ennobling practical lessons and rules of life which flow from the Theism and general religious system of Wordsworth. But among these, the highest, that which truly involves all the others, is the lightening of the "burthen of the mystery" of the

"Heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,"

—this world which for the understanding of man presents so many insoluble problems. It is the yielding

“That serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul;
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony and the deep power of joy
We see into the life of things.”

Wordsworth does not here point to that sublimity of character which is found in a dignified and reasoned acceptance of the inevitable, yielding even a complacency which enables a man to turn to the sunnier side of things and break into song. He leads rather to the composure which arises from a faith whose reflective and scrutinising eye pierces “the cloud of destiny,” and is nourished by what it feels is beyond and above it. There is all the difference between “putting by” and seeing beyond.

“Faith in life endless, the sustaining thought
Of human being, Eternity, and God.”

Meanwhile let this be our rule of life :-

“ Enough, if something from our hands have power
To live and act, and serve the future hour ;
And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
Through love, through hope, and faith's transcendent
dower,
We feel that we are greater than we know.”

THE END.

